

MASON

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY

D443.C6

C001 V

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE CAMBRID



3 4211 000020582

W

N

Strong
—

WITHDRAWN

TEN YEARS
OF WAR AND PEACE

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

BY

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE




CAMBRIDGE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1927

KLINCK MEMORIAL LIBRARY
Concordia Teachers College
River Forest, Illinois

COPYRIGHT, 1927
BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE



PRINTED AT THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U. S. A.

PREFACE

TO warm up cold victuals is apt to be unwise, and an author runs particular risks when he lets vanity persuade him to reprint at a later date articles which have dealt with questions of the day. None the less, the temptation is strong to gather together the results of one's efforts, however fragmentary, in the hope that they may show some grasp of general principles, some unity of thought and treatment, which will justify their reappearance in book form for the benefit of those who have not seen them in the review where they came out, or who, mayhap, have read and forgotten them. I have yielded to this temptation and can only plead that my topics are still for the most part matters of current interest and active discussion, and the problems they raise are far from being settled. The main body of this volume is made up of seven articles which in the course of the last four and a half years have appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, several of them anonymously. I have, however, chosen the title of my first signed contribution for that of the whole volume. I have also added from other sources three articles written earlier, one of which has never been

PREFACE

published, although it was read at a meeting of the American Historical Association. For permission to publish the other two I am indebted to the courtesy of the *American Historical Review* and the *Yale Review*. I have made no corrections, preferring to accept criticism for opinions or predictions which have since proved to be mistaken, rather than to try to retouch my work in order to hide some of its flaws. For these I crave the indulgence of the reader.

CONTENTS

RUSSIA AFTER GENOA AND THE HAGUE	3
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , September 15, 1922, signed "K"	
TWO YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY	40
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , March 15, 1923, signed "A"	
THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE	78
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , March 15, 1924, signed "C"	
TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE	106
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , September 15, 1924	
AFTER THE ELECTION	140
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , December 15, 1924, signed "E"	
DISSATISFIED GERMANY	159
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , October, 1925	
THE GROUPING OF NATIONS	179
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , January, 1927	
THE EUROPEAN RECONQUEST OF NORTH AFRICA	201
<i>American Historical Review</i> , July, 1912	
NATIONALITY AND THE NEW EUROPE	221
<i>Yale Review</i> , April, 1915	
THE BREAK UP OF THE HAPSBURG EMPIRE	241

TEN YEARS
OF WAR AND PEACE

RUSSIA AFTER GENOA AND THE HAGUE

NOW that the smoke of the verbal battles between the Russian and the non-Russian participants in the last two international conferences has lifted, we can begin to estimate what results have been attained by the many weeks of earnest, not to say acrimonious, discussion between the representatives of assembled Europe. Few will deny that these results have been meagre compared with the hopes entertained at the outset. Some will even declare that no progress whatever towards a reconstruction of the world has come from these meetings of "best minds." Others will take a rosier view, but it is too early yet to reach many definite conclusions about questions with such intricate and far-reaching ramifications. We can only distinguish certain immediate and obvious phenomena.

One of these is that there has been a clearing of the atmosphere. Europe may feel no nearer to seeing her way out of her difficulties, but she knows better where she stands and what are the circumstances with which she has to deal. This is particularly true in regard to Russia, the great mystery of the last four years. The Soviet republic has come out of its seclusion, it has shown itself willing, nay eager, to talk with other states. As yet it has been officially recognized by but few, but it has reassumed a position in the concert of

the powers, whether the others like it or not. Its present standing, its attitude and aims, should be clearly understood, for Russia is too large a part of the world to be ignored with impunity.

When in October last Chicherin sent out his first note proposing an international conference on Russian affairs and offering as a *quid pro quo* for assistance the recognition of Russian pre-war debts, not many people realized just what were the situation and reasoning of the Soviet Government. Their overture was generally regarded as the appeal of a hopeless bankrupt forced at last by desperate necessity to recognize the error of his ways and to beg for succor at the hands of those he had grievously injured. Even if we admit that there was justification for this opinion, it was at best only a half truth. It was equally true that the ruling Communists had never felt more firmly on their feet than they did at that very moment, and not without reason.

The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic was just completing the fourth year of its stormy existence, during which it had had innumerable difficulties to overcome and obstacles to surmount. Although by its own admission it could count on the active support of only a minority of the population and had had arrayed against it the vast majority of those who had formerly been the leaders in every form of public life, private enterprise or intellectual activity, although it had been undermined by the plots of reactionaries, social revolutionists, even anarchists,

it had survived. It had fought against Germans, English, French, Americans, Japanese, Poles, Czechoslovaks, against Cossacks and other discontented elements within, led by thousands of trained officers and armed and provisioned from without; it had seen most of its territory over-run at one time or another; and yet it had emerged triumphant. By the autumn of 1921 every assault, native or foreign, had failed. Only in the Far East under Japanese protection was there still military opposition, but even there it was diminishing. Peace had been concluded with Poland and with the Baltic states, for these were alien elements in the body politic which Communist Russia let go with little apparent regret and in full conformity with her theories. She had regained control in the Caucasus, she had concluded political treaties and was on friendly terms with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. It is true she still professed to fear attack in the east from Japan and in the west from Poland and Rumania supported by France, her newspapers and orators still harped on the evil designs of her capitalistic foes, but such talk was chiefly intended to stimulate the patriotism of the masses and particularly of the army. In reality, never before had Soviet Russia been so free from the menace either of foreign invasion or of serious insurrection.

This last fact was not due to any marked increase in popularity of the Communist régime. There was scant evidence of anything of the sort. But all open opposition had been beaten down. Every conspiracy

had been ruthlessly suppressed. The peasantry who formed the immense majority of the population no longer manifested active discontent. What they asked for was to be let alone, and the Soviet Government had learned the wisdom of respecting this wish. The remnants of the former upper and educated classes were now thoroughly cowed by the terror they had lived through. The hundreds of thousands of irreconcilable refugees abroad were innocuous and were getting more and more out of touch even with their like in their native land. The component parts of the loosely federated state acted together with sufficient unity of purpose and were under the same rigorous general control. Doubtless disorder still prevailed in outlying districts and little heed was paid in some regions to the writ of the central authorities, but these were but local manifestations which could be dealt with in time. Altogether, Soviet Moscow felt it had been victorious in both foreign and domestic affairs, and it was as far as possible from any such sentiment as contrition.

On the other hand, there were two painful truths which the blindest adherent of Bolshevism could not deny or explain away. First, in spite of Communist propaganda, no other country as yet followed more than temporarily the Russian example; second, in Russia itself the economic situation was utterly disastrous. In the early days the hopes of the Communists had been high. The Bolshevik triumph was to be but a step in the world-wide revolution which would soon

extend to all lands. For a space, especially in the year 1919, the outlook was promising. In Germany the Spartacus movement threatened the existence of the new republic. At Budapest the red terror was installed by Bela Kuhn, the disciple of Lenin. At Vienna the weak government seemed likely to collapse at any moment. If this happened, the example of Hungary and Austria could not but affect Rumania and Jugoslavia. Italy was reported to be full of seething discontent; and should Italy raise the red flag, France, with her traditions of the Paris Commune, the precursor of the Moscow one, must surely follow. Then the turn of England would come and sooner or later that of the United States. This was the doctrine which Communist writers and speakers — and no others were allowed — preached to thousands of eager believers throughout Soviet Russia.

But the prophecies did not come true. Every one of the supposedly tottering bourgeois governments succeeded in maintaining itself, growing stronger rather than weaker as time went on. Worse still, the régime of Bela Kuhn was quickly overthrown in Hungary, to the intense disappointment of Moscow. Of course, the certainty of the ultimate triumph of Communist ideas everywhere was still proclaimed, but as the months followed each other that triumph began to look discouragingly remote. All the strenuous efforts of Bolshevik propaganda had produced but meagre results, and the natural consequence was a feeling of disillusionment and lassitude. The official tone might

remain the same, the more ardent spirits might continue to dream and to plot, but the abler and harder-headed men at the helm, sobered by stern experience in facing the difficulties of actual administration, had been brought to see that their first task was to make the best of conditions as they were. The capitalistic states of the world existed; they were in no hurry to come to an end; they could help Russia as well as harm her. As they now seemed disposed at least to leave her alone, was it not wisdom to stop wasting efforts on their conversion and to find out on what terms it was possible to live with them?

These arguments were reinforced by the appalling nature of the economic situation in which Soviet Russia found herself. Such a colossal catastrophe the world had never witnessed. Not only had factories and mines almost ceased to produce, but transportation had broken down; tools, clothes, shoes, and other necessities of decent life were becoming unprocurable. Vast masses of peasantry with no stocks in reserve were raising but a fraction of the crops they formerly had and were concealing and hoarding what they did raise. Thus the threat of famine on a gigantic scale needed only a single bad harvest to make it become a terrific reality.

Of course it was explained that these evils were due to the sins of the former tsarist régime and to bourgeois exploitation, to war, to insurrection, to the intervention of foreign armies, to the blockade which had been instituted against the Russian labor republic by

its capitalist foes, and to their continued machinations without and within. But granting all this, though these explanations had been repeated so often that the effect was beginning to wear off, the fact remained that the Communist promised land was becoming a hell on earth, not only to such of the hated bourgeoisie as still managed to survive, but to pretty much everyone else within its borders. Something had to be done to remedy the situation, even if certain sacred principles of Communist theory went by the board.

Already by the end of the year 1920 the Soviet leaders, and especially Lenin, who with his strange cynical frankness seems to take a positive delight in pointing out the errors which he and his have committed, had made up their minds that they must embark on a new policy. They had come to recognize that in a country where nine-tenths of the people were peasants it was impossible to maintain a government supported only by the factory population. It had become evident, too, that the peasants could not be won over unless they were assured not only of the practical possession of their land but of the right to dispose of its products. Experience had shown that, if they were to be deprived of their surplus produce (theoretically in return for manufactured goods which the ruin of industry had rendered it impossible to supply), they would answer by raising only what food was requisite for their immediate needs. There was no escaping the conclusion that they did not appreciate the beauties of Communism and for the present at least were unteach-

able. Therefore, as the life of Russia depended upon them, their terms must be accepted. The system of compelling them to hand over to the state everything not needed for their own requirements, and those of their families, had to be given up. The government surrendered, and it was enacted that henceforth after paying a moderate tax in kind the peasant should be at liberty to sell whatever he had raised, which implied in practice a recognition of his ownership of the land.

This enactment made an irreparable breach in the system under which Soviet Russia had been administered since the winter of 1917. It meant the beginning of what was almost a new revolution, for it did not and could not stand by itself. If the peasant might own and sell, then others must be allowed to. Why should he be the only person allowed to dispose of the fruits of his labors? and if people were to sell they must also have the means to buy. The Soviet authorities had never been able really to put an end to all private trade; indeed, in the cities they had often winked at the illicit sale of food without which there would have been much more actual starvation. They now proceeded to re-establish the right of private property and of buying and selling, the government reserving to itself only the making of regulations and also the monopoly of certain products and key industries, including export. This is the famous "new economic policy" or "strategic retreat," which was elaborated by a long series of decrees in 1921 and the first part of 1922.

Under this policy Russia has reverted to something

like her former life. The markets and the business streets of Moscow are once more crowded; many shops have been opened, though there is but little variety in the goods, largely second-hand, which they have to offer; tickets for railways, tramways and theatres again have to be paid for. All this is obviously in violation of the principles on which the Soviet republic was proclaimed and which it long tried to enforce, and the process has been watched with disapproval and alarm by the more uncompromising left wing of the Communist party, who have asked where it was to end. The necessity of a change was so clear, however, that it has been put through without open opposition.

But the "new economic policy" did not relate to internal affairs alone, for the need of assistance from abroad has likewise been urgent. It is true that the Soviet Government and its partisans declared that Russia, the land of boundless natural resources, was capable of recovering her prosperity unaided, yet even they did not profess that in that case her recovery could be other than a slow and painful one. If she wished to get quickly on her feet, to provide a new plant in place of what had been destroyed, to make a vast number of indispensable repairs and to procure necessary articles of many kinds, in order to set her industries going again on their former scale,—not to speak of the tapping of new sources of wealth,—she could do so only with the aid of a great amount of capital, and that capital she could not furnish herself; she must turn to foreigners, however much she might

condemn their principles. Foreign capital could be obtained only from loans or in return for concessions, foreign goods could come in only by trade, and nothing of the sort could be hoped for as long as Soviet Russia remained an outcast among the nations. If she must get outside assistance from abroad, the sooner she entered into normal relations with the rest of the world the better. The capitalist states might be unregenerate but she could not afford to wait till they had learned the error of their ways. She required immediate help and as a first step to this she wanted recognition.

That this help must be paid for in some way was evident, but the Soviet leaders believed they were in a position to bargain. They too had heard the widespread cry that the peace and prosperity of the world could not be restored until Russia had been once more admitted into the comity of nations and should again contribute by her efforts and from her huge resources to the welfare of mankind. They also knew that in the capitalistic countries there were men who hoped splendid things from a reopening of Russian trade. No wonder, then, that the Moscow papers asserted that "Europe needs Russia as much as Russia needs Europe." What they did not perhaps appreciate was that there were millions of good people all over the globe who regarded Bolsheviks as little better than wild beasts.

The Soviet Government itself was naturally well aware that it would be met at the outset of any negotiations by the question whether it was prepared to

recognize the tremendous claims against it. It was ready with its reply. The claims of foreign states against Russia could be divided into two categories, first, pre-war debts, and secondly, war debts and claims for reparation for the destruction and confiscation of foreign property. As an offset to this second class of demands the Russians could bring up their own counter-claims, which were even more tremendous than the claims of the Allies, or at any rate could be made so if the occasion required. And these counter-claims could not be waived aside as midsummer madness. They were based on quite enough international law and precedent to offer a presentable case before an impartial tribunal, could such a one be conceived. The Allied powers without formal declaration of war with Soviet Russia had for years not only abetted and fostered countless plots against her, and furnished openly or covertly weapons, munitions, and military instructors to armed forces that were trying to overthrow her government, but had also actually sent their armies into her territory. If Great Britain had once had to pay more than fifteen million dollars' damages (the case had been specially studied in Moscow) for having allowed the *Alabama* to sail from England to prey on commerce during the American Civil War, how much did the Allied and Associated powers owe for their continual intervention in the Russian one? To be sure, the Allies had never recognized the Soviet Government, and if it had been overthrown their intervention would have been counted to them by its

successor as righteousness. But it had not been overthrown. It had maintained itself and, its claims could not be ignored. If the South had been victorious Great Britain would not have had to pay an indemnity for the exploits of the *Alabama*. As the North was, she did. The logic of facts has to be taken into consideration.

We need not, however, suppose that the Soviet Government has expected that its claims on this score will be satisfied. Their value consists in their capacity of being used as an offset to Allied claims for compensation or war debt. This applies to the United States as well as to Great Britain and France. Some day the Americans may have to charge off the couple of hundred millions Russia now owes them as war debt and put it down as part of the cost of their expeditions to Archangel and Vladivostok.

As to pre-war debts, although Soviet Russia demurred in theory at recognizing an obligation to repay sums which had served to strengthen the former oppressive autocracy and militarism, in practice she could hardly hope to obtain the new loans she so ardently desired if, at the same time, she calmly repudiated her old ones. Here was her chance to make a concession. While refusing to admit a moral liability for these debts, she would express a willingness to meet them, though just to what extent need not be specified but would depend on the bargain she could drive later.

The country which would profit the most by this

concession was the one which had been the bitterest and most active enemy of the Bolshevik régime from the first, and was most cordially detested by Moscow in return, namely, France. Her attitude was still one of uncompromising hostility, and crowned with victory, she was now the predominant power on the European continent. But it was in France that by far the largest portion of Russian pre-war debt was held, and that not by a few millionaires but by tens of thousands of small investors. In order to protect their interests France would have to put her pride in her pocket, forget past grievances and present antipathies and come down to business. If she continued aloof and hostile, she would be in danger of sacrificing what she had invested in the past, as well as the special opportunities now offered.

With England the situation was even simpler. English conservatives might dislike Bolshevism,—and England had done much to aid the enemies of the Soviets, especially in the warfare of Denikin,—but the English are a practical people who accept the decision of facts. The Soviet Government was now firmly established. As England lives by her exports, her millions of unemployed were a sufficient reason for her to make every effort to open up new markets and to reestablish old ones. Why should she not come to terms with Russia, especially as her holdings of pre-war debts were much less serious than those of France? Lloyd George had intermittently given encouragement to the idea. As early as March 16, 1921, an agreement had been concluded which not only permitted Anglo-

Russian trade, but sanctioned the residence of a Russian commercial agent in London. So far this had not led to any particular results, but the ice was broken.

The attitude of the United States presented a peculiar problem. As the richest, most successful bourgeois capitalistic state of the day, the United States embodies the most advanced type of the form of society which Communists regard as their chief object in life to destroy; but as it has the largest amount of available capital, it is the country which can do the most to build up Russia; and finally, it is the one which has shown itself by far the most generous in relieving Russian distress. Whatever might be the differences in their social conceptions, the advantage to Moscow of cultivating friendly relations with Washington was indisputable. This ought not to be difficult. The Americans have the reputation of caring for the almighty dollar; and here was Moscow willing to offer them special opportunities to obtain a great number of dollars by the exploitation of untapped Russian resources. Yet, strange to say, America, which had no particular quarrel with Russia, which had not been injured by the breaking of an alliance with her as had England and France, which had no conflicting ambitions and several common interests, and which was showing herself such a friend in need to starving Russians, nevertheless remained coldly aloof, haughtily refusing to recognize the Soviet Government or to have any dealings with it except in dispensing charity. To be sure, President Wilson in a direct communication

had urged it not to make peace with Germany, and this might be regarded as a recognition of sorts, but his appeal had fallen on deaf ears, and there had been no further official intervention. Later, the Bullitt mission had aroused Soviet hopes, but it had led to nothing but controversy. Since then not only had the Wilson administration refused recognition, but the Harding one, by Mr. Hughes's declaration of March 25, 1921, had taken an equally uncompromising stand; nay, it had gone further, for it had invited other powers to a conference in Washington to discuss questions of the Pacific and of the Far East without the participation of Russia, in flagrant disregard of the fact that she was one of those most interested in just such questions. Chicherin had protested in July and again in November in vigorous but dignified language and had declared that any decisions reached would be for her null and void. The statement that the United States would act as the "moral trustee" for Russia seemed like adding insult to injury, and it was freely asserted in Moscow that America at the Washington conference would try to buy concessions from the Japanese in other places by giving them a free hand in Siberia. Instead she showed that she took her trusteeship seriously and did what she could to get them out of there.

Some would say that a bond was created between Soviet Russia and the United States by their similar attitude towards the League of Nations. The reasons influencing the two might not be quite the same, but the tone in regard to it of, for instance, the Boston

Transcript differed little from that of the *Pravda*. If a common dislike draws nations together, abstention of the United States and Russia from the League should help to bring them closer to each other and to Germany.

When, in the summer of 1921, in answer to the appeal of Maxim Gorki, the American Relief Administration, whose president is the Secretary of Commerce, consented to enter Russia, it was hard for the Communists to believe that these bourgeois dispensers of charity were without secret political aims; and when this became self-evident it was harder still for them to understand why, if the American people were willing to feed the hungry, they should not be willing to do lasting good in a form that would be advantageous to themselves also, by accepting the hand that was proffered them, entering into cordial relations, and taking part in the work of Russian economic regeneration. It was work, too, such as ought to appeal irresistibly to the daring imagination so characteristic of Americans, for it was not a matter of slowly building up a trade or of petty concessions, but of immediate enterprises on the grandest scale with the promise of marvelous results. Why then did they hold back? Verily these Americans were strange people.

In the above reasoning there were two flaws which the rulers of the Soviet state did not, indeed could not be expected to, appreciate in their full seriousness. To begin with, in all the states with which they now wished to deal, public opinion, or a large part of it, looked on

them with unaffected moral reprobation, not to say actual loathing. To recognize the régime they had established was to condone crime. The tales of atrocities they had committed had shocked the civilized world; their denials and counter-charges had found little credence. Their machinations and their propaganda had spread alarm everywhere; and their wild rantings, as well as those of their controlled newspapers, about the wickedness of the bourgeoisie and the necessity of wading through blood to a world revolution were not calculated to win them friends in countries where the bourgeoisie and capitalists were influential, not to say dominant. Secondly, even granting that a good many people were inclined to overlook the misdeeds credited to the Bolsheviks, the question still remained, were they to be trusted? What guarantee could they offer that they would keep their word? Was it not more than likely that, after they had lured foreign capital by fair promises, they would so hamper its operation that it could make no profit, and that when they were ready they would end by confiscating it as they had done before? Was there anything in their character or record which entitled them to be trusted? The Russian answer to this, that decrees, laws, nay, whole codes, were being promulgated with bewildering activity, guaranteeing all sorts of rights to foreigners as well as to natives, was not wholly convincing. The Soviet Government in its administrative routine may vie with any other in its wilderness of red tape, but it can turn out as many laws as it wants with incompara-

ble speed. By the same token it can repeal them with equal facility. A realization of this may even have lurked in the minds of the creators of the "new economic policy."

This policy having once been decided upon for foreign as well as for domestic affairs, the next question was that of procedure. The Soviet Government, however desirous of recognition and of financial help, and however prepared to make concessions in return, did not propose to appear as a suppliant, or to give up more than it had to. It trusted to its own wits and in Chicherin it possessed a spokesman who had already proved that he could hold his own in dialectics against any opponent he encountered. He opened his campaign with his note of October 29, 1921, in which, while asserting that Soviet Russia was not legally or morally bound by the debts of the former régime, nevertheless, in view of her need of immediate assistance, he stated that she would consent to see what she could do towards meeting foreign claims. He therefore proposed that an international congress should be called which should recognize her government and devise the means necessary to bring about her economic rehabilitation.

This overture met with a chilling reception. Such replies as were received were unfavorable. But Moscow went on its way and though within its borders famine and distress became ever more grievous, its international position continued to improve. German and Norwegian trade delegations arrived in Moscow, the frontier with Esthonia was finally settled and a

treaty was signed with Austria. The meeting of the Ninth Soviet Congress showed that there was at least no open dissension in the ranks of the faithful. Trotsky's speech, which was largely devoted to foreign affairs, breathed confidence, and though sharp in its denunciations of the actions of certain other powers, was not at bottom bellicose. And soon the much-desired happened. On January 6, 1922, the meeting of premiers at Cannes invited Soviet Russia to attend a general European Conference at Genoa.

There was no hesitation shown about accepting, and few attempts to conceal the satisfaction at what the newspapers called "our victory." A strong delegation was chosen, including in theory Lenin himself, though there can have been little serious intention of having him risk his health, not to say his life, merely to satisfy idle curiosity abroad. Chicherin was competent to conduct the Russian case, which had been carefully prepared long before. Meanwhile the making of reassuring laws continued. On February 6th the famous "Cheka," or Extraordinary Commission, whose ruthless exploits had rendered it a name of terror to millions, was formally abolished.

As a preliminary move, the Russian delegates to Genoa on their way through Riga signed an agreement with Poland, Esthonia, and Latvia, confirming existing treaties and promising to facilitate trade and communications between the two parties. The representatives of the other three states also officially expressed the opinion that a general recognition of the Soviet Gov-

ernment would be helpful to the reconstruction of Europe. In Berlin the Russian delegates carried on negotiations which were soon to have important results. All told, they were proceeding to a meeting at which they might gain a good deal and stood to lose but little, for if they could not obtain collective assistance they were confident that, profiting by mutual jealousies, they could make some satisfactory bargains with individual powers.

They had, however, met with one severe disappointment before they started. On March 8th, Secretary Hughes definitely declined the invitation to the United States to take part in the Conference. This deprived it of half its value for Moscow. What Russia wanted was recognition and, above all, money. Without American recognition that of Europe was of less consequence, for only the United States was rich enough to lend on a large scale. We may well surmise, therefore, that the absence of American representatives seriously affected the conduct of the Russians at both Genoa and The Hague. They now felt they had less to gain by making concessions and accordingly less reason for making them. Even Lenin's defiant speech to the Congress of Metal Workers at Moscow on March 6th may have been so influenced, for by that time the American refusal could be foreseen. He declared that if need be Russia would say: "All attempts to impose upon us terms as if we were vanquished are outright nonsense to which it is not worth while to reply. We are entering into relations as merchants and we know what you owe

us and we owe you, and what legitimate and even exorbitant profit you may extort from us. We have a great number of proposals, the number of agreements grows and will grow, whatever the relations between the three or four victorious powers; a postponement of this conference will be a loss for yourselves, because by postponing it you will prove to your own people that you do not know what you want and that you are suffering from disease of the will." Turning to internal politics, he told his enemies, "You challenged us to a desperate fight in 1917, and in reply we took recourse to terror, and again to terror — and will use it still again if you try it again"; and as for 'the new economic policy,' "we can say now that this retreat, as far as concessions made to the capitalists are concerned, is now ended."

In Europe, on the other hand, even, it would seem, in government circles, there existed a widespread belief that the economic situation in Russia was such that, however much her representatives might bluff and bluster at the outset, in the end they would have to submit to almost anything. It would therefore be possible, as well as desirable, to impose not only stringent terms for the repayment of old debts, but elaborate and humiliating conditions for future benefits.

We need not enter here into the story of the Genoa conference. Both sides began by putting forward their demands in extreme form — the principal Allies in the report of the preliminary conference held in London, the Russians in a memorandum they drew up in reply,

stating counter-claims which appeared to the Allied powers utterly extravagant, not to say impertinent. In the weeks of wrangling that followed both sides made concessions but they never were near real agreement. From the first the Russians made it plain that they meant to be treated as equals, not as culprits or supplicants. They took the tone that they came to offer as well as to ask, and in debate they did not shrink from irritating their opponents by sharp rejoinders. Yet, although their demands made Europe gasp, they were quite ready to bargain; indeed it sometimes seemed that there was no principle they would not sacrifice if only they could make sure of a large loan. It is not surprising that the conference ended as it did; it could hardly have done otherwise.

But if, owing to the absence of the Americans, the Russians at Genoa had not expected real financial help, they had no cause to be disappointed with the outcome of the conference. For one thing, they had found what they had long desired, a platform from which they could speak with a certainty of being listened to. They did not particularly care if they were disapproved of and stirred up anger. They had not come for sympathy but to assert themselves, and to obtain practical if not formal recognition. This they had achieved. The recognition they had won might not be friendly but it was real. To pretend not to recognize a government after arguing and trying to reach an agreement with it for long weeks, with the whole world following every move in the game, was almost ludicrous. The Soviet

republic had indeed won the *de facto* recognition of Europe. It could afford to wait a while for the *de jure*, especially as, thanks to American assistance, the horrors of the famine were being combated with some measure of success.

At the same time, the Russian delegates had not forgotten the other string to their bow, the opportunity for conversations with separate powers. The situation was promising. France, and of late even Italy, ordinarily the faithful henchman of England, had shown themselves willing, although still theoretically at war with the Ottoman Empire, to make pacts with the Turks at Angora behind the back of their British ally. The desire of the Italians for a commercial treaty with Russia was well known and negotiations were already well under way. There was nothing to hinder the Soviet delegates at Genoa, or afterwards at The Hague, from dealing secretly with single states as well as openly with a number. This they proceeded to do.

On April 15th the Genoa Conference and the world were astonished by the news that Germany and Russia had just signed a formal treaty at Rapallo, a few miles away. In its terms it was sound and statesmanlike. The two countries entered once more into normal relations, granting each other equal rights and privileges. By a particularly sensible provision all the claims each might have against the other were swept away, thus disposing of a vast mass of complicated and contentious matter, which could be handled in no other

fashion without endless difficulties and possibilities of trouble. The Treaty of Versailles had recognized the right of Russia to German reparation payments. But now bygones were to be bygones. The two mighty former empires had fallen and their old quarrels were but memories. The two new and struggling republics needed the help which each could give the other.

Later history will show some day whether in the long run Russia or Germany will have profited the more by the treaty of Rapallo. At the time it was signed there is no doubt as to which gained by it. However ultimately advantageous it might be to Germany, she ran just then all the risks and paid all the penalties. She doubtless had a theoretical right to conclude the agreement, which was not unlike the one made by Poland, Esthonia, and Latvia with Russia a few weeks before, but she chose the worst moment to do it. She prejudiced her case by an appearance of double-dealing, and she heightened the alarm of France, which it was her interest to allay, as well as weakened the hands of Lloyd George, on whom she depended and who was trying to do what he could for her. As a punishment for putting this spoke in the Allied wheel she had to accept the humiliation of being excluded from all further meetings in which Russian affairs were debated.

But Russia received no punishment. If she had worried England and France, why so much the better. It would make them more amenable to reason by showing them she could turn elsewhere. At the dramatic moment she had won an advantage which not only

strengthened her immediate position but laid the foundation for greater things in the future.

Towards the close of the conference the news of the Shell oil concession created another sensation, though of a milder sort. The relations between the Shell Company and the British Government were enough to make the transaction interesting. Presently, too, the conference woke up to the fact that the intention of the Russians to redivide their oil districts in such a manner as to exploit them in large concessions to the best advantage, though economically wise, conflicted hopelessly with the return of oil properties to their former foreign owners. All that the Russians were willing to do was to offer not compensation but a certain priority in new concessions. At the last, when the conference ended without agreement, they took back all offers of any kind they had made, and rested on their original positions.

When the time came for fresh attempts at accord at The Hague, the prospect was discouraging from the start. The United States had again refused to take part, and the tone of the Russian delegates was not conciliatory; nor did the fact that they were long held aloof by the non-Russians and invited only to meet sub-commissions improve their disposition. On the other hand, they seemed ready to go on talking indefinitely, — it was suspected, with ulterior motives, — and there was again the feeling that they might be willing to sacrifice many principles if only offered money enough. They boldly asked for a huge amount. But the useless-

ness of further discussion soon became so increasingly evident that the conference broke up, this time with complete acknowledgment of failure, as it made no suggestion of further meetings.

To the self-denying ordinance of the non-Russians, adhered to by the United States, that they would frown upon any acquisition by their nationals of Russian concessions which included property that had once belonged to other foreigners, the Soviet Government replied soon after by granting an oil concession to Germans, Germany not having been invited to The Hague. Although this concession did not include any former foreign property, the retort was unmistakable.

On June 5th a treaty was signed between Russia and Czechoslovakia. Some of the provisions are significant. Questions of indemnity or return of property are postponed. Also, although it is stated that the treaty is not meant to anticipate the recognition *de jure* of the Soviet republic, nevertheless the chiefs and two other members of the principal mission of each country in the territory of the other are to have diplomatic privileges and local agents are to have consular ones. In other words, there is recognition in all but the name.

Since the close of the Genoa Conference the attitude of Moscow has perceptibly stiffened, whether it be owing to favorable crop reports which make the Communist rulers feel more independent of outside help, as is shown in their hampering even the work of the American Relief Administration, or whether it be due to an increase of influence of the left wing of the party,

thanks to the incapacitation of Lenin, or whether to some other cause. This has manifested itself in a refusal to ratify the treaty of commerce which Chicherin concluded with Italy just before his departure from there, and still more in the fresh contempt exhibited for the opinion of the outside world. The way in which the recent trial of social revolutionists has been conducted is enough to alienate the sympathies of all but the Communist reaction of European and American socialists, and the treatment of the clergy accused of resistance to the law confiscating church property for famine relief has looked, in spite of the charitable purport of the measure itself, like odious religious persecution. On the credit side we note a proposition, with whatever intention, to discuss the reduction of armaments.

In her external relations, as in her internal conditions, Soviet Russia presents a changing picture. Predictions as to the future are hazardous. We can do little more than note a few salient facts and guess at certain tendencies.

In Europe, Russia no longer borders on any state of the first rank, such as Germany and Austria, but on five smaller ones, Finland (which now separates her from Sweden and Norway), Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania. All of these are composed, wholly or in part, of territory which until recently was hers, or at least under her sovereignty. To-day she has recognized their independence in accordance with the principles she professes, and she has been liberal in the

drawing of frontier lines, notably in the case of Finland, to whom she has made a pure gift of the district of Pechenga in the extreme north, simply because it is of greater value to Finland, which thereby gains a port of access to the Arctic Ocean, than it is to Russia, which has plenty of seacoast on the Arctic, though nowhere else. Examples of such generosity between nations are rare. Nevertheless, Russia's European neighbors are much afraid of her. She is still far larger and possesses far more ultimate resources than all of them put together; she still maintains on paper a standing army of over a million men. They fear that her renunciation of the former borderlands of the empire may have been due only to the necessities of the moment and might be taken back at the first convenient opportunity. There are enough Communists in these states to furnish Moscow with pretexts for interfering if it wishes to do so. They are aware, also, not only that most of the Russians in exile have refused to accept the shrinkage of their country as permanent, but that Soviet policy itself seems to be inspired by more nationalistic sentiment than it was a while ago. The example of the way Soviet governments were established with the aid of Russian soldiers in the three republics of the Caucasus is not reassuring.

On the other hand, a policy of reconquest on the part of Russia would inevitably provoke a coalition against her. Poland and Rumania are bound together by an alliance which represents a population of over forty million people and a very considerable military

strength. They would have allies and they could count on much indirect assistance, and perhaps active support, from France. The Baltic states are far weaker and more exposed, and one of them, Lithuania, from hatred of Poland leans towards Russia. In their case the danger to their independence lies not so much in their having belonged to Russia for two centuries as in the fact that they constitute her natural seacoast on the Baltic. Many wiseacres declare that it is impossible for her to do without them. One may reply that Germans have held the same views about Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, and that these views are to-day not generally accepted. But peril is there and will continue. To meet it the Baltic republics must rely not only on their own sturdy resistance but on outside aid. Poland, for instance, can hardly leave them to their fate, even if she does not covet them for herself as she is suspected of doing. The condition of the Russian army is not of the best, especially for an offensive campaign, and the difficulties of arming, supplying, and handling large masses of men would be great just now. Finally, in fairness to the Soviet Government, one must admit that in spite of rude language and non-fulfillment of some of the minor provisions of its treaties, it has shown no serious signs of deliberate intent to violate them.

With one of her neighbors Russia still has unsettled questions of such importance that under other circumstances they might easily lead to war. Profiting by the Russian revolution and the ensuing confusion, Ru-

mania, on the ground of historical right and more or less with the consent of the inhabitants, about half of whom are Rumanians, has possessed herself of the former Russian province of Bessarabia. This annexation has never been recognized by Moscow. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks appropriated to their own use the Rumanian gold reserve which at the time of the war had been sent to Russia for greater security. Naturally Rumania claims it back. The Soviet Government probably cares no more for Bessarabia (except perhaps the Ukrainian part of it) than it did for other lands it has ceded; but as the Rumanian gold has long been spent and would be inconvenient to return, the obvious course to follow is to keep open the dispute. If Rumania would buy Russian recognition of the *fait accompli* by abandoning the demand for her stolen gold, Moscow would hardly object, and this may be the ultimate solution, but so far Rumania has been unwilling to accept it. Neither side, however, is ready to go to war over these questions.

The threat of an attack upon Russia herself, in her hour of weakness, by her neighbors, especially Poland and Rumania, aided and abetted by France, has been a favorite theme of Bolshevik oratory. We may take it that most of this has been for popular consumption, though she has had some genuine grievances to complain of, for the territory of her neighbors has been used as a base of operations for insurrections in her own. Still, if she has entertained real apprehensions, as she seems to have, this betrays more weakness than she

has usually been credited with. Some Communists may even desire foreign aggression, for it would once more rally disaffected elements to the support of the government. But these small states will hardly be foolish enough to molest their gigantic neighbor, weak as she now is, if she leaves them alone. They have already got in full the boundaries they are entitled to, and even the desire of Poland and Rumania to see a really independent Ukraine which shall serve as a buffer between them and Moscow is moderated by the knowledge that such a Ukraine would be more nationalistic in character and would demand from them their Ukrainian territories with more insistence and asperity than Moscow does.

Of the great powers France is the one whose relations with Soviet Russia are the worst and not improbably may remain so for a good while to come. Some Frenchmen, to be sure, think that it will be easier to reach an agreement by separate treaty than it has been by general international convention. They may be right, but France has much to claim from Russia and comparatively little to offer these days when she no longer has moneys to lend. This puts her at a disadvantage in negotiating with an adversary as unsentimental as the Bolsheviks. But neither country at this moment is in a position to do the other great harm. England has more to offer and fewer claims to present. She is less embittered, and is also in greater need of Russian trade and of tolerable political relations, for she is more vulnerable. Moscow has enough

means of action in the Mohammedan and Asiatic world to make trouble for her in several countries, notably in Afghanistan and India.

Many people regard the recent treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Russia as only a first step towards closer relations and perhaps actual alliance, which some would say exists already. There are indeed many ways in which the two countries might help one another. German industry could furnish Russia with the chief articles of which she is in pressing need; German science and technical skill could guide the up-building of her industries, the reopening and the administration of her mines, the construction of great public works, and likewise the training of her armies, although at least Trotski would assert they are trained already. The trouble is that all these benefits have to be paid for in cash — paper roubles and other forms of Soviet credit will not do — and Russia has not the cash to pay for them. Besides, though she wishes to use the Germans and has a wholesome respect for their abilities, she does not intend to put herself into their hands for exploitation. For her part she cannot give them the thing they would value most, military security. Russian armies to-day could not keep the French out of Berlin. Even if they could, they would not be welcome. It looks, accordingly, as if Moscow and Berlin will not become intimate; but, though they have little trust in each other, they will remain on friendly terms. They have one common bond, which

has helped to keep them together in the past and may again—their deep dislike for Poland.

Although in principle the foreign policy of the Soviet republic is based on internationalism and in practice is dominated by the necessities of the moment, some of the traditions of the former empire have not been forgotten. The Russia of to-day declares that she has renounced imperialistic ambitions but that this does not mean she is indifferent to legitimate national interests even if she is not now in a position to assert them effectively. This is true of her policy in both the Near and the Far East. She no longer menaces Turkey, indeed she is on excellent terms with the Angora Government; but she has not lost her right to be heard in questions regarding Constantinople and the Straits which will always remain of vital importance to her southern trade. She will therefore not accept as valid any international arrangements concerning them made without her participation.

The same principle holds in regard to the Far East. Russia has given fair warning that the agreements reached at the Washington Conference do not exist as far as she is concerned. Her right to take this stand is unquestionable, but she will make no complaint if the policy of Mr. Hughes results in the evacuation of Siberia and northern Sakhalin by the Japanese—a thing she earnestly desires but is too weak to bring about unaided. At any rate, she means some day to assert herself once more in this part of the world, though she may do so in the name of the Far Eastern

Republic which, without being a Soviet state, is none the less in her eyes a member of the Russian Federation. If the Americans, in the meanwhile, are willing to pull her chestnuts out of the fire for her, so much the better. And now Japan has just manifested a willingness to enter into conference with her.

In her future dealing with China, as with Turkey, she will have the considerable advantage that she alone of the great powers has agreed under certain conditions to surrender all claim to consular jurisdiction and other capitulations of the sort which have seemed so necessary for the protection of Europeans in the past, but which are so resented by Chinese and Turks to-day. She has also given back her share of the famous concession of special rights along the Manchurian railway, thereby ingratiating herself with the Chinese and making the position of the Japanese in South Manchuria more awkward.

And finally, as to America, the self-appointed moral trustee, the benefactor who has dispensed such charity as no people ever before bestowed on another, and at the same time the stern critic who declines to recognize the government she has been coöperating with in feeding millions of its people — what is she going to do? Her position is morally strong, for in her condemnation as in her charity she has been guided by unselfish considerations. In no other country is there more genuine horror of the Bolsheviks as men of blood, without ruth or faith, who have wrought a havoc unparalleled in history. Are they to be helped and comforted because

they have got to the end of their rope, and after limitless wanton destruction have shown themselves incapable of creating or rebuilding? Their methods are still those of brutal terror under which no one but the ruling minority can feel secure. Of what value are the promises of men whose highest aim is to subvert the very basis of the society on which our civilization is founded and who believe that every means to this end is justified? Some of these men may be honest fanatics of a dangerous kind, others are mere criminals. To grasp their hand in friendship is to touch pitch and be defiled.

To this some reply by denying the accusations or putting much of the blame elsewhere. Still others believe that even granting the truth of the charges it does not follow that because we disapprove of the rulers of a country we should have no dealings with the people who suffer most from their rule. The progress of mankind has come through intercourse, and if we wish to aid the unfortunate millions of Russia, the way to do so is not to leave them alone or even merely to pauperize them with charity, but to help them to get to their feet again. Free communications with the outside world would be an inestimable boon to many of them. Shall we refuse to sell sorely needed farm instruments to the Russian peasants because we dislike the Moscow Soviet? To recognize the government of a country does not imply that we admire it, it is merely to take note of an existing fact. If the crimes of Sultan Abdul Hamid were not deemed a bar to American commerce and to the necessary official relations with Turkey,

why should trading with Russia make us responsible for the practices of Lenin and Trotski?

But apart from ethical considerations there are other reasons which explain the hesitation felt by many governments, and notably the American, about recognizing officially the present régime. Among these is doubt as to its duration and to what may succeed it. This is no mere question of change of personnel such as has often occurred in Latin America and elsewhere, but of something much more fundamental. To-day we can see four possibilities of development in the case of Russia, any one of which would be of world-wide importance and any one of which might be precipitated by the permanent disappearance from the scene of Lenin — an event which, in view of the state of his health, may occur at any time, if it has not occurred already. The part which he has played has been so great and the place which he has held has been so commanding that by his departure he would leave a gap difficult to fill. A struggle for power between those next in line, of whose relative strength we know almost nothing, might lead to far-reaching results.

These four obvious possibilities are, first, a counter revolution, though not necessarily in favor of monarchy, such a one as was attempted by Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel, and others. This is still the dream of hosts of Russian exiles and of an unknown proportion of the population of Russia itself. The previous attempts to bring it about have failed and there seems no particular reason for expecting that others would succeed now.

Second, the "new economic policy" may continue to spread and may take deep root, the new codes of law may supplant the arbitrary dictatorship of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie may be able to raise its head again, and the men directing the ship of state, taught by experience, may abandon in practice many of their previous theories and methods. In other words, the Russian republic may undergo the same sort of transformation as did the first French republic after the reign of terror. Even now a few more changes would make Soviet legislation not very different from that of the other new socialistically inclined republics.

Third, there may be a reaction to the left. If, for instance, Trotsky or Zinoviev succeeds to the place of Lenin, we may witness a return to the attempt to govern on purely Communistic principles, accompanied by increased activity in propaganda abroad.

Fourth, even without dissension in the Communist ranks or attack from without or within, the economic condition of Soviet Russia may become so deplorable and transportation break down to such an extent, that the central government will lose its control and the country fall into anarchy, breaking up into fragments, each mindful only of its own wants. How far such a process of disruption might go and whither it would lead is beyond our ken, but of this we may be sure: it would mean confusion and misery such as would stagger the imagination.

TWO YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

ON March 4, 1921, Mr. Harding was inaugurated President of the United States and Mr. Charles Evans Hughes assumed the onerous duties of Secretary of State. There could be no doubt as to the immensity of the task which confronted the new Secretary. The whole world was out of joint and, though he was not "born to set it right," he was called upon to conduct, and in large measure to shape, the relations of his country with the rest of this disjointed world. The wisdom of his policy might affect the fate of countless millions of his fellow creatures and influence profoundly the course of history. It was a responsibility no man could undertake lightly, but the opportunities of achievement could not but appeal to one's highest aspirations.

For the conduct of its foreign affairs the new administration apparently enjoyed a highly advantageous situation. It had behind it the sweeping victory of the presidential election, which not only had brought Mr. Harding into the White House but had given the Republican Party a large majority in both branches of Congress. Accordingly the executive, at least in theory, could count on the support of the legislative branch of the government. There was less likelihood of dissension between the two because the American people had just given a clear indication of their desires at that moment.

Unquestionably they wished to keep out of European complications and in particular not to join the League of Nations. For the time being, further discussion on this topic was academic. The Senate had refused to confirm the Peace of Versailles, or to take an Armenian mandate; the treaty of alliance with France was shelved without even coming up for discussion; and America no longer participated officially in any of the Allied conferences. The table was thus cleared for a new deal.

The position of America among the nations was imposing. In power and wealth she stood first. Her intervention had decided the fate of the World War; at the peace table, while demanding little for herself, she had been the arbiter of peoples bound to her not only by genuine gratitude but by that kind which has been described as "a lively sense of favors to come." Some two years had now elapsed since the great days of the conference at Paris, but in spite of the grievous disappointment caused by her failure to ratify the signatures of her delegates, a large part of the world still looked to her with open or concealed hopes. If her moral prestige had declined, her material one was unimpaired.

Such a position, however, brought its own disadvantages and dangers and could not in the nature of things be permanent. Nor were the difficulties awaiting the new administration, and especially Mr. Hughes, to be found only abroad. At home, to begin with, there was the Senate. Never in the history of that august body

had it been more convinced of its right to participate in shaping the foreign policy of the country. It was flushed with triumph after its long and bitter struggle with President Wilson, and it had in Senator Lodge a chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of tried knowledge and competence who could be trusted not to forget one jot or tittle of senatorial prerogative. Although the Senate had not opposed the appointment of Mr. Hughes, whose ability it recognized, it had not greeted him with enthusiasm and it would be quick to resent encroachment or disregard on his part.

In President Harding the Secretary had a chief of whose loyal support he might feel assured. The President had never possessed special knowledge of international questions or shown extraordinary interest in them, nor was he the man to take private counsel with some intimate friends and make far-reaching decisions over the heads of his responsible advisers. There has been no Colonel House in the present administration. But certain things presidents reserve to themselves, particularly the important appointments. Among these the most coveted are the chief diplomatic posts, most of which are filled in accordance with political considerations rather than with especial fitness. As a consequence, a Secretary of State must put up with certain subordinates about whom he has been consulted merely through courtesy and whose influence in the party may well exceed his own. President Harding's appointments to foreign missions have been made on the same principles as those of his predecessors and

have not been markedly better or worse. We may note to his credit that he has extended the practice already followed by President Wilson of raising from the ranks of the secretaries some few to the position of minister, as a reward for long and faithful service. A Secretary of State has also to take his colleagues into account. International relations to-day affect every department of the government. The more competent and forceful the heads of the other departments are, the more the Secretary of State has to reckon with them and seek to harmonize his policy with theirs. Mr. Hoover, for instance, whose Department of Commerce is vitally affected by foreign conditions, has a reputation for ability to play a lone hand rather than for team work. It is, therefore, creditable to all concerned and is a proof of the tact and skill of the President, that he has kept in line a Cabinet containing so many strong personalities, and this too despite the fact that there is so much that is haphazard in the division of subjects between them. Even the unwarrantable overlapping between the consular service and the commercial agents has not led to the friction it might have between Secretaries Hughes and Hoover. But the coupling of the English debt agreement with the ship subsidy bill must have been more welcome to the Shipping Board than it was to the State Department.

It would be futile to attempt here to follow out the foreign policy of the present administration in the various fields in which it has been pursued and to appreciate the measure of its success. The general prin-

ciples by which it has been guided and the larger results it has secured are of more interest, as well as importance, than the details of execution. From the first Secretary Hughes made it plain, at any rate until recently, that his grasp was firm. He has known what he wanted and how to set about to attain it, and also how to be patient and to make allowances for the difficulties of others as well as to realize those which lay in his own road. Without arousing the susceptibilities of the Senate or antagonizing public opinion, he has shown independent judgment and initiative. He has the lawyer's faculty of stating his case clearly and convincingly. His attitude has been broadminded, kindly, and unemotional. At least on one occasion he has proved that he possessed the vision of high statesmanship, a quality of which the world has never been in greater need than at the present hour.

There was one question which the new administration plainly did not feel called upon to consider, and that was its relation to the League of Nations. It simply did not have any. That matter had been settled for it by the November elections, when the country had reacted so violently against everything that savored of Wilsonism. To be sure, during the campaign the Committee of Thirty-One, by their adherence at the same time to the cause of the League and to the candidacy of Mr. Harding (who did not discourage their support), had prevented the issue from being a clear-cut party one. None the less there could be no doubt as to the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the Re-

publican voters, and the administration accepted the decision. The appointment of Mr. George Harvey as Ambassador to London, if less important, was more significant than that of Mr. Hughes as Secretary of State. Nothing more was heard about any "Association of Nations." And America, having decided she would stay out of the League, had taken a dislike to the whole institution. This was logical enough. If the League, however imperfect, represented a step in the right direction, if it was capable of improvement, if its ideals were in conformity with those on which Americans had prided themselves, was there not an obvious selfishness in keeping aloof without even the suggestion of a desire to come to an understanding? It was easier and pleasanter for the national conscience to assume a censorious tone, to scoff at the League and its supporters, to criticize its proceedings, to sneer at its achievements and to laugh at its failures, and even to dub it "the evil thing with a holy name." These themes have been harped upon countless times in the press and on the platform.

Of course it would be manifestly unfair to accuse the administration or the State Department of having adopted any such attitude of vicious criticism. They have not condemned the League, they have merely repulsed its timid attempts at familiarity and ignored its existence. Even the constitution of the World Court, in which Mr. Root took such a part, and the appointment of Mr. John Bassett Moore as one of the judges elicited for some time no manifestation of inter-

est because these judges are chosen by the League. Not until lately has the official accession of the United States to the High Court been mentioned as a possibility.

This attitude which, however natural, was at least ungracious, — some have called it nasty, — has provoked among the supporters of the League anger and pointed reference to Mr. Hughes's own previous stand. Some of the shafts of criticism appear to have penetrated, if we may judge from the asperity of the Secretary's reply to the charges brought against him by Mr. Hamilton Holt and others. Since then there have been indications of a slightly greater readiness on the part of the government to recognize that the League is trying to do good and in its modest way is accomplishing results deserving of American coöperation, but an ugly kick has just been administered it by our objection to its being represented in the Pan-American Congress at Santiago. In the broad public, too, there has been, under the influence of recent events, what looks like a beginning of a change of heart. Even the principles of the Committee of Thirty-One appear to have been not dead but sleeping during the last two years, and are showing signs of revival. They are held by Republicans of unimpeachable orthodoxy and may have their day yet in councils of the party. So far, however, the attitude of official Washington towards the League, though more politely manifested, is not unlike that of Moscow.

One aspect of the League of Nations which perad-

venture may affect us, whether we stay out or enter in, relates to Latin America. Most of the Latin-American states have joined the League, and at the last meeting of the Assembly a Chilean was elected president. To be sure, this (and we may suspect a desire to curry favor with the United States in view of the Tacna and Arica question) led to the withdrawal of Peru; nevertheless the election was significant and gave pleasure. The latest snub of the League by the State Department is likely to have the opposite effect, at least at Santiago. It is quite conceivable that Latin-American countries may try to use the League as a protection against any too great preponderance of the United States or extension of the Monroe Doctrine.

John Hay once asserted that his foreign policy rested on the Ten Commandments and the Monroe Doctrine. The problems that Mr. Hughes has had to deal with have been much more complicated than were those of Hay and it has been harder to know just how the Ten Commandments applied to them. On the other hand, there has been little cause for the application of the Monroe Doctrine. The time is past when we need dread European intervention prejudicial to our interests in the western hemisphere. An Asiatic challenge is perhaps more probable. Some day it may be that our position will be questioned by Japan on the ground that the Monroe Doctrine is a proclamation of a "sphere of influence" not unlike what we reprobate in the Far East, and that Japan and Mexico have as good a right to be bosom friends as America and China,

and other things of the sort. But the time for this may never come, and anyway it has not come yet. To-day we are concerned with the relations of the United States and Latin America, relations calling for a good deal of tact on our part, as the interests of the Latin-American peoples often make less trouble than their susceptibilities. Pan-Americanism is a tender plant which still requires careful nursing. All the banquets, speeches, and exchange of messages in the world do not alter the fact that in the lands to the south of us, though there may be admiration for the United States, there are also much fear, dislike, and above all suspicion, and not without some plausible justification. Our actions towards any one Latin-American state are at once noted, and usually with disfavor, in the rest, and may have far-reaching results. On the other hand, a Pan-American sentiment does exist among them and there is a possibility of using it for the development of further "regional understandings."

In dealing with these states the policy of the present administration has been characteristically safe and sane. It began by healing a running sore, the claim of Colombia that she had been feloniously deprived of Panama. The Wilson administration had virtually admitted this by agreeing to pay Colombia a sum of twenty-five million dollars, but the treaty had never been ratified by the Senate. It was now taken up and put through, although some of those who voted for it, like Senator Lodge, must have found difficulty in reconciling their action with their former attitude. But the

sullen sense of injury cherished by Colombia met with sympathy in other parts of Latin America and hampered Pan-Americanism. It was worth a sacrifice to remove, and the Republican majority, like the administration, though less convinced than were the Democrats of the wickedness of President Roosevelt's exploit, were willing to make a handsome payment to get rid of the question. To be sure, what they regarded as an act of generosity will probably be interpreted by history as a formal acknowledgment of guilt.

The paying of conscience money has been a curious characteristic of the foreign policy of America. No other country has, without constraint, handed over such large sums except as subsidies. The history of her territorial expansion has been unique in this way, for not only has she acquired the greater part of her area by actual purchase, but even when she has got land by conquest, from Mexico and Spain, she has, while imposing severe terms on her adversaries, made a money payment herself. This has been due in part to the feeling that she was taking more than the provocation or her sacrifices warranted. She also points with pride to her return of indemnities to Japan and China, so that her recent settlement with Colombia was in accordance with tradition. If we were not quite so prosperous a nation it might make more of an impression on outsiders.

With most of the Latin-American states our relations during the last two years have been friendly and uneventful. Secretary Hughes has made a visit to

Rio de Janeiro and has been proposing a more extensive tour. A boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Panama has been adjusted by the application of gentle pressure on the Panamanians, who had refused to accept an arbitration that had gone against them. Chile and Peru have been induced to confer in Washington and to sign an agreement which, we may hope, now that they have invited America to act as arbitrator, will settle at last their long and bitter dispute over Tacna and Arica. Similarly, successful attempts have been made to bring the all too individualistic republics of Central America into something like harmony, though not as yet into actual union. In these excellent enterprises the government at Washington has shown tact as well as benevolence. It has also fortunately been able to refrain so far from actual intervention in Cuba, even if conditions have been such as to invite action. But however beneficial a resumption of American authority in the island might be, there is no telling where it would end and no escaping the fact that it would produce a disastrous impression in many of the other Latin countries of this hemisphere.

The policy followed by the United States in regard to Hayti, San Domingo, and Nicaragua also serves as a touchstone for those fearful of Yankee imperialism. Here again the conduct of the present administration has been conciliatory. As the various interventions in these states were begun under a Republican administration and maintained and developed under a Demo-

cratic one, they have not become party questions. But of late the American public, which at first paid little heed to what had taken place, has shown a disposition to look into the matter more closely and to disapprove of the depriving of even turbulent or backward peoples of their right to manage their own affairs. President Harding and his advisers, without condemning the conduct of their predecessors, have tended to regard the task of pacification and reorganization of these backward regions as satisfactorily completed, and to terminate direct American control. The three republics should soon be standing once more on their own feet.

With the President of Mexico we are still without official relations. For better or for worse, in sickness or in health, the United States has on its border a great expanse of territory inhabited by a people of Spanish civilization but predominantly of Indian blood, a territory full of undeveloped resources to tempt the capitalist and exploiter, a people the immense majority of whom are uneducated peasants easily degenerating into banditti, or soldiers ready to follow any turbulent, ambitious leader. And high or low, their instinct is to fear and hate their northern neighbor, while recognizing that they have a certain need of his superior knowledge and enterprise. The continual revolutions since the downfall of Diza have been accompanied by great loss to American property and many atrocities against American citizens. Twice during the Wilson administration the United States interfered by force, first at

Vera Cruz, second by Pershing's expedition across the Rio Grande in pursuit of Villa. In neither instance was the result entirely satisfactory, and intervention on a large scale has more than once looked probable. But the huge cost of any such intervention and the immeasurable difficulties to which it might lead, besides its wide unpopularity at home and the disapproval and suspicion it would arouse throughout Latin America, have been more than enough to make the authorities in Washington hesitate before committing this country to a course with such grave possibilities. Like its predecessor, the present administration has preferred to follow a conservative policy, and so far it has been fortunate in not having to deal with as critical a situation as the one which faced President Wilson at the time of his accession and on several later occasions. While not adopting an unfriendly attitude towards the government of General Obregon, it has refused to grant him formal recognition until it has received sufficient guarantees for the security of the lives and property of those of its citizens who are carrying on legitimate business in Mexico. It has not felt called upon to show itself sympathetic, but it has been patient and forbearing, and has worked quietly for a better future.

Unsatisfactory as such a policy may be to the few in the United States who have favored armed intervention or to those at the other extreme who would at any time grasp the hand of Mexico, bloodstained or not, it has so far commended itself to public opinion, which realizes the complexities of the Mexican prob-

lem and is willing to leave it to the government to deal with them. It has also met with a measure of appreciation in other Latin-American countries where Mexico does not just now enjoy overmuch respect. As for those Mexicans who dream of an ally against the United States, they turn their eyes, imperial Germany having vanished from the scene, not to their kinsmen to the southward but across the sea to Japan.

The Far Eastern question, both in its immediate seriousness and in its latent possibilities, presented the most urgent problem of foreign policy inherited by the Harding administration. On the one hand, the Chinese were showing themselves distressingly incapable of orderly self-government; on the other, the position of Japan seemed to be becoming permanently dominant in that part of the world in a way unfavorable to American interests. Meanwhile the relations between the United States and Japan, which had been growing slowly but steadily worse since the Peace of Portsmouth in 1905, had now become almost openly unfriendly owing to events connected with the World War. American public opinion disapproved of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, of Japan's twenty-one demands on China, of the conduct of the Japanese in Siberia, of the Japanese retention of Shantung. American business men dreaded unfair commercial rivalry, and American naval officers saw a peril in the development of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese on their part resented the American attitude of race exclusion, and Japanese soldiers, statesmen and others of imperialistic

tendencies had come to regard the United States as the successor to China and Russia in constituting the chief obstacle in the path of their future expansion and greatness. By 1921 the Far Eastern situation was not one for further watchful waiting, which would mean competition of armaments with increased suspicion on both sides. What was required was bold, statesmanlike action.

The government at Washington rose to the occasion. It interwove with the peculiar necessities of the Far East the world-wide demand for a reduction of the crushing burden of armaments, and called an international conference to discuss both subjects. When the conference assembled, America took the lead with dramatic suddenness by her proposal for scrapping several battleships and for a ratio in future ship-building which, for mutual benefit, should put an end to competition with Great Britain and Japan, the only other formidable naval powers. After the first moment of surprise the proposal, whose sincere honesty of intention could hardly be doubted, was accepted with few modifications; and though not many of the later suggestions in regard to lighter vessels and to submarines were equally fortunate, here too something was accomplished.

The question of the Far East presented greater difficulties, but again our representatives, aided by the good-will they met on all sides and by the notable moderation of the Japanese, won a signal success. It may be that American naval authorities have grounds

for dissatisfaction at the outcome, and that other critics are right in thinking that Japan has reserved for herself more advantages than are apparent to the layman. Time alone can show the truth of this. But there is no denying that the Americans have obtained the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese treaty — a pretty harmless compact in its later years but one that had got on their nerves. They have also obtained a more formal recognition than ever before of the open door and of various other provisions intended to keep China on her feet; and since the conference, and primarily as the result of it, the Japanese, contrary to all pessimistic prophecies, have evacuated both Shantung and Eastern Siberia. Another fortunate consequence was a dissipation of suspicions and a genuine increase in good feeling between most of the participants. All told, the achievement at Washington may rank high in history.

Unfortunately this achievement is not yet complete enough for us to pass a final judgment on it. It still lacks ratification both from those who took part and from those who did not. The conference also was not productive of good feeling only. On the contrary, it embittered relations between France and England and impaired those between France and the United States. Although the French made mistakes, the fault was not all theirs. At the very outset the American delegates (it has been rumored that Mr. Hughes was not the one to blame in this respect) were guilty of a serious error in tact. Perhaps thinking that the fewer people you have to consult about an agreement the easier it is to

reach, they decided not to include France in the preliminary program as to relative naval strength but to establish her quota of capital ships, like that of Italy, as a secondary matter later. The proportion allotted her seemed reasonable enough. She not only did not have to scrap any existing vessels but had a leeway to build more new ones than she had any immediate intention or likelihood of doing. Nevertheless this manner of proceeding showed lack of understanding. It overlooked the fact that France, with her vast colonial empire, which during the World War had contributed so much to her resources, felt that her need of a great sea power to defend her communications was second to none. And, with a certain Anglo-Saxon lack of imagination, it forgot that during most of the last two centuries France had been the second maritime power in the world and that she cherished with legitimate pride the traditions and glories of her navy. She had been obliged to neglect her fleets while she devoted her strength to winning the war on land, and now, after a glorious victory bought with her heart's blood, she was invited, without previous consultation, to accept a position of permanent naval inferiority, one far below that of Great Britain and the United States, well beneath the Asiatic empire of Japan, and only on a level with Italy, the jealous rival whose geographic position menaces her vital communication with her North African possessions. Small wonder that the French delegates to the conference, although they ended by accepting the ratio as to capital ships, showed

themselves intractable regarding lighter vessels and submarines, not to speak of land armaments. Their foolish tactics and other blunders were soon recognized and condemned at home, but this did not prevent France from feeling that she had come out of the conference belittled and humiliated. She believed, too, that wittingly or unwittingly the Americans had played the English game at her expense. Franco-American relations have never been quite the same since.

When the Washington treaties were once signed, the American public took it for granted rather too easily that ratification would soon follow in all the countries concerned. Rumors of French dissatisfaction made no more impression in Washington than similar expressions of opinion in the United States did in Paris in 1919. But M. Poincaré has not seemed in a hurry to bring the matter to a vote in the Chamber. The desire of America to see the treaties ratified has been one of the few cards that the French Government has held in its hand in discussions with Washington. Naturally it has not wished to discard it prematurely. And now when the two Anglo-Saxon powers, her late comrades in arms, have left her, with outspoken disapproval of her conduct, to struggle with her own difficulties and perils, she is not in a mood to renounce any rights of self-defence that she possesses. She may deem it wise to ratify the disarmament treaty as well as the others, but if she does not, or puts in amendments, we need not be surprised. To the charge of failure to honor

their signature and of sacrificing the cause of humanity to their own blind selfishness, the retort of the French would be only too obvious.

Another — perhaps not mistake but flaw — in the Washington Conference was that it did not include all the parties interested. To have brought in any of the Latin-American states might have complicated matters unnecessarily, though there was something strange in the exclusion, from a conference dealing with the Pacific, of Chile, which of all countries has the longest coast on that ocean. But the omission of Russia was a different affair. Under the circumstances it could hardly be helped. But the defect was none the less serious, not in respect to the naval agreement — Russia is not going to build a formidable fleet just yet — but in the Far Eastern questions. No one can pretend that Russia is not deeply interested in the Far East and that her assent is not necessary sooner or later to any permanent arrangement there. Chicherin in vigorous but dignified language twice protested formally against her being left out, and declared that she would regard as invalid any agreement, however good in itself, concluded without her participation. The protest went unheeded, and we may suspect that the backstairs conversations carried on with her satellite, the Far Eastern Republic, were prompted in part by a desire to detach it from Soviet influence. If this was the case the plan failed completely. When the necessity of foreign support was over, the camouflage of Far Eastern independence was promptly abandoned, all

other opposition collapsed, and the word of Moscow is now law at Vladivostok. Russia has indeed cause to be grateful to American policy for helping to get the Japanese out of Siberia, a thing she was too weak to bring about by herself; but gratitude counts for nothing in such cases. She is in a position to bide her time in the Far East and to make trouble when she chooses to; and when the day comes that she is ready to adhere to the Washington compacts we may expect her to ask her price.

Seldom have the relations between two countries been more curious than those between Russia and the United States during the last four years. Although the Soviet revolution of November, 1917, was as generally disapproved in the United States as the February one which overthrew Tsar Nicholas II had been approved, American diplomatic representatives remained in Russia for a year and a half longer. Their position was most anomalous. While refusing to recognize the new authorities, they were obliged to deal with them; indeed, President Wilson himself directly addressed the Lenin administration and appealed to it in vain not to make peace with Germany. Still they stayed on, finally withdrawing to Archangel, which was occupied by an Allied force containing an American contingent that played its part in the winter fighting of 1918-1919. Other American troops were sent to Siberia, though they were forbidden to penetrate far; yet Russia and the United States were not and have not been at war. The so-called Bullitt mission was joyously greeted in

Moscow, and aroused unwarranted hopes, followed by speedy disappointment. After the recall of the American troops from Archangel and Vladivostok, relations ceased almost entirely.

One of the questions confronting Mr. Hughes when he came into office was what attitude he was going to adopt towards the Soviet government, now firmly established and desirous of resuming contact with the outside world, particularly with the United States. American public opinion, though somewhat allured by fancied possibilities of trade and concessions in Russia and especially Siberia, still in the main regarded the Bolsheviks and all their doings with unfeigned horror, and the régime they had established as a thing monstrous and unclean. Consequently, when, in response to an overture from Moscow for the opening of trade relations, Secretary Hughes made on March 25, 1921, a clear pronouncement that the Soviet government did not yet present the guarantees of respect for life and property, the sanctity of contract, and the right of free labor which would authorize America to recognize it, he met with general approval. He has repeated this statement since, to the sad disappointment of Moscow, which had indulged in rosy day-dreams of American assistance in putting her on her feet again, and which even had entertained fancies of a political understanding directed against England and Japan.

There is much to be said for the policy of aloofness pursued so far by the administration, like its predecessor, both on moral grounds — though the Bolsheviks

and their friends here can hardly be expected to agree—and on those of worldly wisdom, in view of the uncertainties which becloud almost everything Russian. The claim, too, that the desire for American recognition exercises a salutary influence on the Soviet leaders cannot be entirely rejected. At any rate it is absurd to declare, as has been done, that by our non-recognition we are outlawing one hundred and thirty million people and maintaining a blockade against them. No blockade is being maintained. Any American may trade with Russia at his own risk and peril, and grow rich thereby if he can, but his government does not feel bound to aid and protect him in his enterprise. As for outlawry, it is a strange charge to bring when one nation has for a year and a half been feeding and succoring the other on a scale quite without parallel in history.

The news of the appalling misery which the economic breakdown, followed by famine, had brought upon millions in Russia touched the generous heart of the American people. To what extent the Russians themselves, or at least the men they had chosen or allowed to govern them, were responsible for the calamity did not affect the central fact of the terrific suffering of vast numbers of human beings. Fortunately there was ready, in the form of the American Relief Administration under Secretary Hoover, an organization comprising many men of tried ability in dealing with situations of this kind. The very magnitude of the task only made them the more anxious to undertake it. The appeal of Maxim Gorki met with a ready response;

an agreement with the Soviet authorities was reached at Riga, and the work of relief was begun at once and has been carried on ever since with magnificent success.

The theory that the whole relief work was a private unofficial enterprise has been strictly maintained from the start. The circumstance that the president of the relief association happened to be one of the most prominent members of President Harding's Cabinet was treated as if it were a coincidence. But the food and other supplies soon ceased to be furnished by private charity alone, which, however great, was manifestly insufficient to meet the demand. Huge quantities of medical and other stores accumulated for the war were turned over, and Congress voted a sum of about twenty millions to be used for Russian relief. But though all this had been done for the people of Russia and necessarily in coöperation with her officials, no formal recognition has yet been extended to her government, although it has now been in existence for five years, although it rules over eight million square miles of territory and has never looked firmer than at the present moment. Could paradox well go further?

But supposing one says "so far so good," one cannot help wondering how much longer this policy can be continued. Sooner or later it must come to an end, even if the present communist system and methods remain unchanged, for Russia is too large a portion of the globe to be sent permanently to coventry. Whether we like it or not, she exists and she cannot be forever ignored. It is true, the United States is still in a posi-

tion to choose its own time, but something may be lost by waiting too long. Anxious as the Soviet government is for American recognition and capital, it is not disposed to submit to severe or humiliating terms. It has shown by the way it snubbed the suggestion of an American commission of investigation that it does not intend to be condescended to; indeed the fate of the similar suggestion of an international relief commission in 1921 might have warned Washington of the futility of the proposal. There are inconveniences, too, in not having Russia seated at the board of nations and adding her signature to international treaties. She will have to be dealt with later and perhaps paid for compliance with the arrangements made by others. The State Department will do well to remember that Russian interest in the Far East is at least equal to ours, and that in the question of the Straits it is many times greater. The Straits are, in truth, more vital to her than the Panama Canal is to us. Chicherin's manners at Lausanne may not have been ingratiating, but there was some soundness in his contentions, and Russian views in that part of the world cannot be left out of account indefinitely. Likewise there is no gainsaying a certain force to the argument that, if we lag behind the others in our recognition of Russia and her claims, American capital and trade are in danger of finding occupied certain profitable fields which they might have secured by an earlier appearance. It is also asserted that we shall be able to do more to succor the Russian people when we are again on good terms with

their government. Be that as it may, the movement in favor of recognizing Soviet Russia as part of the general world settlement is gaining ground in the United States.

But whatever are the complications of the Russian problem, they are of far less pressing consequence to the welfare of the American people than the situation in western Europe. To be sure, the rôle of the United States looked simple at first. When the Republican Party came into power, the temper of the triumphant majority, reflected in Congress and to a lesser degree in the administration, demanded a policy of letting Europe stew in her own juice. The Americans had done for others more than anyone had a right to expect. It was time now to attend to their own affairs and mend their fences. They had claimed no undue reparations, they asked for no favors, only a respect for their rights and a fair field for their enterprises. The selfish rivalries and unedifying disputes of the European powers, great and small, old and new, were things to keep out of.

This reaction against the high-strung idealism of the war time and in favor of a policy of enlightened selfishness was natural in itself and in one form or another common to many countries. The first decisive step taken by the new administration was to arrange for a peace with Germany (followed by similar ones with Austria and Hungary), stipulating for America whatever advantages she would have obtained under the Treaty of Versailles, but without assuming the obliga-

tions. She has, however, felt sufficient interest in the workings of some of the financial provisions of that treaty to keep an unofficial member on the Reparations Commission, although Congress showed its fear of commitments by forbidding that he be made official without its consent. In the second place, Secretary Hughes has propounded and sharply maintained the doctrine that the United States, owing to its participation in the war, is entitled to a voice in the question of mandates and that it shares in the priority of payments for the expenses of the military occupation of the German Rhine territories, in which, rather illogically, but for the general benefit, it continued to take part till the other day. In all these questions the American Government has stood on firm ground, though it has not erred from excess of generosity. As the Senate had refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, peace had to be made in some other way, the sooner the better.

But obvious as this was, the disappointment at our action was keen throughout Europe. So much had been hoped of America, of her lack of selfish interests, of her generosity and, above all, of her abundant resources, that even disillusioned statesmen, as well as incurable idealists and the eager public, have found it hard to get over the hope that she would presently "come back." Every time an unofficial "observer" has attended an international conference, or Mr. J. P. Morgan has made a visit to Paris, or encouraging remarks have been delivered by some Congressman,

rumors have immediately been rife. And repeated disappointment has inevitably led to a great loss of American popularity, a loss all the greater because neither the governments nor the public have dared to express their feelings openly. They are still too anxious for our assistance to indulge in frankness where we are concerned. But this very necessity for hypocrisy and subservience tends to embitter them. Even the continued outpourings of American generosity, especially in the devastated region of France, in the Near East, and in Russia, while awakening much local gratitude, have occasionally been likened to the charity of the rich Pharisee.

Unmoved, however, by European lamentation, the American people and their representatives have hardened their hearts. They have refused to take official part at Genoa, at The Hague, or at Lausanne, they have disclaimed all interest in the political affairs of the old world and fought shy of discussing the financial ones, knowing full well that every plan of rehabilitation presupposed a large contribution from them. The persistence and the naïve tactlessness with which their good offices have been solicited have irritated them and strengthened their conviction that, even if Europe is in need of aid, it is not the business of the United States to serve as a milch cow to anybody and everybody.

But as the months have gone by, men have begun to wake up to the existence of certain unpalatable facts — facts, it is true long, predicted, but rejected with contumely by the dominant Republican Party. The first

of these is that, whether the United States does or does not have a political interest in European affairs, it certainly has an economic one, and that, if Europe, through no matter whose fault, keeps on going to the dogs and cannot buy American products, then America cannot sell them, which means loss to her shipping and her trade, to her farmers, her manufacturers, and her laborers. Besides, how are the European powers to pay their debts if they have no money? These unwelcome lessons have been slow in penetrating, but bad times have driven them home. To-day, although the American people have no more desire than before to get mixed in the "damned mess" on the other side of the Atlantic, their attitude towards such questions as reparations has been passing from indifference to painful solicitude. It is all very well to say that Europe must first put her own house in order before we extend assistance to her, but suppose she is perverse enough not to do so? Are we going to let her go to a ruin that will have disastrous reactions on us when by assisting her in the right way we might also benefit ourselves?

This query has been raised with ever-increasing insistence and has had its effect on the voters as well as on the powers that be. Even before the striking evidence of the November elections some of the Republican leaders were uncomfortably conscious of the increasing unpopularity of their party. The elections and many other signs, including the new light which has dawned on Senator Borah, have made it evident that a change is taking place in public opinion. The

widespread discontent of the farmers and the growing belief among them that they need a prosperous Europe which can buy American products has been revolutionizing the whole tone in regard to participation in European affairs. Granting, at least for the sake of argument, that the crux of the difficulties lies in the question of reparations, and that on its speedy and proper settlement the welfare of Europe and of the world depend, then the sooner the United States, the one disinterested and yet deeply interested party, takes a hand in that settlement, the better for all concerned.

There are certain facts about the reparations question which might as well be faced at the start. It is admitted on all sides that Germany cannot possibly pay more than a fraction of the contribution originally imposed upon her, and it has been feared that the attempt to collect something by force would bring about chaos and revolution. France, though recognizing the peril, believes that Germany has so far cheated about the payments, and meanwhile she herself, in order to build up her devastated districts, has incurred vast expenses based on the money promised her. Unless she receives it she will go bankrupt. If somebody is to be ruined she does not see why it should be she rather than Germany. At any rate, if she cannot get what she is entitled to she should at least be released from her own financial obligations. England accuses France of a mad desire to destroy Germany, regardless of the harm it may do others. For her part she is willing to

relinquish much in order to put German credit on its feet again, but she sees virtue in the principle "forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors," a principle she expressed in the wrong way in the ill-starred Balfour note. She has enormous sums owed to her, and like France, Italy, and several others of the Allies, she owes enormous sums to the United States.

But the American public has until very recently shown itself resolutely hostile to any remitting of the Allied debts. It has taken the ground that America did more than her share in the war and alone asked for nothing in return. Her allies, for whom she made such sacrifices, ought at least to be willing to pay back what they borrowed from her. She too needs money. Repayment would mean the lightening of the grievous tax burden of the American citizen, and would be quite possible if the European nations would reduce their expenses for armies and other reprehensible objects. Civilized society rests on the sanctity of contracts. What if the bankers in the United States and especially in New York do believe that repayment is not only impossible but undesirable? The answer is that that unpopular class thinks only of its own interests and cares nothing for those of the people.

The strength of the popular feeling on this subject was strikingly manifested in the Refunding bill at the very beginning of President Harding's administration. The Senate, of which he had so recently been a member, was presumably most friendly to him and disposed to listen to his wishes, and yet on the mere suspicion

that Secretary Mellon might be too soft-hearted, instead of giving him the discretion which he asked for to deal with foreign nations according to the circumstances in each case, it enjoined him by law to exact repayment within twenty-five years and it set a four and a quarter per cent rate of interest. He was thus practically ordered to browbeat rather than to negotiate. There is truth, though there may be exaggeration, in the alleged remark of Mr. Stanley Baldwin that "the debt has got on the nerves of the American people and there is no sentiment whatever in favor of cancellation. The word makes them shy all along the line." Matters were not helped by the speech of Secretary Hoover of October last in which he blurted out that the Allied debts could and should be paid.

Now it is all very well to say that one's own bad debts have nothing to do with what one honestly owes somebody else. That is theory, logic, morality if you please, but it is not human nature. To men or nations in financial difficulties there is a very real relation between money which has been promised to them and money which they have promised to others. To expect that the harassed French people, for instance, will freely forgive what Germany, their enemy, owes them while at the same time they will pay all they owe us, their friend and associate, is to ask a good deal. Similarly there is no sign that the Italians think of paying anyone. We may assert, as Secretary Hughes has, that the limit of Germany's indebtedness for reparations is the limit of her capacity, which has no connection with

what the Allies owe us. In their minds their own capacity to pay depends on what they are to receive, and if stern necessity forces them to consent to a reduction of what they ought to get, they fail to see why the only wealthy country should be the only one exempt from further sacrifices. There may be flaws in their reasoning but it will be hard to shake their conviction that the fair and feasible solution among the late Allied and Associated Powers would be a clean slate, and if there is to be an international economic conference there is just as much reason for it to take up Allied debts as reparations. Even England, which has been the most willing and can best afford to attempt repayment, has shared in these sentiments. She has shown that she will not flinch from painful sacrifices to maintain her unsullied financial honor, but in their hearts many Englishmen feel that our conduct is shabby, the more so as our new tariff makes repayment by the sale of goods to us impossible. As things now stand, none of the countries which owe us money wishes to dishonor its signature or will admit the thought of doing so, but all of them are anxious to be forgiven their debts, and in none of them do the people at bottom believe they ever will pay them, can pay them, or should pay them. What are we going to do about it? How do we propose to collect?

Under these circumstances the position of the State Department has not been an enviable one. The Disarmament Conference owed its success in large measure to the fact that the United States began the proceed

ings with the announcement of a great, definite sacrifice that it was prepared to make for the common good if others would do likewise. But owing to the obligations imposed by Congress in the Refunding Act, the precedent then set cannot be followed now in respect to reparations and Allied debts. Instead, a compromise contrary to the terms of the bill has first to be arranged in secret and then referred to Congress to be condoned.

This was what was done in the case of the Stanley Baldwin mission. The spirit of the negotiators on both sides seems to have been of the best and an acceptable compromise was agreed upon. The approbation of Congress had then to be obtained. It came with a celerity which showed that that body has learned a good deal in the last year or so about what is possible and what is not in the present financial condition of Europe. This is fortunate, as our other debtors are much less solvent than England. They are also more vitally affected by the question of reparations, on which the fate of western Europe now hinges.

By December last the situation, both at home and abroad, was such as to impress the administration with the necessity for positive, constructive action. The elections showed how it had lost credit throughout the country, and even among the Republicans its conduct of foreign affairs was being criticized with more and more acerbity by the groups represented by the Irreconcilables on the one side and the Committee of Thirty-One on the other. If, as some declared, its only notable or at least spectacular achievement since it had

been in power was in the field of foreign policy,— the Disarmament Conference,— should it not try another venture of the kind? Apparently it appreciated this, and though one can hardly say that it took the lead, it threw out feelers and sounded the way. The open initiative came, as in the case of the Disarmament Conference, from Senator Borah. His proposal of an international conference elicited the slightly querulous letter in which the President pointed out to Senator Lodge and to the American people how he was hampered by the restrictions imposed upon him by Congress. Next day Secretary Hughes in his New Haven speech announced that he had already intimated to the Allied powers that, if they were unable to agree as to the amount of reparations Germany could pay, America was willing to attend an economic conference which should harmonize their differences.

This idea was favorably received and Senator Borah withdrew his motion. But luck was running against the administration. Four days later the English and French in Paris disagreed on almost every point except the total of reparations, which was just the one that America was offering to help them out on. Then came the French occupation of the Ruhr — it is said, quite contrary to the expectations of the State Department and in spite of previous intimations of American disapproval. The somewhat unseemly dispute as to how officially these intimations had been conveyed, and the abrupt manner in which the withdrawal of the American contingent from the Rhine was decreed, looked like

a show of temper and detracted from the dignity of the step. It soon became evident, too, that the government was more surprised and shocked than the public was. The Boyden incident also was unfortunate and it stimulated the dissatisfaction already expressed in many quarters with the system of "unofficial observers." All told, the prestige of Secretary Hughes has suffered severely.

It must be admitted that except in the case of the Disarmament Conference the foreign policy of President Harding's administration has not been such as to make the heart beat quicker with patriotic pride. It has generally been wise and it has been cautious, it has given heed to the popular principle of "safety first" and it has avoided encouraging hopes it was unable to fulfill and making demands it was not sure it could enforce. It has looked after American interests and has asserted them convincingly and firmly, and has usually ended by carrying its point. It has been courteous and aboveboard in its dealings, and it has maintained a fair neutrality amidst the jarring discord of the powers which have appealed for its support or tried to use it against one another.

On the other hand, this policy has not often been inspiring. It has been that of the careful householder who has recently been overspending his income and has decided that charity begins at home, which is too apt to mean that it ends there. One finds it hard to deny a certain truth to the charge so often made in Europe and increasingly in this country, that from the

separate peace with Germany to the Conference at Lausanne, where it sent not observers but debaters, to claim and to harangue but to sign nothing, the United States, while refusing to recognize obligations, has insisted on its rights and privileges. It has been prompt to claim "equal opportunities" but slow to admit equal responsibilities. In this the government has only reflected, perhaps too readily, the prevalent mood of the American people and particularly of Congress. We have preferred to confine our altruism to direct charity and to pious homilies; we have sympathized with, succored, and talked about the suffering Armenians, but like western Europe we have left it to Bolshevik Russia to be the first to offer a refuge to the hundreds of thousands of homeless exiles. We have been willing to feed stricken Europe but not to lend our help in trying to reconstitute it. The reasons for this may have been compelling but they will hardly be regarded as a subject of national pride. Nor can we wonder if Europe sometimes listens to our exhortations and admonitions with a "weary impatience," and neither France nor Germany nor any other country cares to meet us again in general conference unless we have something to proffer besides advice. Even the President's belated recommendation that we should now take part in the World Court, however significant and admirable in itself, will look to many Europeans in their agonies like offering them, not the bread they are starving for, but a stone.

Few would deny that the international situation at

the present moment is charged with ominous possibilities. The momentous decision of the French to wait no longer, but to obtain by an occupation of territory a guarantee for the reparations they have been promised, has started a crisis of the utmost gravity whose outcome it is impossible to foresee. In that crisis American opinion has not yet found itself. Although there are many who condemn the action of the French and others who think it was a fatal mistake, it has been far more generally approved than had been expected. Clearly France still has a host of partisans and enjoys greater popularity among the American people than she does in official circles in Washington. The whole country is watching the outcome with deep interest. The Irreconcilables declare that the wisdom of their policy is proved by the event, the Democrats scoff at the "fumbling" of the administration, the champions of the League of Nations have gathered new courage and believe their cause is gaining ground. Their contention that the civilized world would never have got into its present disastrous state if America had not refused to join the League is a telling argument hard to disprove.

And now, goaded by the criticisms directed against it from every quarter, the administration in the last hours of its second year of foreign policy has taken a step which will be interpreted by both friends and foes as an approach to the League. Our adhesion to the World Court created by it would constitute a recognition of the utility and the moral authority of the

League, hitherto denied. Whether this beginning of community of action would lead towards ultimate membership will be widely debated, and we may doubt if the intentions of the White House itself are quite clear in this respect. But the issue has been raised for discussion long months before it can be settled. Its importance, vast as that is, lies in its bearing on the future. The World Court offers no refuge from existing difficulties.

One thing is plain. America, however reluctantly, is preparing anew to take an open, active part in the settlement of European questions. She is troubled and hesitating, but sooner or later she will have to put her hand to the plough to aid in the redemption of a Europe now physically and morally devastated. The Harding administration has of late appeared to be drifting somewhat helplessly. It has reached a critical period in its career. During the last two years it has more than once shown in its foreign as in its domestic policy that it possessed wisdom. What are also needed by it and by the nation at the present juncture are vision and courage — the vision that sees beyond the needs of the day and looks to a better world, the courage that will meet and overcome obstacles and will not shrink from sacrifice.

THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

THE hundredth anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine has now been duly celebrated. In the literature elicited by this occasion the dominant note has been one of satisfaction and of praise. Plainly the American people with few exceptions are proud of the Monroe Doctrine. They look on it as a monument to the wisdom of the fathers. They believe that it has proved beneficial, not only to themselves, but to the whole Western Hemisphere, without giving cause of legitimate umbrage to the rest of the world, for it is a doctrine of defence, not aggression. It has been and still is the shield of many a weak state. So far from being "an obsolete shibboleth," it is as living to-day¹ as when it was first enunciated and is admitted to be the fundamental principle of our foreign policy, from which no statesman at Washington may swerve even by a hair's breadth.

To be sure, these views come a little more glibly from the Republicans than from the Democrats. The Monroe Doctrine did get into the Peace of Versailles, but it was rather as an after-thought with the not very inspiring appellation of a "regional understanding." It

¹ See *The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth*, by Hiram Bingham, Yale Press, 1913. The fact that the author revised his opinions later does not make the book less worth reading.

THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

may not be incompatible with the League of Nations, but the relations between the two require a certain amount of explanation. This explanation the Democrats have offered, — indeed they have had to keep on offering it, — put at the best theirs is only a defensive attitude, however vigorous, while the Republicans can expatiate on the triumphant continuity of the truly American policy from the days of Monroe and John Quincy Adams to those of Harding and Hughes. Certainly its success has been remarkable and great is its present renown.

A century ago, when the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, though it warmed the heart of people at home, its effect abroad was less than many have imagined. In actual fact it did not attract widespread attention in Europe or enthusiasm in South America, nor can one demonstrate that it had any direct influence in the settlement of the two questions which led to its formulation — namely, the attempt of the Russians to extend their American coast to the southward, and the half-formed, quickly abandoned, plan of the Holy Alliance to assist Spain in the subjugation of her insurgent colonies. But the new principle was launched, and to-day there are no nations, great or small, which do not know that they must regard it as the ark of the covenant of the foreign policy of the most powerful country in the world. Its enforcement is ensured by the determination of the American people with all the immense strength, moral as well as material, which they represent. No European minister is now in a

position to reject any part of it as outspokenly as was done by Canning, or sixty years later by Lord Salisbury. It may not be liked everywhere, but it has been recognized by the fifty-four states who have joined the League and there can be little doubt of their readiness to pay it whatever further respects may be required.

The Monroe Doctrine is, as we have always admitted, based on mixed motives. This is proper and human. The harping on its altruistic side to an extent which arouses the cynical amusement, if not the actual wrath, of the foreigner, is also natural enough, even if perhaps peculiarly characteristic of the English-speaking peoples. Nevertheless, no reasonable critic can deny that in regard to it there has been altruism in the attitude, and on numerous occasions in the conduct, of the United States towards its sister republics. Even to-day when the necessity of protecting them is pretty well passed, there is a strong popular sentiment, not to say sentimentality, about them — a sentimentality, be it noted, that does not extend to Canada, which is nearer to us in almost every respect, but which has so far been content to enjoy her liberties under a monarchical government. As has been well said by Mr. Root, the Monroe Doctrine “crystallized the sentiment for human liberty and human rights which has saved American idealism from the demoralization of narrow selfishness, and has given to American democracy its true world power in the virile potency of a great example.”

This idealism, which still exists, helps to account for

the enthusiastic support accorded by the American public, regardless of party, not only to the words of President Monroe, but to the later applications of his policy. The most striking example was in the case of the Venezuelan boundary dispute, a matter no one had heard of before President Cleveland sent his message to Congress, but which the country was quite ready to go to war about, although the territory under discussion was in itself negligible. On the other hand, the tangible material advantages which the Monroe Doctrine has ensured and still seems to promise require no subtlety for their comprehension by the average voter as well as by those who guide his opinions. Its popularity is therefore established. Whatever uncertainty there may be as to its status and its prospect of duration may be ascribed, not to weakness or to lack of faith in its devotees or to the might and perversity of its adversaries, but to defects in its own nature, if there be such, or else to tendencies of the age which threaten it with decadence. What are these defects or tendencies and why should we entertain doubts about the future?

To answer this we must begin by examining a theory which is too often presupposed as a fact, namely, that there is an especial community of interests and aspirations between the peoples of the western world. If so, why so? On what is that community based? Some would say on geography, but this view, which though common has never been very sound, is becoming every year more antiquated. As time goes on, the division of

the world by continents has less and less actual significance. For instance, as a political, cultural, or economic entity, the old conception of a separate "Europe" has lost most of its meaning. Either it should include Siberia or it should not include Russia, for the Urals no more mark a division between the two than do the Alleghenies between our own East and West. Again, who will maintain that a Frenchman from Algeria, even if born and bred there like M. Viviani, is in any true sense an African, and that his natural affinities should draw him not towards Paris but Timbuku? In the same way, why should the circumstance that the United States and Argentina happen to be connected by land (a matter of physical geography but of no practical consequence) outweigh the fact that Buenos Ayres is about as near to London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome, and New York is much nearer, than Buenos Ayres and New York are to one another? Calling them in the same hemisphere does not bring them any closer together. And what is true geographically is equally true economically. Foreign trade depends on many variable as well as permanent factors, among which sentimental ones are apt to play a small part and are not likely to be durable. There is no inherent reason why non-contiguous American countries should deal with each other rather than with anyone else. In the long run trade will follow whatever are the natural lines.

If we come to cultural affinities the case is still clearer. By and large, the average American, even

when like the late President Roosevelt not primarily of English descent, has more in common not only with the Englishman but with other northern Europeans than he has with the vast majority of Latin Americans. He is also at bottom more interested in them and their countries. Ireland is nearer to us in miles than is Uruguay. It also means, and will mean, much more to us. To be sure, we have ten million negroes in the United States who may feel more akin to the blacks in Hayti or Brazil than they do to Europeans. Still it can hardly be said that it is for their especial benefit that we are fostering Pan Americanism.

We stand on firmer ground in another argument which is frequently urged in behalf of the Monroe Doctrine and of Pan Americanism, to wit, the similarity in historical origin, in political outlook, and in the problems to be confronted by the young independent states of this hemisphere. That there is a certain amount of similarity between them in these respects is undeniable. Historically the republics of the new world have freed themselves from European domination and monarchical rule and have thereby cast off many of the trammels of the past; they are still sparsely peopled over much of their extent and are full of untapped resources which give them the expectation of a brilliant future. They have thus the freshness and vigor, the hopes and the ideals of youth, as contrasted with the hoary antiquity of Asia and Europe. This in itself has been enough to create a natural bond of sympathy between them.

So far so good, but we must not forget that in these days republics are the rule, not the exception. There are as many of them in Europe as there are in South America. Liberty has made enormous strides in the last generation, and the despotisms of to-day are no longer based on the divine rights of kings. Some of the new republics of the Eastern Hemisphere may be as oppressive and as ruthless as the systems they have dispossessed, but there are no such theoretical differences between our "system" and that of Europe as there were when President Monroe wrote about them, nor, except in the case of Russia, is there any essential discrepancy in political outlook. As for the protection we have extended against foreign interference, forms of government have had little or nothing to do with it — witness the fact that for the last fifty years the United States would no more have tolerated aggression against an American state on the part of the French Republic than it would have on that of the British Empire.

Similarity of problems to be faced unquestionably tends to create a tie, or at least understanding, between peoples as it does between individuals. It is more or less correct, too, though decreasingly so as the years pass, to divide countries into old and new from the point of view of their economic development. The republics of the Western Hemisphere are all of them new countries with many of the same sort of difficulties to solve. This gives them a community of interests and, to a certain extent, of viewpoint. What can be

more natural than for them to coöperate and to proffer to one another the benefit of suggestion if not of actual assistance in the carrying out of their manifold tasks, as has been done in the Pan-American Scientific Congresses and other non-political conferences which can arouse no objection and should be productive of good to all concerned. Parenthetically, we may regret that Canada has so far not been invited to take part. To leave her out is ridiculous and betrays a narrow-minded reluctance to get away from nationalistic conceptions. One must admit, too, that the term "the new world" cannot properly be confined to the Western Hemisphere. Australia, New Zealand and most of South Africa and Siberia are in truth just as new countries as are the United States or Brazil or Peru, and offer like problems to be solved and helpful illustrations of how to solve them. Of course this is not a reason against coöperation for the common good between the American republics themselves, but it does strengthen the doubt whether the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan Americanism which has grown out of it are based on any unusual solidarity between the commonwealths concerned.

Finally it should be remembered that the policy of "America for the Americans" until recently has been accompanied by a clear admission that, if Europe must keep out of American affairs, it is incumbent on America to keep out of European ones. This has been proclaimed again and again, and is to-day the official dogma of the Republican Party. On the whole, the

principle has been well observed in practice. American statesmen have more than once resisted not only temptations but urgent solicitations to take a hand in the settlement of European questions. In their refusal to do so they have met with popular approval. But willy-nilly, as time has gone on, we have become increasingly involved, and this not through desire of our own but through the working of the improved means of communication and of the vast economic forces which have brought the different parts of the world so much nearer to one another. American interests, political as well as commercial and cultural, have expanded. Already before the World War we had shown that we were willing to intervene in Asia and even acquire possessions there, and it is no longer true that "in the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do." On the contrary, we have taken part on a tremendous scale, with results of incalculable importance for the future. Of course the Monroe Doctrine never suggested that we should not respond to provocation, and with our whole might. We did so and exacted the satisfaction we were entitled to, but in so doing we sent huge armies across the seas, assumed an active rôle in remaking the map of Europe and the leading one in creating a league meant sooner or later to include all nations. It is true that we remained an "associated" not an "allied" power, that the Senate did not ratify the peace treaty recommended to them by the President, and

that the country has endorsed their action, but this has not undone the provisions which he and his advisers helped to draw up and impose. It has merely put an end to our participation in their fulfilment. Besides, there is no certainty that we may not intervene again before long. The Republican Party may loudly proclaim the error of the ways of the former administration — in the matter of the peace though not of the war — and may be filled with the belief that the path of wisdom lies in keeping out of European entanglements. But who can say that a Democratic victory a few months hence may not lead to a reversal of our policy. Indeed to many, both in this country and abroad, the attempt to return to our former comparative isolation looks like a desperate effort to make water run up hill. Even a Republican administration is willing to interest itself, at least indirectly, in the question of reparations, for whether we like it or not the payment of the allied debts to us may depend on its solution. What the Republicans deny is not the right but the wisdom of our intervening in European affairs. The welfare of the United States is the only criterion to be observed.

As regards Asia our position has still less basis of reciprocity. In recent years, since the rise of Japan, we have maintained that the Monroe Doctrine applies to Asia as well as to Europe and that no interference would be tolerated from that side any more than from the other. This was stated by Secretary Hughes in his speech in Philadelphia last November. Yet we

have possessions and keep troops in Asia and have definite policies there. In the Philippines, which are of as much interest to the Japanese as, say, Venezuela is to us, we are their next-door neighbors. We took the islands before Japan was strong enough to have a voice in the matter, and we feel no more obliged to consult her about them than Spain did to consult us about Cuba as long as she held it. But if Japan had been strong enough, she would have had as good a right to oppose the transfer as we had in the last century to veto any transfer of Cuba to England or France. Remembering this and also our political and commercial activities in China, we need not wonder if the Japanese look on the Monroe Doctrine as one-sided in so far as they are concerned. They will agree with Mr. Hughes that "it is a principle of exclusion."

But if there is to be no reciprocity in regard to the interference of the great powers of one hemisphere in the affairs of the other, if the Western Hemisphere is to be free to meddle with the Eastern while remaining a closed preserve, or if at best we are to say "we will not, others must not," the logic of the situation and of the Monroe Doctrine looks peculiar. Other countries may submit to it because they have to, — and at the present moment they need American help too much to bother about logic; on the contrary, many of them are beseeching us to disregard it, — but is such a doctrine fair and can it be maintained in the long run?

One may reply that we don't care what others think. The first duty of a nation is to look after its legitimate

interests, as it has a perfect right to do if it does not infringe on the rights of others. The Monroe Doctrine is and has been most useful to us, and we mean to maintain it on our own account, only incidentally congratulating ourselves that it shields our weaker neighbors and does injury to no one. By such a frank abandonment of altruistic grounds we put the Doctrine on a level with other policies of national interest, for instance, the one held so long by Great Britain that Britannia must rule the waves if she is to preserve her Empire and to keep herself from being starved out by her enemies. From the British point of view there is much to be said for this creed, but none the less Britain has just had to modify it to avoid a ruinous competition with the United States. Instead she must content herself with such security as is afforded to her by the resolutions of the Disarmament Conference. We are thus witnessing what, amidst the immeasurable changes taking place about us, bids fair to mark the beginning of the end of a principle which for centuries England has held to be vital to her very existence. Is it not possible that in like manner the Monroe Doctrine may be superseded by some new conception, either because of increasing resistance to it as it stands or because its objects may be obtained by other and better means?

A possible coalition of European nations to set the Doctrine aside has been suggested here and there in the past, though not very seriously or by responsible statesmen. Such a thing is perhaps imaginable in the

future, but has never looked less probable than it does now. Should some of the European powers band themselves together to oppose us, it is much more likely to be against what they regard as American or Anglo-Saxon domination all the world over than with the thought of aggression in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the peril of future conflict between Japan and the United States is due, so far as this side of the Pacific is concerned, to Japanese resentment at the discrimination against her nationals, and not to Japanese designs on Magdalena Bay. On the other hand, it is by no means inconceivable that the Monroe Doctrine may lose its vitality by the drawing asunder of the parties for whose benefit it was elaborated, and that an estrangement between the United States and Latin America will lead to their forming in other quarters permanent ties stronger than the mutual bonds which to-day bind them together.

Such an outcome might result from certain tendencies on either side or from parallel ones on both. Let us take the most obvious possibility. In the present age when "systems" of government are becoming more or less the same all over the globe and when former geographic conceptions are getting out of date, ultra nationalism, both as a creator and as a destroyer of empires, is one of the dominating impulses in the political and cultural world. Nationalism tends to be bound up with some particular language, and there is a marked disposition on the part of the people speaking that language, and even of those speaking languages

in the same group, to draw closer together. The natural drift of the future would therefore appear to be, on the one hand, towards something like a federation between the so-called Anglo-Saxon nations, with perhaps union between the United States and Canada (it is too late to talk of "annexation"); on the other, towards Pan Iberianism, that is to say, a strengthening of the connections between Latin America and the mother countries of Spain and Portugal. This new happy family of what are termed Latin peoples, whatever their blood, might perhaps include Italy and at a later date possibly, though not so probably, France, thereby consummating a grand Pan-Latin entente. If this double evolution were to occur, there would not be much left of the Monroe Doctrine, or reason for its further existence.

But even without a regrouping of the sort, the attitude of Latin America towards the Doctrine is of more consequence than most people in this country realize. In none of our foreign questions are clear thinking, coolness, and patience more necessary for us than in those affecting our southern neighbors. We have to be continually alert to avoid illusions and to appreciate the view of the other side. On our own we start with the belief that in the past, again to quote the words of Secretary Hughes, we have "rendered an inestimable service to the American republics by keeping them free from the intrigues and rivalries of European powers." But for us their liberties, nay, their very life as independent communities, would have been endan-

gered and large parts of them might have become conquered colonies of distant and alien masters. Perhaps. That we have shielded them is indisputable and for this kindly attitude they have expressed themselves as grateful. That without our protection they would have fallen a prey to foreign powers is not so susceptible of proof. It is true, a good many arguments may be advanced in support of this contention. We can point to the immense colonial expansion of several European powers in Asia and Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and declare that it was nothing but fear of the United States which saved the Western Hemisphere from similar imperialism. But this is not conclusive. No European power, whatever it may think of the others, will admit that it entertained designs of the kind, and many Latin Americans are convinced that by 1880 when the most active and dangerous period of European expansion began, they were quite competent to take care of themselves, especially as they would have aided one another against European aggression, and that at least south of the Caribbean basin the guarantee of the United States was superfluous. Some of the Latin republics may have been ill governed and disorderly but they were not barbarous African tribes or decrepit oriental despotisms. At the last resort they had good powers of resistance, thanks to their inherited aptitude for guerilla warfare if for no other reason, as the Germans would have found if they had landed in Venezuela in 1902. Take the famous case of American action in

1866 in regard to the French intervention in Mexico, which is usually quoted as the most striking application of the Monroe Doctrine (although the term itself was not used in the discussion). The end of Maximilian's empire was only hastened by a few years. The French were tired enough of the whole Mexican business before Mr. Seward served his summons upon them, and anyway the war of 1870 with Germany would have led to the withdrawal of their troops from Mexico as inevitably as it did from Italy. The final crash would then have not been long delayed.

But even granting that we rendered Mexico a notable service in 1866, few will venture to assert that it surpassed the injury which we had inflicted on her twenty years earlier when, after invading her territory and storming her capital, we deprived her by right of conquest of a third of her dominions. It may be that this invasion was justified. Many will feel, too, that whatever the attendant circumstances, the transfer of California and Arizona and New Mexico from Latin-Indian to Nordic rule has been a gain to civilization. Still we can hardly wonder if there are Latin Americans who opine that, whatever we may have done to preserve their republics from European aggression and perhaps transient domination, it does not compensate for the lasting curtailment of the Latin portion of the continent brought about by our annexation of Texas and by the Mexican War. Verily the famous Zimmerman note proposing to undo the work of General Scott's victories and give back to Mexico much of

what she had lost must have excited a certain wistful longing in the breasts of some persons to the south of us.

We must remember likewise that hostile critics brand our profession of protecting Latin America as rank hypocrisy. They denounce our political intervention in Panama, San Domingo and elsewhere, and point to our cultural work in the Philippines and in Porto Rico as attempts to supplant Hispanic by Yankee language and civilization. It is true that a more sensible opinion has hailed in the past our guarantee against European aggression, and even to-day the statesmen in such stable countries as Brazil and Argentina can understand why the United States still feels the need of shielding the comparatively weak and distracted region about the Caribbean. Also, as the most famous and effective expression of the idea of America for the Americans, the Monroe Doctrine has been acclaimed, if not always with the same sincerity, in every republic of the Western Hemisphere. In Rio de Janeiro a palace has been built to its name.

But the protection which it has extended to Latin America is no longer deemed necessary. Further insistence on this point not only is looked upon as tactless but arouses suspicion and anger. After all, the idea of "protection," especially if uncalled for, is not far removed from that of a "protectorate." And a protectorate, that is to say an overlordship on the part of their great northern sister, is to-day infinitely more feared by the Latin republics than is any danger from

European imperialism. Our repeated assurances that we respect the rights of every independent state and regard all such as equal may dispel alarm for the moment, but too often they are listened to with skepticism or their effect is quickly effaced by some untoward word or incident. Latin Americans remember well such phrases as Mr. Olney's declaration in 1898 that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." If this is the conclusion to be drawn from the Monroe Doctrine, small wonder that they deem it not a safeguard but a menace.

That this menace is felt to be very real may sometimes surprise us, for we are conscious of the best of intentions. None the less the fear exists and we must take it into account. So long as we confine ourselves to regarding the Monroe Doctrine as a splendid expression of elevated policy, a lofty enunciation of principles, something like the Declaration of Independence, so long will Latin America applaud it freely and on festal occasions celebrate its glory with all the fervor of southern eloquence. But the moment it comes to be regarded as conferring on us any especial rights or privileges, and the moment the ever-ready suspicion is excited that it is being used in the name of law and order as a cover for encroachment on the liberties of others, what popularity it has vanishes, and it provokes sentiments akin to those entertained in the past about that same "Holy Alliance" against whose aims it was originally directed.

Some will assert that there is a simple way out of this uncomfortable situation, a way pointed to by Latin Americans from the first as the one which would eliminate their objections, but which the United States has so far refused to follow. Although the principles laid down by President Monroe in 1823 do not seem to have provoked particular enthusiasm on the part of the liberator Bolivar, he undertook to carry them a step further and to incorporate them into an official doctrine for all the American republics. With this object he got up a congress which was to meet at Panama. The United States was invited, though not by him, but showed itself very lukewarm about taking this first step towards Pan Americanism; indeed it hemmed and hawed and declared its aversion to any alliance, and its delegate did not arrive until after the assembly had come to an end. The fact was that the Americans then, as so often afterwards, were disinclined to do anything which would interfere with their own freedom of action. The Monroe Doctrine was theirs and they meant to keep it so. Leagues of nations, even to further the ideas they themselves had started, did not appeal to them. "Monroeism," as the Latins call it, was thus the parent of Pan Americanism but it refused to identify its cause with that of its offspring.

After this rebuff Pan Americanism slumbered peacefully as far as the United States was concerned, for the next sixty years or so, until it was reawakened by the active genius of Secretary Blaine, who in the winter of

1890 convoked in Washington the first official Pan-American Congress. Although not much was accomplished on the occasion, a start was made in the development of general inter-American relations. But five years later, when President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuela dispute assured the Monroe Doctrine a celebrity and a standing throughout the world that it had never before enjoyed, there was no attempt to enlist the aid of the other American republics which, on the contrary, although they approved of the intervention, were alarmed by the language of Secretary Olney. Since that day the first Pan-American Congress has been followed by others, countless friendly words have been uttered, useful agreements about subjects of varying importance have been entered into (though not always ratified), the political congresses have been reënforced by scientific and technical ones, and the Pan-American Bureau has been created and has functioned as a permanent central organ. By such means, first and last, a good deal has been done to bring the American republics into closer communion, to make them understand their common interests, and to increase the feeling of solidarity between them. We may say that the cultivation of Pan Americanism is now part of our recognized policy.

But the very growth of Pan Americanism has led Latin American opinion, including that portion most friendly to the United States, to feel with increasing intensity that the Monroe Doctrine, if not superseded, might at least be absorbed. From being an article of

faith of one American republic it should become the creed of all, for all have an equal interest in its maintenance. Let it be openly adopted, then, as one of the basic principles of Pan Americanism, to which all adhere and for whose enforcement all are alike responsible. None will then have cause to fear it.

The United States, however, has not welcomed adherence of this kind. It does desire and expect the approval of the sister republics, but it prefers not to have their coöperation; of which it feels no need and which might prove embarrassing. If every American state were equally a guardian of the Monroe Doctrine, each one would have an equal right to be consulted as to its applicability to any given set of circumstances. This could hardly fail to hamper our liberty of movement. The government at Washington, therefore, has sedulously avoided calling on the Latin-American republics for support, either in discussions with European powers or in trying to settle difficulties in the Western Hemisphere. The chief exception to this rule was President Wilson's appeal to the A.B.C. powers in 1914 for assistance in straightening out the tangled affairs of Mexico. They responded with alacrity and, though their good offices did not meet with much lasting success, many men believed that a new era had begun, and that joint action of the leading American countries rather than the isolated intervention of the United States would be the normal process in the future. But this instance of the participation of other American powers has so far remained an isolated one.

THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The United States has shown no further inclination to share its duties, however delicate and burdensome, with the sister republics. President Wilson himself declared that "the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility."

Last year at the Congress at Santiago the differences of opinion as to the proper position of the Monroe Doctrine in the scheme of Pan Americanism came to a head. In answer to attempts to make the Doctrine part of a common program, Ambassador Fletcher flatly proclaimed that it was a unilateral expression of our individual policy in which no one else could take part and whose applicability to a given case we alone must determine, though we should welcome the following of similar policies of their own by the other American countries. In this attitude he has been supported by the administration. In his speech of August 30, 1923, Secretary Hughes declared: "The Monroe Doctrine is distinctively the policy of the United States; the Government of the United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application." The question is therefore settled for the time being.

It is too early as yet to judge what will be the effects on Pan Americanism of this latest pronouncement. The State Department has only followed its almost constant tradition, and for weighty reasons, but the decision is serious. Such a stand cannot increase the popularity of the Monroe Doctrine, indeed there is a

general belief in this country as elsewhere that the Santiago Congress, although it established some useful rules of business procedure, failed in its main object, the promotion of better relations between the American peoples. At any rate, the Latin-American ones have been notified that the Monroe Doctrine, even if it is for their benefit, is none of their business. But as they on their side no longer feel any particular need of it they are not likely henceforward to give it at the best more than polite lip-service. At the worst they will view it with increasing suspicion and hostility, as an arrogant assumption of superiority if not a permanent threat to their liberties. "Monroeism" and Pan Americanism in spite of our efforts to reconcile them may come to represent incompatible ideals between which we shall have to choose. Such a prospect is not pleasant. No doubt we are strong enough to endure it, but it offers a poor outlook for the future, and the question naturally arises whether under such circumstances the game would be worth the candle.

Another set of reflections is suggested when one considers the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League as first conceived and first drafted in Paris appeared to threaten the further existence of the Doctrine by rendering it supererogatory. President Wilson may have felt about this as he did when he yielded to British objection to his first insistence on the freedom of the seas, that it mattered not, as the greater included the less. Such, however, was not the feeling of the public

at home, which soon gave so clear indications of uneasiness over the impending peril to a cherished tradition that the President after his return to Paris caused to be inserted a special provision in its favor. If he imagined that this was enough to reassure super-sensitive patriots he was mistaken. His afterthought quite failed to satisfy them. The alarm he had occasioned did not die down and was one of the causes of his ultimate failure in rallying the country to his support.

But although we have not entered the League of Nations, almost all of the Latin-American republics have. We can find no fault with this. At the time they did so they had fair reason to hope that the United States, which had taken the leading part in the creation of the League, would sooner or later be one of its members. At any rate, they are independent communities, free to join or not as they please without consulting us. We may suspect, however, that among the motives of some of them was the thought of finding a counterpoise to too much tutelage on the part of "los Yankis." This is natural, but not calculated to increase the none too great friendliness of Washington for Geneva. Let the Latin-American members of the League interest themselves if they will in the question of Lithuanian boundaries or the government of the Saar, that is their affair; but it would be a very different matter if the League, whose membership is preponderantly non-American, were to show a desire to meddle, even if invited, in such matters as the frontier

dispute between Costa Rica and Panama or the Tacna-Arica question between Chile and Peru. There can be little doubt that the United States, although on several occasions in the past it has not protested against arbitral decisions by European powers in American controversies, will be opposed to such things in the future, and in its present mood will regard even the most peaceful interventions, not only of individual European states but of the League of Nations, as contrary to the Monroe Doctrine.

So far the League has had the wisdom to refrain from activity of this kind. It stands in too great awe of us to run such risks. When in 1921 Bolivia made complaint against Chile and asked for a revision of her peace treaty of 1883, the matter was promptly buried in a commission which has never reported. The honor and the difficulty of settling the long standing and bitter dispute between Chile and Peru, and incidentally, let us hope, of doing something for Bolivia, are now in the hands of the State Department, which will need its whole stock of wisdom to find an arrangement that shall not lead to deep and lasting disappointment, not to say resentment, in one quarter or another.

Perhaps the League is to be congratulated on not having to deal with this particular question, but patently it is left in a position of humiliating impotence if, owing to the disapproval of an outside power, it does not dare to accept the appeals under the articles of the Covenant of one of its own members against another. But supposing it should find the courage to do so, or

supposing both parties to some American dispute should prefer, in spite of Pan Americanism, to submit the issue to the arbitration of the League, are we to take it as outside "interference" and to forbid all such action? If we do, and this would seem to be consistent with our general attitude, many in Latin America will accuse us of imperialistic tyranny and of subjecting them to a servitude from which they will yearn to escape. We must realize that to assume the right of being the sole arbiter who can be called in is to assume the ungrateful rôle of the policeman. And even the policeman cannot well bar voluntary compacts beneficent to everybody. For instance, should the meeting at Rome under the auspices of the League of Nations bring about among the smaller powers, including the Latin American ones, an agreement to extend the principles of the Disarmament Conference and to cease all naval competition, the world including ourselves could only applaud. But applause from Washington might be tempered by a touch of chagrin that the League had succeeded where Pan Americanism under our aegis had failed at Santiago.

Of course partisans of the League of Nations do not hesitate to point out that the obvious way for the United States to avoid all such troubles is for itself to join the League. Pan Americanism will only profit by the change. Everything that the Monroe Doctrine has achieved in the past will remain; everything that it might legitimately hope to achieve in the future will be as well accomplished through another agency. As

long as the "law of the jungle" is the guide of conduct among peoples, including our own, the Doctrine may be a necessity. In a world transformed by the League of Nations, the much decried Article X would alone be enough to guarantee the fulfilment of its principles. If from sentimental motives we wish to maintain its being, the Covenant has specifically provided that we may do so. The power that we now hold in readiness to see that it is observed would exist equally under the League, but there would be no longer the same danger that we might be called upon to use that power.

This reasoning, though not easy to refute, is hardly likely to make many converts among those opposed to the League. They will regard it as a mere sugaring of a pill which they do not intend to swallow.

Be that as it may, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if we do some day become a party to the League or to any association with like objects, and if these pacts are honestly observed, the Monroe Doctrine in the spirit in which it was conceived will no longer have the same reason for continuance. It may linger on as a pious memory or as another name for a fraternal spirit of Pan Americanism, but its political significance can hardly remain unchanged. Even without the League, a World Court with wide jurisdiction might by itself act as a dissolvent of the same kind. Here, too, the price may be worth paying, but there is a price to pay even if it is only a sentimental one. To be sure, the mere suggestion of our being called upon to sacrifice one of our most cherished dogmas is

THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

still enough to fill with anger many, perhaps the majority, of the American people and to imperil the prospect of their adhesion to either League or Court. Yet there are others who believe that the sun and the moon will not stand still and that the very controversy which has raged about the proper nature of our relations with the rest of the world is not empty wrangling over a closed incident but one of the steps in a new evolution.

Thus, when all is said and done, the Monroe Doctrine, however safe against attack from without, is not equally immune to the gentler perils of dissolution from within, or to absorption in some broader humanitarian ideal. To-day it is a name to conjure with; perchance in some not very distant to-morrow it will be nothing but a name. But even so, its task will have been performed.

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

WHEN the year 1914 had half run its course the world as a whole appeared fairly tranquil. It is true that there had just been two wars in the Balkans, whence ominous rumblings were still being emitted, that there was strife in Mexico and American troops had been landed at Vera Cruz, that disorder was rife in China, and that the situation in Ireland was critical; nevertheless in the main there was peace on earth and a reasonable amount of good will among men. To-day we have peace once more, but of good will among men, or at least among nations, there has been a deplorable decrease. In the last ten years a large part of mankind has passed through a period of untold suffering which in many cases has not yet ended. We have witnessed disasters of appalling magnitude, a waste of human life, a destruction of property, an overthrow of long-established governments and the erection of new ones, an unsettlement of the most fixed relations, and countless other subversive phenomena undreamt of and undreamable. What does it all mean and whither are we going?

The World War burst upon us like a sudden thunder-clap. The storm had long been brewing, so long indeed that many had got used to the threat and gave little heed to it. Statesmen in the countries concerned might be full of apprehensions, and military men be expecting

war very soon, as is their wont, but the mass of the public had no particular forebodings. When the crisis did come, five of the six leading European nations were swept into the maelstrom within a fortnight. The Austrian ultimatum started an inexorable sequence, against which rulers and statesmen seemed to struggle in vain. The ultimatum itself was — and was meant to be — so severe that no self-respecting state could accept it. When it was not submitted to unconditionally, Austria, who had prepared her demand with deliberation and with a realization of the seriousness of the risks incurred, felt that she would stultify herself if she accepted the Serbian refusal. Russia could not leave Serbia to her fate. The whole history of the Eastern Question, every ambition of Russia in the Near East, the intensity of her public sentiment as to her duty to protect the weaker Slav peoples, forbade this. But if Russia attacked Austria, Germany, bound by the assurances Berlin had given to Vienna at the start, as well as by the Austro-German treaty of 1879, must support her ally. But then France was even more bound in honor to stand by Russia, otherwise the Franco-Russian alliance would have been the veriest scrap of paper.

The next development, however, was more uncertain. Germany and France were the only states in Europe brought into the war by existing treaties of alliance. England was tied to France by no formal pact of this sort, and in spite of Anglo-German rivalry and of the Anglo-French Entente there were high hopes

in Berlin that she would remain neutral. If the Germans, instead of violating the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, had remained on the defensive in the west, taking the ground that they had no quarrel with France, and had thrown their main strength against Russia, we may well doubt whether England, where at first the majority of the Cabinet were against intervention, would have laid her sword in the scale. Had she stood aside, Italy and Rumania might sooner or later have joined the Central Powers, their old allies, instead of doing just the opposite. But the German Government chose to sacrifice political and moral considerations to what it believed to be military ones, as it did a second time with equally fatal effect in 1917 in its relations with the United States.

After the conflict had once begun, the vast majority of people involved, high and low, were convinced, as most of them still are, of the essential righteousness of their cause. This was not altered by the fact that four of the states bargained hard and long with both parties before casting in their lot with either. When they did act, they were as sure as anyone else that they were animated by the highest principles. Their motives were comprehensible and even their miscalculations were not altogether foolish. Turkey and Bulgaria have indeed paid heavily for having guessed wrong, but in 1917 it looked as if it were they who would emerge triumphant and aggrandized, while Italy and Rumania would suffer for their disastrous mistakes.

The war was fertile in surprises. At the outset no

one foresaw its length, though Lord Kitchener came near to doing so. Even the wildest fancies were surpassed by the immensity of the effort, the consumption of life and treasure, the sheer destruction of every kind. The battle of the Marne meant the miscarriage of the long and meticulously prepared German plan of striking France to earth by one terrific blow. On the other hand, British failure at the Dardanelles may well have prolonged the struggle by a couple of years. The Russian Revolution, followed by the withdrawal of Russia from the field and by the forced capitulation of Rumania, would probably have meant German victory but for the entrance into the war of the United States, a contingency undreamt of in July, 1914. The German submarine warfare proved a complete miscalculation in its ultimate objects, but who can say how near it came to success? Had the *Leviathan* alone been sunk by a torpedo, with her cargo of twelve thousand soldiers, we cannot tell what would have been the effect on American opinion and on the transport of armies across the ocean.

When at last Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria had collapsed and Germany had been beaten to her knees, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, in congress assembled, were called upon to determine how the world was to be refashioned. Thanks chiefly to the desire of President Wilson to array against the Central Empires the moral opinion of mankind, the Allies had welcomed to their ranks a number of nominal adherents — Cuba, Liberia, Siam, and others — who added

to the congestion of representatives at the Peace Conference. Under such circumstances all the real decisions had to be made by a few men. It was hard enough to get even those few to agree on the many and complicated questions. Though their principles might be theoretically the same, their views were far apart and the interests of their countries differed. Nothing could have been achieved by public debate in a general conclave where all might have a voice and a vote, but where no majority could bind sovereign states. To get results much compromise was indispensable, and compromise can best be reached by a few responsible individuals whose arguments are addressed to each other and not to the gallery. In delicate negotiations, public or private, however friendly, "open diplomacy" is sometimes about as feasible as open strategy in warfare.

Contrary to precedent, the defeated foes were not invited to take part in the discussions of the terms which were to be imposed upon them. Such objections as they were permitted to make afterwards met with scant attention. This has been resented by them ever since as a crying injustice. It is unlikely, however, that the presence of their delegates throughout the Conference would have had serious influence on the final result. There were no new facts they could bring forth or arguments they could urge which would have affected the sentiments of the nations that had just come out victorious after four years and a half of life and death conflict. At any rate, the Allies did not wish

to be bothered by representatives of their enemies to make the difficult work of obtaining a consensus of opinion more difficult still, nor did they propose to run the risk of having some German diplomat repeat the exploits of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna.

Certain notable articles of the Peace of Versailles were due primarily to a popular craving that those responsible for the terrific suffering and loss the world had undergone should be brought to justice before the tribunal of mankind. This is the explanation of the futile provision for the trial of the Kaiser (the one thing which could have rehabilitated him), who was already well out of harm's way, and also of the extraordinary demand that Germany must acknowledge her guilt as the author of the war. Such a requirement was as unwise as it was unusual. The German people had fought for years in the belief that they were defending themselves against the unprovoked aggression of a coalition of jealous rivals. To be forced now at the point of the sword to announce that the blame was theirs appeared to them a monstrous perversion of the truth. They submitted because they had to, but without the least moral acceptance. Ever since they have been investigating with passion the subject of the origin of the war, and of course they are as convinced as ever of their own essential innocence. Even in regard to Belgium they have been unwilling to plead guilty, though outside opinion has been practically unanimous against them. They have jumped at every scrap of so-called evidence that the English and French

had intended to act in the same way, and that the Belgians deserved their fate, assumptions of a kind common among culprits. Many of them believe, too, that if they could discover a document which would fasten the responsibility for the World War on some other nation, the whole peace treaty would be overturned as being based on a false premise and would have to be remade on totally different lines.

The three powers in whose hands lay the decision at Paris had the good fortune to be represented by very remarkable men. President Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George were as unlike each other as they could well be, but all three will stand high in the annals of their countries. The mere play of their contrasting personalities presents a fascinating study. The Americans held a position of immense advantage. Not only was their material power unlimited as compared with that of their exhausted associates, but, thanks to circumstances rather than to their superior virtue, they were the most disinterested of the important participants. Their championship of the self-determination of peoples, of the League of Nations, and of other general causes was not hampered by previous commitments or by necessities of security and reparations. Nor were their representatives simple inexperienced citizens who were circumvented by the "wily diplomats" of Europe. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were no more professional diplomats than was Wilson, and we may doubt whether any European delegation contained a man of larger and more varied diplomatic

experience than Mr. Henry White. The fatal mistake in the American Commission in Paris, fatal not for its work then but for the confirmation of that work afterwards, was that it did not include a Republican of political standing and influence.

Although not ratified by the United States, the Peace of Versailles has been termed an American peace. It was based on propositions laid down in advance by the United States and in the main adhered to. This is particularly true of the geographical provisions, where the doctrine of self-determination, which was one of President Wilson's cardinal tenets and which roughly corresponded with that of nationalities, was accepted as the guiding principle. The later treaties followed the model of the first. In disputed questions and matters of detail friends rather than enemies were favored, and there were a few cases of glaring violation, notably the allotment of the German-speaking southern Tyrol to Italy, which France and Great Britain had agreed to in the Treaty of London in 1915, and to which the consent of President Wilson had been obtained in the early days of the Conference — a consent he regretted later but did not feel justified in withdrawing. But in general the principle of self-determination prevailed and in doubtful instances the decision was left to plebiscites. Even if the newly formed countries contain too large a percentage of citizens who are hostile to the dominant nationality, they correspond as a whole to the wishes of the majority, and in most cases of the great majority, of their inhabitants.

With the new frontiers due to the Russian Revolution and the emancipation of peoples formerly under Russian rule, the Paris Conference had little or nothing to do. The states thus formed are indirect results of the war, though not of the peace. Even Poland and Rumania owe their size to the triumph of Lenin as well as to that of Wilson. Europe to-day contains more republics than does South America. It is easy enough to declare that many of them are economic monstrosities and cannot live in this age of great agglomerations. But Switzerland has contrived to get on very respectably for the last four centuries, in spite of her scant natural resources, her lack of a seaport, her open frontiers, her two religions and her four recognized languages.

For the disruption of the empire of the Hapsburgs the Allies were not immediately responsible. In the end of 1918 Austria-Hungary went to pieces of itself, and no authority from outside, unless supported by armed force, could have restored it. All that was left for the umpires at Paris was to mark out the lines for the new dominions, and they had trouble enough in determining these and in enforcing their decisions. It has often been asserted that they should have insisted on the preservation of at least the economic unity of the fragments of the former Dual Empire. But only by a foreign administration supported by foreign bayonets could such unity have been imposed on millions of people whose claim to independence had been formally recognized and whose most passionate desire

was complete self-determination, right or wrong. Besides which, the Poles, the Jugoslavs, and the Rumans of Austria-Hungary did not of themselves constitute new states. They joined already existing ones outside. Even what was left of Austria and Hungary showed no inclination to keep up the century-old connection between them.

Austria, despite her recent rally perhaps the least viable of the new republics, is forbidden from entering into a voluntary union with Germany. This flat violation of the principle of nationalities and of the right of self-determination was due to the fears of France, and should not be lasting, though we can understand the repugnance of Frenchmen to granting Germany an accession of territory which would make her larger than she was in 1914. It is all very well to condemn French selfishness in this respect, but the English would put on a sadly wry face if circumstances were to lead to a voluntary union between France and Belgium, for which some analogy might be claimed; and as for our virtuous selves, would not the Monroe Doctrine forbid any Latin American state from having enough right of self-determination to enter into a political union with a European power? For France, organic connection with Belgium might serve as a compensation for the building up of a greater Germany; but, unluckily for her, in Belgium (where the dispute between the two nationalities has begun again since the war) it is probable that the Flemish would fiercely oppose closer permanent relations, even if the Belgian

monarchy should be succeeded some day by a republic.

For the future peace of Europe the problem of the security of France must be solved somehow or other. The world does not wish to see another Franco-German war, nor does it wish to see France led by her fears into making futile attempts to keep Germany in bondage and to check natural recovery by artificial means. French fears are indeed exaggerated, based though they are on the very real grounds of Germany's much greater population and her much higher birthrate, which renders the disparity even worse. It should be remembered, on the other hand, that Greater France has a population not of forty but of about one hundred millions — or not much less than the United States. Admitting that as a military and economic unit the average Annamite or Senegalese is not the equal of the German or the American, — though there is no reason why a French black should not fight as well as an American one, — still the military power of France is not to be measured by her European resources alone. In the World War she drew from her colonial possessions half a million troops of one kind or another. Besides, before the war the German birthrate had already begun to decline and the process has continued.

Whatever may be the peril of France, that of Poland is incomparably greater. We may hope that the Germans will learn to accept their present boundaries to the west as the last word in the age-long controversies on this subject, but can we expect them to take a similar view to the east, where the territories left to them

are not even contiguous and where millions of their compatriots have been put under the rule of a nation which they regard as far inferior to themselves historically and culturally? The decisions of the Allies in regard to the Danzig corridor and to the division of Silesia may have been right on moral grounds, but they have hardly made for lasting peace. And Poland's danger is not only from Germany. To her misfortune, she has always lacked clear-cut boundaries, geographical, historical, and ethnical. To-day both on the east and on the west her frontiers present few natural features. She may have a good claim to Vilna, but as long as she retains this former capital of Lithuania the present Lithuanian republic will not forgive her. She also counts among her citizens some five million Russians of one kind or another. They are not contented; and just across the border are their kinsmen, now organized into White Russian and Ukrainian national republics to give them greater powers of attraction, and with the whole power of the Soviet Union behind them. To meet this menace, Poland has allied herself with Rumania, a neighbor standing in like fear of Russia. As against Germany, she relies on the assistance of France which, since the days of the Paris Conference, has favored her aspirations as consistently as England has opposed them.

The economic chapter of the Peace Treaties was, if anything, even more complicated than the political. There were the questions of what the Central Powers ought to pay, what they were able to pay, and to whom

they ought to pay it, concerning all of which it was possible to hold, in good faith, quite conflicting opinions. In the background there lurked the problem of the debts of the Allied powers to one another, and particularly to America.

In theory the defeated nations were not to be penalized by any war indemnity, they were only to be asked to make good what they had wantonly destroyed. This magnanimity was facilitated by the fact that the cost of reparations alone might well equal if not exceed the total of what could be extracted from the Central Powers; indeed this became certain from the moment that Lloyd George, in order to make the British claims comparable to those of the French and to give something to the Colonials, put through the principle that reparations should include pensions.

Before long, too, it dawned on the most reluctant that there was little to be got out of Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. Germany was more promising. She had greater resources and in spite of severe curtailment she was left more nearly intact. But what the Germans really could pay, neither they nor anyone else knew then or knows now.

It is still an open question whether it would have been wise for the Peace Conference to have decided in 1919 on a fixed sum for reparations. This was not done, and the official demands were not formulated until two years later. But the amount then named, though accepted by Germany under pressure, was soon recognized to be impossible. Since then there has been an

uninterrupted series of proposals, conferences, negotiations and acrimonious discussions until at last the report of the experts has furnished a ground on which there are better chances of agreement and of actually accomplishing something than there have been up to the present time. The report not only looks like the best guess yet made, the one most carefully worked out, and the most impartial; it also has come at a time when in all the countries concerned the public is more than wearied of fruitless controversy and is so eager to get real peace that it is willing to make serious sacrifices of what it believes to be its rights.

A most discouraging complication throughout has been the estrangement between England and France. Of course it was to be expected that when the Allies came to make the peace settlement, and still more when they were called upon to interpret their formulas, there should be a certain divergence of views between them and a cooling off of the enthusiasm they had felt for each other before and during the war. Unfortunately, besides natural differences of opinion in regard to Poland, the Near East, and various other matters, the question of reparations has led to most serious disagreement, due to a clash of fundamental interests for which neither country has been responsible. France, the more self-supporting of the two, but the devastated one, has placed reparations above everything else except her future security. She has insisted on payments which, by making good the vast sums she has had to spend on her devastated regions, should save her from

bankruptcy. Compared with this object, the sufferings of Germany and the general rehabilitation of Europe have been a secondary outside interest. England, on the other hand, with her huge number of unemployed, has felt that she needed, above all, the restoration of normal conditions the world over (including Germany) in order to set the wheels of her business going again at full speed. Reparations are comparatively unimportant to her, and the sufferings of France no longer make the appeal they once did. She has sufferings of her own. To her the increasing bankruptcy of Germany and the danger that the Reich might be submerged in anarchy have been real terrors, but she has been little worried by Germany's non-payment of her debts and the recrudescence of Teutonic militarism. On the contrary, she has accused France of imperialism and of a desire to destroy Germany altogether.

During the years 1920 and 1921 most of the political provisions of the Peace Treaties were gradually put into effect. Plebiscites were held, boundaries were marked out, the new states managed somehow to stand on their own feet, not too shakily, and except in the Near East, where the Treaty of Sèvres proved unworkable, fighting ceased. But the question of reparations, of what Germany could or would pay, made no progress towards a settlement. The French came to feel that, in the conferences and negotiations, they invariably got the worst of it, that they made one concession after another without gaining anything in return, and were continually being duped by the

superior cleverness of Lloyd George, for whom their dislike grew into a mania. The fall of Briand was due in good part to the belief that he was continually outwitted by his British colleague.

With the advent of Poincaré the situation changed abruptly. Henceforth it was the French who had their way while the British angrily demurred. Lloyd George came to grief at the Conference of Genoa, where the Germans whom he was trying to aid played him false, the Russians with whom he wished to make terms proved intractable, and the Little Entente, alarmed by his attitude about Galicia and Bessarabia and by his readiness to revise the Peace Treaties, the foundation of their existence, rallied to the support of France. The failure of British policy in the Near East further discredited the British Premier and he fell soon after. His successors, Bonar Law and, later, Baldwin, though disapproving, were unable in 1923 to prevent the French occupation of the Ruhr, nor did they enjoy even the moral support of the United States, for which they had hoped. Poincaré went on his way undisturbed. In open argument he got the better of Lord Curzon and with public sentiment in France solidly behind him he was as little moved by the fulminations of the British press as by the howls of the German. Now the English are not used to having their wishes ostentatiously disregarded. They were sure that not only was Germany being ruined but that the welfare of Europe and particularly of Britain was being endangered by French greed and blindness, and they

deeply resented their own apparent impotence. Poincaré soon became as unpopular in England as Lloyd George had been in France, and for about the same sort of reasons.

In the last few months the situation has improved. Germany, which had long been banking on some kind of active support from England, was forced to a surrender by the costly failure of her policy of passive resistance. On the other hand, the French, although they had possessed themselves in the Ruhr of a tangible guarantee for ultimate payment, had lost financially by the transaction, and the discreditable fiasco of the separatist movement in the Rhineland made them feel that they had gone too far. Above all they were alarmed by the decline of the franc, whose fall was checked only by outside assistance. The obviously good intentions of Ramsay Macdonald disarmed much suspicion in France, the fall of Poincaré produced satisfaction in England. Public opinion thus was ripe for the Dawes Report. All told, the immediate political prospect in western Europe, though still uncertain enough, gives more reason for optimism than it has done at any time since the outbreak of the war, except for a short moment after the close of hostilities when so many in the victorious countries and some in the defeated indulged in golden visions of a new world where peace on earth should be maintained by the League of Nations.

But an agreement as to Allied debts still looks sadly far off. American opinion that they should be paid,

at least in the main, is apparently as unshaken as ever. On the other hand, the sentiment of the European debtor states is growing stronger that, however theoretically valid their debts to us may be, to exact payment when they are unable to obtain what is owed to themselves would be a crying injustice and a flagrant instance of the oppression of the poor by the rich. In 1922, England missed her opportunity. If she had had the courage and foresight to declare that, while willing to fulfill her own obligations, she would renounce what was due to her from her allies, they would have followed suit by cancelling what they owed each other, and the United States would have found itself in the unenviable position of being the sole country exacting its pound of flesh from its friends. The consequent moral pressure on us to show ourselves magnanimous in our turn would have been very difficult to resist, and from this England would have profited. Instead, by the tactless Balfour declaration she angered both the United States and France, and so far her policy of conditional offers has had unfortunate results. As for the Baldwin agreement, it may have proved to Americans that Britain had a high sense of financial honor, higher perhaps than that of the nations of the continent, but for their own part they were convinced that they had been generous in their concessions. They had not the least feeling of having been put under any obligation, and the attempt to win them over to support British policy against France, which in the British mind underlay the negotiation, failed completely. In England

there is to-day much suppressed anti-American bitterness, a bitterness which is revived as each fresh payday comes round, and which does not seem likely to diminish as long as these payments continue. It is not sure, either, that the Baldwin agreement has not complicated rather than facilitated the clearing up of the whole international financial situation, for it has stiffened the attitude of America towards her continental debtors, while its success has not been such as to impress most of them with the advisability of following England's example. Italy in particular, which owes much and is owed nothing by her partners, cares little about German reparations compared with Allied debts.

The spectacle of what is going on south of the Alps is absorbingly interesting and may contain lessons for several countries. Fascismo, starting as an ultra-nationalistic movement, with unabashed imperialistic ambitions which it has never disavowed, evolved into an expression of a reaction against the increasing socialistic peril and of a craving for efficiency in place of the apparently hopeless ineptitude of the parliamentary government of Monte Citerio. It has stood for order rather than for law. Indeed, Mussolini has shown almost as much contempt as Lenin for the wishes of the majority if they happen to disagree with his own views. The world has looked on and wondered whether he was a Napoleon or a South American dictator, whether he was a savior of society or a menace to free democracy and to the peace of the globe. But

over and above the question of his personal characteristics and achievements, remarkable as they both are, is the broader one of whether he represents a general movement of real significance, as suggested by recent developments in Spain and elsewhere. There is no doubt that to-day parliamentary, not to say congressional, government, though commonly admitted as a necessity, enjoys but little sentimental popularity. Hereditary and aristocratic privileges are gone not to return, but the prestige of the strong man "who does things," compared with the legislators who only talk, is if anything on the increase. Unluckily the strong man who puts down opposition at home is not apt to be patient when it comes from abroad, nor, when he thinks he has been smitten, to turn the other cheek by appealing to the League of Nations.

The League has in truth assumed a tremendous sum of responsibilities as well as of aspirations. The difficulty of its task has been added to by the incorporation of the Covenant into the Peace of Versailles. The motives which dictated this step were of the highest and in keeping with the idea of "the war to end war," but the results have been disadvantageous to both League and Peace Treaty. The combination of the two has, among other things, increased the suspicion which the majority of the voters in the United States felt towards the whole work of the Peace Conference, and has helped to keep us out of the League which we took such a part in forming. Our refusal to honor President Wilson's signature was a blow as stunning

as it was unexpected abroad. That the League has survived is strong testimony to its vitality. Although people differ about the importance of its actual achievements, in its comparatively crippled condition, and contrast them with the dreams of world-regeneration which it was to have made real, no one can deny that whatever it has accomplished has been unselfish and for the good of humanity. To Soviet Russia the League may be an embodiment of the evil bourgeois spirit, to the United States it may be an association of foreign idealists who wish to meddle in our business, to Latin America it may mean chiefly an opportunity to take part in the general affairs of the world free from the aegis of the United States, but to much of Europe it represents the one hope of the future against the recurrence of the disasters which have brought her to the verge of ruin.

Grave as are the perils which still menace the peace of Europe, and immense as are the difficulties in the work of rehabilitation, there are other political problems which are perhaps even more momentous for the world. One of the most immediate arises from the fact that formerly backward peoples have acquired a new consciousness and are no longer willing to submit to being ruled by foreigners. To argue that if left to themselves they will relapse into despotism or anarchy and barbarism may be true, but as they or their leaders do not think so, it does not help matters. The danger threatening the governing powers is not open insurrection, which in most cases could be put down

without much trouble. The essential difficulty is that, so far as we can judge, no democracy can and will persist in keeping another nation in permanent subjection. A modern democracy is capable of harshness at a given moment but is ill fitted to maintain an iron rule for an indefinite time. To do so is too much against its own ideals, and there will always be a party at home to espouse the cause of the discontented. The working masses everywhere, preoccupied with the questions of their own immediate betterment, tend to care little for foreign dominion, which they suspect of being only for the benefit of the rich. They are becoming increasingly unwilling to allow their children to be conscripted to hold down malcontent subjects in distant lands, and even obtaining the necessary troops by voluntary enlistment is not as easy as it used to be.

Nor let it be supposed that any people is likely to remain content with semi-independence. It may welcome this as a first step, a partial concession, but not for long. There is no logical stopping place, no halfway house which will make a permanent home on the road to equality, and those who have once got well started on that road grow increasingly impatient and resent every effort to delay them on their way to their final goal.

A good result of the above truths is that they have diminished the temptations to imperialism at the expense of backward races. The task of governing them, developing them, exploiting them and elevating them

no longer looks as attractive as it once did. People are not so eager as they used to be to "take up the white man's burden." This may prove the salvation of certain countries, notably China. It may be that China at the present moment is, as Lord Curzon has recently said, "nothing more than a great splash on the map — an amorphous collection of human beings without government, without cohesion, without solidity, and with nothing except their vast numbers. China is split up into a series of small, independent governorships under military dictators, who collect the taxes, amuse themselves, despise the Central Government, and do exactly what they will."¹

Not long ago these were just the circumstances which would invite foreign intervention. To-day no power, great or small, is anxious to take over millions of Chinese subjects. The "break-up of China" may be a possibility, but the "partition of China" can hardly be called so. In any event no political vicissitudes will eliminate the vast numbers of the Chinese or the great qualities of the race, which must sooner or later ensure them their due place in the frame-work of society.

It is also evident that existing colonial empires rest upon insecure foundations. There seems, indeed, something unnatural in the spectacle of seven million Dutch ruling over fifty million Malays. Not long ago Germany hoped that Holland would look to her for assistance when the task of controlling so many de-

¹ *The Near East*, July 10, 1924.

pendents should prove too arduous, and that thus both the Dutch and their colonies could be attached to the Teuton empire. This dream has vanished, at least for the moment, and the future of the Dutch possessions is highly uncertain. Those of Belgium and Portugal will in their turn present similar problems, though as yet tropical Africa has not reached the cultural stage of agitation for self-government.

Of the hundred millions of the population of Greater France, almost sixty are not of European origin. If they are to be kept in permanent French allegiance their loyalty must be secured. The French flatter themselves that they are peculiarly successful in winning the affections of those over whom they rule. So be it, though it is probable they entertain a good many illusions in this respect. In any event, they have an immense task before them. In particular one may well doubt whether the distant millions of their Indo-Chinese empire, who have their own ancient Asiatic civilization and history to look back to, will ultimately consent to submit to foreign control, however slight. It is true, their loss might not be very serious for France. Far more vital is the question whether she can permanently assimilate the inhabitants of her territories in North Africa. The European element, even reinforced by the Jews, will always form only a small minority. The large majority of the population are Mohammedans, imbued with the traditions of Islamic empire, and at least half of them speak as their native tongue Arabic, one of the chief cultural languages in the his-

tory of the world. The prospect of making good Frenchmen out of them looks discouraging, for if religious antagonisms are less acute than they once were, nationalistic ones are more so. But the loss of North Africa, followed, as would be likely, by that of her tropical holdings further to the southward, would be an irreparable blow to France. Without her colonies she cannot maintain her position in the front rank of nations. Still we must remember that her powers of attraction are great. In North Africa she may be able to rally to her side the Berber half of the inhabitants, who are racially of much the same stock as the south Europeans and are not as fanatical as the Arabs, for whom they have little love. If she can do so, she will vastly strengthen her position.

Whatever the more distant future may reserve for Holland or France, Great Britain is called upon to face now and at once the problem of how she is to preserve her wonderful empire, perhaps the most remarkable political achievement of any people. The dangers which menace it have long been foreseen by thoughtful observers and are at last beginning to be generally realized. To meet them, such plans as an Imperial Federation and a British Commonwealth of Nations have been devised — so far without marked success. One would have imagined that the magnificent way in which the colonies rallied to the support of the mother country in the World War would have bound them more closely to her. This may yet prove to be the lasting effect. For the moment the reaction produced by

the present period of hardship and disillusion is more visible. But supposing that the British Commonwealth of Nations can be made a reality and can include among its loyal components a reconciled Ireland, which is trying to unlearn the hated English language, a Canada all of whose natural interests draw her closer to the United States, and South Africa, where the Boer by a superior birthrate may supplant the Briton as the leading factor and where both are far outnumbered by the blacks — granting a Commonwealth comprising all of these, what is to become of India?

India to-day, though covering only about a seventh of the territory of the British Empire, contains more than two-thirds of its population. In the last twenty years she has wrested one concession after another from Great Britain — a process hastened by the World War. To all appearances they have quite failed to satisfy her. On the contrary, it seems as if the discontent were steadily becoming more widespread and acute. There is little reason for thinking that the movement will stop. The outlook is rather that within a few years India will be given up as Egypt has been given up. The British democracy will not try to retain her by force. Of that we may be sure. The enormous benefits that England has conferred on the country and its swarming millions will count for nothing in retaining their allegiance. The jealousies, rivalries and hatreds of race and creed among the many different peoples, though they may make trouble enough hereafter, have not proved capable of preventing them from

combining against their British masters. If India is to be given home rule, as seems inevitable, it takes a stretch of the imagination to conceive of her as merely an Asiatic member of a European commonwealth in which only one other member has as much as a twenty-fifth of her population, and several of them exclude her inhabitants from their territories. We can see no reason, too, why the example of India should not be followed in course of time, and according to the measure of their abilities, by other parts of the British dominions where Asiatics or African races predominate. To be sure, even without them and reduced to its white constituents, the British Commonwealth would cover a large surface on the map and would be one of the first among states, but it would be something very different from the old British Empire.

Of the greater nations the United States can most easily slough off its foreign holdings. We shall let the Philippines go before long, and we shall hardly know the difference. Porto Rico likewise is not essential to our happiness. Our race difficulties are within our own borders, where we have a black population that we have absorbed culturally but do not accept as our political and social equals, who are too numerous to be expelled and from whom we cannot get away. It was feared that as a result of the war, in which we had about as many colored men in military service as did the French, we should witness among our negroes an increase of independence or insubordination — call it what we will — that might produce alarming race conflicts in

the south. Fortunately these fears have not so far been justified.

Beyond and beside the affairs of the western world, revolutionary Russia has pursued her blood-stained path. At the outbreak of the war the public rallied as enthusiastically in Russia as elsewhere to the support of its rulers and threw itself with passion into the struggle. The army was by far the largest in the world. The resources of the country seemed limitless, but the machinery of the bureaucratic and corrupt administration, inefficient at best, was inadequate to handle the vast numbers of men it had to care for and the innumerable difficulties which confronted it. Russia, too, had no such reserves of educated, intelligent, and patriotic private citizens as did the United States and Western Europe, to come to the rescue of the official machine, put new vigor into it and supply its deficiencies, nor were the relations between government and people such as to bring about loyal coöperation in time of stress. The Russian soldiers fought with their customary courage; some of their commanders were men of ability and achieved brilliant successes; but as the months went on, one disaster followed another in the field and confusion reigned supreme. The autocracy in the hands of a well-meaning but weak, incompetent, and blind emperor so completely lost credit that by the beginning of the year 1917 there were on foot several separate conspiracies of a more or less revolutionary character, conspiracies among men of all classes, including even members of the imperial family.

The revolution itself broke out almost accidentally and triumphed with scarcely an effort. The old system was too hopeless. But the new improvised government did not succeed, and could hardly expect to succeed, in dealing with the bewildering problems it was called upon to master. To the millions of soldiers at the front "liberty" meant the liberty to go home after years of suffering and slaughter for a cause they did not understand. Hence the armies soon began to melt away. As time went on, the more radical factions in Petrograd got the upper hand and they in their turn were overthrown with little resistance by the Bolsheviks. Communist Russia withdrew from the war and entered upon her career of revolutionizing her own social structure as a prelude to world revolution.

The Soviet Republic is now seven years old. At first, it had to contend with widespread armed resistance which received substantial aid from outside. It triumphed, and since 1921 its authority has been supreme within its borders. The prophecies of violent dissensions among the leaders after the death of Lenin have not as yet proved true. On the other hand, the intended world revolution has spread no further (except for a short time in Hungary), although the Communists, who take their inspiration if not their orders from Moscow, are now a recognized party or faction in every country, and in several constitute a danger to the existing order. In Russia itself scarcely had the Bolsheviks overcome their opponents and established their communistic system when they were obliged by

the almost universal economic ruin to reverse their policy and return, in a large measure, to a system of private ownership and trade. Of late there has been at least a beginning of economic recovery, but few dispassionate observers would maintain that Russia bids fair to be happy or prosperous for a good while yet. Her relations with the rest of the world, however, are becoming more normal. One after another the European powers, tired of waiting for the oft promised counter-revolution which has never eventuated, have recognized the state which in its official title no longer calls itself Russia, but the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, a name emphasizing the fact that it is based not on land or nationality but on a theory of society. Since every good communist regards those of his creed in other countries as his enslaved compatriots, the promises of official Moscow to abstain from propaganda abroad are open to skepticism. Likewise, it is not easy for foreign trade and capital to function in a normal fashion in a country where the rights of private property are at best only tolerated as a disagreeable necessity for the time being, and where there is almost no guarantee against arbitrariness and violence. Russia indeed presents a vast and menacing enigma, and no sure sign of the solution is yet discernible.

The temporary eclipse of Russia, the power which formerly had the least to hope or fear from us, is one cause of the commanding position now held by the United States. The war losses and crying needs of the victorious Allies, as well as the disaster to Germany,

have contributed still more to our relative superiority. To be sure, vast as are our territories and resources and large as is our population, they are smaller than those of the British Empire, but our immediately available wealth of men and material is much greater, and we are incomparably more secure against attack from without or dissolution from within. The United States is at present the strong man and the rich man, courted by all and having little to ask or fear from anyone. It cannot, however, expect the popularity it has enjoyed in the past. On the contrary, it must be prepared to be widely disliked. Thus, in spite of the extraordinary generosity it has shown so often in recent years, it is charged, as rich men are apt to be, with callous selfishness, and there are Americans who believe that as long as we keep out of the League there is ground for the charge.

President Harding's administration, wishing to prove that even if America had withdrawn from the European embroilment she had not lost her interest in the welfare of the world, called the Disarmament Conference at Washington. The Conference proved a success, if only a partial one. The limitation and scrapping of battleships was a step in the right direction, and the Far Eastern agreements, besides bringing about the end of a superfluous alliance, laid the foundation for a better future. Unfortunately, whatever good feeling the Conference created between the United States and Japan has been more than undone by what has seemed to the Japanese the gratuitously nasty

treatment they have received in our recent immigration law. Henceforth, though American relations with Japan may be correct and courteous, there is scant reason why she should feel affection for us or pay any more attention to our desires than her own well-understood interest demands.

Nor let anyone imagine that the immigration question is settled for all time. It may be for the present, and in the way that is most beneficial to us. We are convinced that we have acted for sufficient cause within our own undoubted rights. None the less we must not forget the spread and power of socialistic ideas in all countries and the weakening of faith in the sanctity of private property, especially in regard to the holding of wide lands. If it is held to be morally wrong and anti-social for one man to possess huge estates, which he may develop or not as he chooses, while hundreds of others near by are relegated to landlessness, why should one people acquire, by similar accident of birth or achievement, a claim to an inordinate share of the good things of life and a right to exclude from them other less fortunate peoples, white, black, or yellow? Already the theory has been urged officially by European statesmen of high standing that the exploitation of the fundamental natural resources of the earth, wherever they may be located, should be open on equal terms to men of all nations. Already it has seemed an anomaly that the Australians should have the right to exclude the Chinese from a continent which is twice the size of China proper and

has only about a sixtieth as many inhabitants. But this is only the most flagrant of many cases of the sort, including our own. We shall hear more about these questions some day.

Ten years is but a fleeting instant in even that small portion of history of which we have actual knowledge. But the ten just past have been momentous beyond precedent. It is true, we must not ascribe too exclusively to them the political and social changes that have taken place. The decay in the ancient loyalty to the throne and the altar, and in the belief in privilege as a right, is no new thing. The ultimate triumph of democracy throughout the civilized — and, indeed, the whole — world has long appeared inevitable to many thinkers, whether they liked it or not. The growing power of the doctrines of international socialism has also been obvious, although their antithesis, extreme nationalism, has gained rather than lost in force, and now the reaction of the other races against the dominant white man constitutes one of the gravest questions of the day. But though the origin of all these movements lies far back of the World War, the war has immeasurably stimulated them. Similarly, the old ideas of general disarmament, international tribunals, and associations of nations have been made vital issues by the unparalleled horrors and sufferings we have witnessed. Who would now venture to advocate frankly the imperialism which was unblushingly avowed by leaders of opinion a decade ago?

There have been times in the last ten years when, in

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

the old world at least, men have been tempted to despair of humanity. The aftermath of the war has seemed to some more cruel than the war itself and they see no end to it. Yet there has been progress as well as destruction. Even if we must admit that the cost has been fearful, that more has been destroyed than has been built and that more questions have been raised than have been answered, we may still trust that we have been moving forward, not backward. To face with courage the present difficulties of mankind, let us have faith and hope in the future and also charity for the past.

AFTER THE ELECTION

VOX POPULI — the great American people — has spoken in no uncertain tones. It has declared that it wishes to have Mr. Calvin Coolidge for President and that it approves of his policies, which are those of the party he leads. But what are these policies? In spite of the flood of recent as well as of earlier literature on the subject and the pronouncements of those highest in authority, there is still room — indeed there will always be room — for the inquiry.

In the London *Times* for October 13th we find its American correspondent saying of the presidential campaign, "There is not a genuine issue before the country." This is not the place to enter into the question whether such a sweeping assertion contains any truth in regard to our domestic affairs. Be that as it may, can we not at least maintain that the three great parties differ profoundly in their ideals of foreign policy? If so, the renewed triumph of the Republicans will mean something more than the victory of a particular set of men. It determines our attitude for the next four years towards the other nations of the world. What, then, is our attitude? Let us begin by summing up in the briefest space the tenets of the American parties in regard to foreign affairs.

Certain broad principles are generally accepted, for instance, the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door. To come down to a more concrete and immediate

example, all three parties believe — the Progressives most of the three—in payment of the Allied Debts. All recognize, too, that America must take some part in the settlement of world problems, including European ones, but their interpretation of that part varies greatly. The Republicans favor what might be called coöperation without commitment. The Democrats wish to join the League of Nations after they are sure the majority of the voters will support them. The Progressives prefer to keep out of the hornet's nest of European complications, while poking a stick into it by stirring up the most irritating question possible, a revision of the Peace Treaties; these they regard as the unclean thing, even worse than the war as the source of Europe's troubles. The Democrats, on the contrary, feeling a responsibility for the making of these treaties, approve of them, though some admit that President Wilson had to make deplorable concessions to the greed of his allies. As for the Republicans, having refused to ratify the treaties but having got all the benefit for America there was to be found in them, they are indifferent on the subject of their theoretical excellence. Both the old parties have endorsed the idea of a World Court with more or less reservations — the Republicans more, the Democrats less. The Progressives do not much like courts of any kind if they interfere with the desires of the people — who knows, the one at The Hague might be worse than the one in Washington? They also demand immediate recognition of Bolshevik Russia. This is the more laudable

as the advantage to the American farmer of putting Russia on her feet so that she may again become an exporter of grain is not obvious at first sight.

One may dispute as to how fundamental the above differences are and how free any party is to carry out its own program. At any rate, it is the Republicans who have won the election and they have the President and, however nominally, both houses of Congress, so their foreign policy is the only one of practical importance at the present moment. There is nothing mysterious in their intentions or new in their plans. Through the speeches of the Secretary of State they have told us what they have done and what they mean to do. We are all fairly familiar with the story. Nevertheless, when we are looking forward to the beginning of a new administration, even with the same President, it is well for us to take stock.

We may assume that in its foreign policy the Republican administration will "carry on." The President has expressed his warm approbation of the achievements of Secretary Hughes, and the Secretary has stood forth as the most effective Republican speaker during the election campaign. We may, therefore, take it that for the present there is to be no change in the head of the State Department, and that he will be given a free hand. But that hand, like the President's own, is none too free at best. There are two sets of factors that will always have to be reckoned with, those due to internal conditions and those due to foreign conditions.

The most obvious difficulties arising from the internal situation are that though the Republicans control Congress they are far from having the two-thirds majority of the Senate necessary for the ratification of treaties, and that the President's control of his own party is not firmly established, indeed at the end of the last session it was not established at all. Since then the situation has improved. The President has behind him the prestige of an extraordinary personal triumph, he has had time to build up his own party machine, and is in a much stronger position to secure attention to his wishes than he has ever been before. But there will always be limits to that attention. Congress is jealous of its own authority, and the Senate in particular will not be disposed to abate the tiniest fraction of its prerogatives, real or imaginary. Senator Borah, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, may not have the wide knowledge and experience of the late Senator Lodge, but he is equally set in his opinions. Though he sometimes seems to delight in being enigmatic, we know that some of these opinions are further removed from those of the administration than were those of Senator Lodge. Secretary Hughes, with the best of intentions, has never been particularly successful in conciliating Senators. He will have to tread warily. For instance, the idea of a cancellation of the Allied Debts, much as there is to be said for it, cannot for the present be entertained.

One pressing question has been settled by the Democratic Convention. There are few things most of the

members of that august assembly understood less or cared less about than the treaty between Turkey and the United States, negotiated at the time of the Lausanne Treaty and on similar principles. None the less, as a concession to one group, a condemnation of the Turkish treaty was inserted in the Democratic platform. Little as such planks often mean, it is hard to see how the Democrats in the Senate can now vote for the treaty which is to be submitted to them. Without their votes it cannot be carried. The State Department is thus left in an embarrassing quandary. Treaty or no treaty, the Turks do not intend to recognize the capitulations any longer. We are likely to find ourselves in a position where we shall have no legal means of protecting Americans in Turkey, or of obtaining redress of grievances, save by the use of force on a large scale, which we certainly do not wish to undertake. To be sure, our trouble with Turkey, though disagreeable, does not affect vitally many people in the United States. If every American is put out of Turkish territory, if the American schools and colleges which have done such wonderful work are closed and further American enterprise of all kinds is made impossible, this will be annoying, but it will not endanger our security or prosperity. We can forget about Turkey if we have to. The Far East is another matter.

When we compare the situation in the Far East from the point of view of American interests with what it was four years ago at the time of the accession of President Harding, we note three cardinal points.

AFTER THE ELECTION

First, the internal situation of China has become worse, and the danger of actual political dissolution is more menacing. Second, the relations between the United States and Japan, after a temporary amelioration due to the Disarmament Conference, have not improved. On the contrary, the Japanese have a real and lasting grievance which they did not have before, and which they are going to make use of. It is true that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is defunct, but that presented no real danger to us. As to whether the United States is left relatively better or worse off by the military provisions of the disarmament treaties, we can leave this to the experts to quarrel over. What is more serious is that the good feeling which the reduction of armaments was intended to promote, though stimulated for the moment, has been more than neutralized by the immigration bill and by the particular way in which Congress, in spite of the President and to the humiliation of the Secretary of State, insisted on applying it to Japan. The intensity of Japanese sentiment on the subject was well shown by the incident of the patriot who committed *hara-kiri* in protest and who, as is illustrated in the recent honors accorded to him, will doubtless go down to posterity as one of the heroes of Japanese history. Third, Soviet Russia has reappeared in force on the Pacific. She has reoccupied the old Russian territories and reasserted Russian claims; she is in no way bound by the Washington agreement, to which she was not invited; she is fond of fishing in troubled waters, and as long as we

maintain our present attitude towards her she may be counted on as being hostile to the United States. We need not be surprised, therefore, if we find her frequently making common cause with Japan now that the two countries are on speaking terms again.

Such are the disagreeable facts. They must be faced, but it is not clear what we can do about them. It is true, we are too powerful for anyone to pick a quarrel with us needlessly. Even if Japanese public opinion may be hostile to us, the government of the Mikado is not likely to go beyond an attitude of cold and dignified reserve. It has not hurried to send back its ambassador to Washington, it may not send one back for years — this is a legitimate form of showing resentment, and western rather than oriental. Meanwhile events in the Far East will take their course, and the possibilities are disquieting. We cannot hold China together if she insists on falling in pieces. What shall we do if she does disintegrate? The lending of money to put her on her feet does not to-day look attractive as a venture. To what extent are we ready to go, in order to check Japanese domination or hegemony or spheres of influence in the Far East? Are we prepared not only to keep the Japanese out of our part of the world, but to interfere with them in theirs? Are Pan Asianism or Pan Mongolianism more unnatural than Pan Americanism? Many questions of the sort might be asked, to which it would be difficult to make a satisfactory reply. It does not look as if there were much for us to do at present in the Far East except to mind

AFTER THE ELECTION

our own business, look after and protect our commercial and other interests as best we can, be helpful when there is a chance, and trust that the situation will improve of itself in the course of time. But our days as the "great and good friend" of everybody are over.

Towards Russia we have adopted an attitude which apparently commends itself to the majority of the American people and from which, with all due respect to Senator Borah, we shall not soon depart unless important changes occur there. This attitude has been firm, consistent and dignified, and its official harshness has been tempered by splendid unofficial charity. To be sure, this attitude presents grave inconveniences. The Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics covers too large a portion of the globe for us to be able to leave it comfortably out of account. We may have few points of contact, but there are some, even if we are willing to sacrifice for the time being our opportunities of mutually helpful trade. Now that the Soviet Federation has been recognized *de jure* by all the great powers but ourselves, as well as by many smaller powers, it will be increasingly difficult to avoid meeting, that is to say, dealing with, its representatives at international gatherings of every sort. Are we to refuse to appear whenever the Russians are invited? And it will be hard to leave them out even when we issue the invitations ourselves. This is especially true of any disarmament conference. Our government cherishes the hope of convoking another disarmament conference at Washington that shall continue and surpass the achievements of its

predecessor three years ago — achievements of which the State Department is justly proud and concerning which it has never quite been able to understand the lack of livelier enthusiasm. But it is only too obvious that a disarmament congress in which Russia does not take part will be even more incomplete than the last. At that time her non-participation meant a gap in the Far Eastern settlement whereby whatever was concluded lacked the consent of one of the most interested and most powerful parties. Now it is Europe and western Asia that are concerned. If the Russians remain free to maintain armies of the size they think fit, how can the weak states along their borders, Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey, which already live in fear and trembling on their account, be expected to cut down their own forces? How can France do so if she is to support these weak states, some of which are her allies and look to her for protection? But unless France reduces her forces we can hardly ask it of her neighbors such as Italy and England. The Bolsheviks may dislike the League of Nations as much as do some Americans, but there is a chance, however small, that they will accept the invitation extended to them to take part in a disarmament conference at Geneva. It is possible that they will abide by the decisions arrived at there and will consent to a fair proportional reduction of their armies. But they cannot even be invited to attend at Washington, except perhaps as "unofficial observers."

The recent establishment of a Soviet legation in

Mexico and the open expressions of sympathy for Communist ideas on the part of members of the Mexican Government are phenomena which we may view without alarm but not with pleasure. Russian influence in Mexico will be exercised in a sense unfavorable to the United States, and it will not be agreeable if we are to have a base of communist propaganda established to the south of us. Still we should probably mind this less than one of Japanese influence. Not long ago it seemed that what we might have to fear was too close relations between Mexico and Japan, something like an alliance against the United States. There also appeared to be a possibility of an influx into Mexico of Japanese, some of whom would tend to cross the border in spite of our customs guards. This may still happen, but the Mexicans of to-day, like many other peoples, are more exuberantly nationalistic than of old. They no longer welcome Asiatic immigration, indeed it is conceivable that they may follow our example and forbid it. On the other hand, Mexicans are not excluded from the United States by our immigration laws and we may look forward to their flowing over in ever greater numbers. Before long, in southern California the place of the Asiatic may be taken by the peon. Whether he will be as efficient, time will show, but perhaps it is better he should not be if he does not want to become equally unpopular. Any attempt to shut him out would add one more to the possible causes of ill-feeling between us and our difficult neighbors.

These causes are grave enough already. It is in the nature of things that the Mexicans, though in certain respects anxious for our assistance, should not like us and should distrust and fear us profoundly. We have got to accept this and make due allowances for it, and we shall often have to exercise infinite patience. The way that we handle Mexican affairs will be a test of our statesmanship. At present the State Department seems to be meeting this test with credit.

With the rest of Latin America we may be thankful that we have no such permanently delicate relations. We have been withdrawing or are going to withdraw American guards from Santo Domingo, Hayti, and Nicaragua. In Cuba the situation is reasonably tranquil and things are progressing smoothly elsewhere. The Monroe Doctrine remains a shibboleth to which due homage is paid. Pan-American congresses bid fair to continue with much flow of the soul. All this is well enough as far as it goes. What one sometimes wonders is, how far does it go? Is much really being accomplished? For instance, the State Department has held that the Santiago Congress of a year and a half ago was a success, but that view does not appear to be widely entertained outside. The government also holds that Latin America has never been better disposed towards the United States than at the present day, yet some people declare that there is a growing hostility towards us. If this last be true, a thing difficult to determine with certainty, it is unfortunate and discouraging, for there can be no doubt of the friendliness on our side,

a friendliness perhaps tinged with a patronizing indifference but genuine enough in its essence. We have honestly tried to play the good big brother to Latin America. Still, even the rôle of the best big brother may be overdone.

Since the World War, as never before, except at the time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the more important side of our relations with Europe has been the general one rather than the dealings with any particular country. We of course have our separate relations with each, but they are in the main simple and satisfactory. It may be noted here parenthetically that the return to power of a Conservative government in England will mean strong efforts to check the increasing disintegration of the British Empire. One form these efforts will assume will be an attempt to introduce imperial preference in tariffs, a measure which, however desirable from the British political point of view, cannot help being disadvantageous economically to the United States. Of course, as a highly protectionist country, a protest on our part would be ridiculous. Retaliation would have many dangers.

We may divide our relations with the European world into four main heads, corresponding with four great questions which we are doing our best to keep asunder but which insist on remaining connected with one another. These are Rehabilitation, including especially the reparations question, Allied Debts, the League of Nations, and the World Court.

We — that is, the triumphant Republican Party and

the administration — have always been anxious to aid in the rehabilitation of Europe and the betterment of mankind. But we prefer to do it at our own time, in our own way, without running unpleasant risks or incurring awkward obligations. We have rejoiced at not being in the mess in which Europe has been floundering, at not sharing the passions and mistakes of her peoples and her statesmen. We have not been wanting in sympathy, as our private charity has shown, but we have believed it to be better for the world (and emphatically for ourselves) that we should keep out of the turmoil and merely proffer advice and indirect aid.

This policy has been justified by its results, at least in the eyes of the American people. After the somewhat sterile period of "unofficial observers" has come the more fertile one of approved, though still unofficial, coöperation. The success achieved by the commissions of experts gave the name of Mr. Dawes a popularity sufficient to make the Cleveland Convention feel that his nomination for the Vice-Presidency would add to the strength of the Republican ticket. There can be little doubt, too, that the presence of Secretary Hughes and his wise words at the opportune moment in London, Paris, and Berlin helped materially to secure agreement to accept the report. By our consent to the appointment of Messrs. Perkins and Gilbert we have given it a further blessing. If all goes well, we shall claim no small credit for our share in the transaction. If all goes badly, we shall maintain that it is not our fault. We have recommended and assisted the best

solution yet proposed. If it is not carried out in practice, the blame must be attached to those who have not profited by the chance of salvation offered to them.

Our interest in rehabilitation and in reparations, though great, is indirect. The question of the payment of Allied Debts, though luckily not pressing, is direct. The outlook at the present moment is hopeless enough. Of course no government of continental Europe has even hinted at a flat repudiation of what it owes to us or to England, but at bottom no one of the peoples believes that they will be called upon to pay their debts any more than the American people intends to forgive them. The English have made an arrangement which we regard as generous but which many of them resent as iniquitous, and which helps to make it difficult for them to remit what is due to them from the continental powers. Like ourselves, they assert that such debts are quite independent of what the Germans owe for reparations, a view which only prudence prevents the French Government from denying and which to the French people seems monstrously unjust. At any rate, we can see that if Germany does pay a substantial sum for reparations the situation will be easier. If no reparations are to be forthcoming, the prospect is gloomy. Our government, to its credit, has appreciated the magnitude and delicacy of the task before it and has so far acted with real tact. Unfortunately its hand may be forced at any time by clamor in America or by ill-advised action in Europe.

The famous declaration of the Thirty-One prevented the presidential election of 1920 from turning specifically on the question whether the United States should join the League of Nations. The size of the Republican majority, however, and the attitude of the Republican press made it evident that the country as a whole was opposed to any such step. President Harding, who had given encouragement to the Thirty-One, soon dropped all talk of an association of nations of any kind, and for long the League received little attention (its partisans said scant courtesy) from the State Department. Many Republicans spoke of it with open dislike and derision. Undeterred by this, or perhaps in ignorance of it, the public in Europe continued to hope that the United States might change its mind, and in spite of frequent rebuffs America was persistently invited to take part in one conference or another, and again and again refused.

In the last year or so the tone of the Republicans has become more generous. The League has ceased to be a bogey to them. They have been willing to recognize that it has excellent intentions and has done good in its way. They have approved of our joining in its conferences about such subjects as the white slave traffic and the evils of narcotics. Thus, though there have been few signs of conversion of Republicans, there has been a diminution of hostility on their part, indeed, most of them have not regarded the connection between the League and the High Court as an insurmountable obstacle to our participation in that Court

AFTER THE ELECTION

provided our own rights, as we choose to define them, are safeguarded. On the other hand, President Coolidge soon after he came into office declared the question of the accession of the United States to the League to be a "closed incident," and the Bok Peace Plan, which was a move in that direction, fell rather flat. The further publicity it might have hoped to enjoy, thanks to its being made the object of a senatorial investigation, was cut short by the more absorbing topic of the oil scandals.

When the Republican Convention came together in Cleveland the refusal to have the United States enter the League of Nations was, without opposition, made a plank of the Republican platform. The Democrats were in rather a plight. Their party was committed to the League, but they feared that the majority of the American people might be opposed to it. Accordingly they tried to sidestep the issue by a Platonic declaration in its favor and a promise to submit the question to a referendum. One may doubt whether they gained any votes by this subterfuge, for they exposed themselves to the jibes of their adversaries for their cowardice, and they made it easier for pro-League Republicans to remain faithful to their own party, on the ground that there was not much to be hoped for from the Democrats. In one way the attitude of the Democratic convention might be compared to that of the Thirty-One four years earlier. Both prevented the question of our accession to the League of Nations from being a clear cut major issue between the parties at the

presidential election. This is something for which American partisans of the League may be thankful.

For its part, the Assembly of the League met in Geneva last September in a mood to take more resolute action than it had taken since the days of its formation. It had been stung by the charge that so far it had only settled small questions and proved itself incapable of solving large ones. It had also apparently come to the reluctant conclusion that there was no hope of an immediate change of mind in the United States nor advantage in longer waiting. The Dawes Report and its acceptance, the community of views expressed by Macdonald and Herriot, the new willingness of France to entrust the guarantee of her security to the League instead of relying merely on her own military strength, all paved the way for weighty decisions. The result was the Protocol.

This is not the place to go into the meaning or importance of the Protocol, which we were not invited to sign. Much has been said about it and we are only at the beginning of the discussion. For a good effect on America it came out at an unfortunate moment in an unfortunate way. Rightly or wrongly, the Protocol has increased distrust of the League here, reviving the somewhat forgotten alarms of those who had opposed the League on the ground that it was creating a super-state. To make matters worse, suspicion has been much intensified by the eleventh-hour action of the Japanese. It is true that they did not obtain their demand in the form they had put it in. It also may be

true, though it is not clear, that they will be in no better position to urge their claims for a reopening of the immigration dispute than they were before. But the mere fact that the League seems to provide a way in which, without incurring its disapproval, the Japanese may go ahead and act as they please about what we believe to be a domestic question, is like a red rag to a bull to the average American. Supporters of the League will continually have to explain away a clause which seems to present in concrete form a danger whose existence they have denied in the abstract. All told, the chance of anything like the immediate accession of the United States to the League appears to have been reduced to a vanishing point. Even the more friendly attitude we have of late been maintaining towards it is menaced. Already there has been some little feeling in America at the proposal to call a disarmament conference in Geneva next June regardless of our expressed desire to have another one in Washington under our aegis. The charge, justified or not, that the Protocol facilitates anti-American designs on the part of Japan is almost enough to wreck all chance of our participating in any disarmament congress fathered by the League of Nations. If, as now seems probable (and even desirable to many friends of the League), the Protocol fails to receive the number of ratifications necessary to make it valid, we may witness the opposite effect. It is too early yet to make predictions.

But this is not all. The fact that the High Court has

been brought into connection with possible Japanese claims about what we regard as domestic questions threatens to stimulate American dislike of any such Court. To be sure, President Coolidge as well as President Harding, the Republican Party as well as the Democratic, have pronounced themselves officially in favor of our participation. Still, a good many Americans have their doubts, and a large number, well represented in Congress, demand that it shall be entirely disassociated from the League. This demand has been strengthened, at least temporarily, by the incident of the Protocol and will be affected by its outcome. But the High Court is an indispensable part of the League. It can hardly be cut off to please us nor can it easily be made to serve in two capacities.

On this question of just what we intend to do about a World Court the administration must soon make up its mind. There is no such necessity in regard to the League, for there its mind is already made up. We intend to stay outside with Russia, Mexico, and Ecuador. We shall continue our policy of coöperation and we shall try to collect our debts. In our present mood we care less to have our course idealistic than to have it safe and sane, even if our definition of safe and sane looks to some people a short-sighted one.

DISSATISFIED GERMANY

PEOPLES, like persons, are subject to changing moods of content and of discontent, moods which in their consequences affect not only them but others. The discontented are prone to be sensitive and unreasonable, if not quarrelsome, and this in itself is a danger to peace. In the world of to-day most of the peoples appear to be reasonably content with their position and with the existing framework of international comity. Some, however, are profoundly dissatisfied and accept the status quo only in so far and so long as they have to.

Naturally enough, this applies first and foremost to the European nations defeated in the World War. They have met with disastrous calamity and have fallen from high estate. It would be too much to expect them to be pleased with their present conditions. It is also plain that an increasing number of populations in Asia and Africa have awakened to a sense of grievance, unfelt a generation or two ago, and are demanding with increasing vehemence a recognition of their claims. As a connecting link between these two discontents, we have Communist Russia in its remorseless campaign against the structure of modern society, eager to promote trouble anywhere and everywhere. On the other hand, we may take comfort because the

smaller, formerly more or less oppressed, nationalities of Europe, such as the Poles, the Czechs, the Jugoslavs, the Irish and others, have passed from the dissatisfied to the satisfied category. The same is true of the French and the Italians, though reservations must be made in both cases.

In the Western Hemisphere all the countries, with the possible exception of Peru, have the good fortune to belong in the satisfied class. The most striking example of one that has good cause to be pleased with its lot is the United States.

Although, as the World War has shown, a quarrel in which one of the two parties is a small nation may set the world in flames, a small nation can hardly achieve this unaided. If Serbia had not been supported by Russia in 1914 she would have had to submit to the Austrian ultimatum or undergo chastisement which might have ended her existence as an independent state. Similarly Hungary and Bulgaria, however bitterly they may brood over the wrongs which they believe have been done to them, however determined they may be not to accept their present boundaries as final, can only nurse their secret hopes and bide their time. Of themselves they can accomplish nothing. We may sympathize with them or we may condemn them, but it is not on them that the future tranquillity of the world depends. It does depend to an alarming extent on the actions and attitude of certain more important peoples who at the present moment are dissatisfied. We are beginning to learn that this is true

of China, we are unpleasantly aware that it is so of Russia, and few have ever doubted it as regards Germany.

That Europe cannot settle down without some sort of voluntary acquiescence on the part of the Germans is indeed self-evident. It is, however, equally certain, though this has sometimes been overlooked, that there is nothing to be gained by purchasing German acquiescence at the price of the permanent discontent or alarm of some other great people. Therefore the problem is to reconcile whatever may be their legitimate demands with the interests of the nations affected by them. English statesmen realize this, albeit unwillingly, and admit that the question of the rehabilitation of Germany cannot be separated from that of the security, and even of the mere sense of security, of France.

Among the many obstacles to a better feeling between these old opponents is the unfortunate relation to each other in which they have been left by the outcome of the World War. Ordinarily after a trial of arms it is not difficult for one side — the victorious one — to forgive and forget. This means that at least one of the parties most concerned is ready for a reconciliation. For instance, after 1871 the Germans ceased to hate the French, indeed they would have liked to be friends with them if the latter had been willing to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as irrevocable. But in the World War, victorious France, on whose soil it was fought, suffered far more than did defeated Ger-

many, of whom, besides, owing to her inferiority in population, she is more afraid than Germany is of her. In consequence, although the victor, she harbors the passions, not to say the desire for retaliation, which we are wont to associate with the vanquished, while the vanquished nation has been equally embittered by the treatment meted to her by the terms of peace and in the years that have followed. We thus find a mutual sense of injury, a distrust and a dislike so intense as to make us almost despair of a solution.

And yet the necessity of appeasement and of some sort of relations that shall be tolerable to both sides is so obvious, that in the two countries not only international Socialists and unsentimental capitalists but sensible and moderate men of all kinds are striving for an understanding. During the last few months real steps in this direction have been taken. Now that the Dawes Plan has worked for over a year, that the episode of the Ruhr occupation is past, that the first of the three occupied Rhine zones is to be evacuated, and that Germany is to enter into the League of Nations and be a member of the Council, a corner has been turned. Although she has still to bear the penalty of defeat, and part of the Fatherland is still occupied by foreign soldiers, Germany need no longer feel that she is regarded as a criminal and an outcast. Her first and most passionate demand, that she be once more treated as an equal, will have been in some measure acceded to, and she can resume normal international life and intercourse and play her part in general questions.

Up to now, the Germans say, they have been treated as sinners or, at best, penitents on account of a war which was the fault of somebody else; the Peace of Versailles has loaded them with servitudes and they have been bullied and humiliated ever since. Even the Dawes agreement is a measure which has been imposed upon them and which they have accepted only under dire necessity. For them to enter the League of Nations without having a permanent place in the Council would have been an added indignity. If assured of their proper position there, and of equality in the Security Pact, they can feel for the first time since the war that something has been done to relieve them from the badge of inferiority fastened upon them, and that Germany will once more stand on the same footing as Great Britain and France.

In answer to all this there is much that might be said, but we need not go into the question here. Gall-ing as it is to Germany to be treated as a defeated state, of whom her victors are still suspicious, as the allies were suspicious of the French after the fall of the great Napoleon, such things right themselves sooner or later — how soon depends on the attitude of the vanquished as well as on that of the victorious party. They need not present a serious peril for the future, but obviously the sooner this grievance is removed, the better for everyone concerned.

Many Germans dream of revenge to-day, as many Frenchmen did after 1871, and whether we approve of them or not, it is not always easy for a broad-minded

neutral to condemn without qualification the one more than the other. All that can be exacted of Germany is that she accept the Peace of Versailles as France accepted the Peace of Frankfort, a thing hateful in her own sight but a necessity to which she has bowed. The most loyal acceptance by a defeated nation of an unfavorable treaty of peace need not preclude cherishing the hope that circumstances will lead to changes some day. Such circumstances are apt to be due to violence, yet they may come from outside. It was not a Polish insurrection but the World War and the Bolshevik Revolution which led to the rebirth of independent Poland. Germany also has a perfect right to obtain whatever modifications in the treaty she can persuade the other signatories to agree to. In the League of Nations she will have a field for effective legitimate action in the furtherance of her purposes such as no beaten country ever enjoyed in the past. She will have friends from the start and she may be counted on not to neglect her opportunities.

Leaving to one side minor and temporary objectives, we may well ask what will be her fundamental desires and what are the obstacles in the way of her attaining them. The Germans, and especially the German nationalists, evidently want a great many things. There is, of course, every variety of hope and design among them, from the most modest to the wildly extravagant. Still we can see a consensus of opinion on certain broad issues, remembering, too, that many of the demands of the extremists can count on the sympathy of the

moderates, who do not support them only because they regard such dreams as unattainable, not as undesirable.

If we wish to sum up their aspirations in a phrase, we can say that the Germans insist on the necessity of a revision of the Peace of Versailles, which to them is the embodiment of foolish wickedness. In this they have the sympathy of their partisans everywhere and of a good many idealists of one kind or another. But the difficulties in the way of a sweeping, wholesale revision which would have to be agreed to by all who had a hand in the treaty would be tremendous. Probably no one would maintain to-day that the Peace of Versailles was perfect in itself, but, whatever its imperfections, it is now an important integral portion of the public law of Europe. Parts of it, to be sure, have already proved inoperative, and others will doubtless be modified before long; but to imagine that the Powers which forged it out after months of labor and prolonged if sometimes futile discussion will sit down together again at the council table, this time with the participation of Germany, and take up the whole treaty, article by article, and recast it or substitute another in its place, is a foolish, not to say dangerous, illusion. The mere attempt at such a proceeding would be a menace to the peace of the world. Everyone, of course, will admit that there are provisions in the instrument which may profitably be changed if such changes can be brought about peacefully and without injury to others. Doubtless there will be many of them

sooner or later, perhaps indeed very soon; but unless there is another catastrophe, they will come piecemeal and not by any all-inclusive act of general consent.

A peculiar feature of the Peace of Versailles was the unwise provision by which the Germans were compelled to acknowledge that they were responsible for the war. They protested emphatically at the time, but had to submit, and did so, but with no more feeling of being morally bound by such a declaration than a man is by a lie he is forced to tell to a highwayman whose pistol is at his head. On the contrary, from that day to this, they have made every effort to prove that the charge, to which they gave the apparent confirmation of their signature, was an outrageous calumny whose falseness they are exposing to the world. With this incentive their historical writers have in the last half-dozen years done far more and, on the whole, better work than those of any other country in investigating the causes and origin of the conflict. As might be expected, not only have they convinced their compatriots more firmly than ever of their own innocence but they have made no small impression among neutrals and even in lands formerly hostile to them.

The practical conclusion which the German people draw from these investigations is that as, forsooth, the provisions of the peace treaty were based on their supposed guilt, these should be changed at once, now that their innocence has been demonstrated. All the penalties imposed should immediately be abrogated if not imposed on someone else. Of course, no such thing

is going to happen. The French, and indeed people in the Allied countries generally, still hold the Germans primarily responsible. No international investigation, any more than one by the American Senate, could do much besides add a little fresh material to the controversy, and thresh over the old straw of what we know already. Men will be discussing the rights and wrongs of it for centuries. At any rate, it has little practical bearing to-day on the terms of the Peace Treaty. Even if the charges against M. Poincaré, who has of late been the favorite object of attack, were proved to the full, his responsibility would be no greater than was that of Bismarck for the war of 1870. How many of the Germans who are forced to admit (though they do not condemn) the fact that Bismarck wished for a war at that time and did his best to bring it about, have ever suggested that the French indemnity after defeat should have been remitted for that reason? But logic or no logic, we must none the less realize that one of the acute grievances of the German people is that they believe they are being punished for a crime when it has been demonstrated that they were innocent. Even in regard to Belgium, about which outside opinion is practically unanimous, few can yet bring themselves to admit any real guilt.

From the point of view of pure equity, perhaps the severest criticism which can be made of the treaty is the number of permanent servitudes, large and small, which it imposes. Such servitudes are not unusual after a war and a defeat. The limitation of the Prussian

army by Napoleon I, the prohibition of a Russian fleet in the Black Sea after the Crimean War, the obligation of the "most favored nation" clause imposed on France by the Treaty of Frankfort are well-known instances. But permanent servitudes, unlike indemnities which can be paid and forgotten, constitute, even when they are no real burden, a perpetual irritant and reminder of former humiliation. In practice they have seldom been effective for long. They are too incompatible with the pride of a self-respecting nation to be borne indefinitely. Germany will never accept hers for all time. The best that can be hoped is that the two most important of them, the reduction of her army and the demilitarization of the Rhine zone, may become parts of some general agreement of disarmament to which she will accede as an equal, and that her remaining servitudes will gradually disappear of themselves or be obliterated by other compacts. But a good deal must happen first to reassure the French.

Turning to the economic field, though there is plenty that might be said about many of the provisions of the Peace Treaty, the crucial question at present is that of reparations. The Germans declare that the reparations demanded of them have been far beyond their capacity to pay. What their "capacity" really is, neither they nor anyone else can know with certainty. What a country can pay depends not a little on how you interpret the word "can," whether applied to reparations or to Allied debts. It is now widely admitted that the first totals arrived at were too high

and that the whole vastly difficult and complicated matter has been mismanaged. The amount has been reduced several times, and in the adoption of the Dawes Report we have the last and most hopeful attempt at a solution. There may have to be others later, but for the time being the Dawes Plan is being tried out in a fair manner by all parties.

It is when we come to questions of national sovereignty and territorial limits that we meet with the most nearly insoluble problems. Here again the Germans have complaints and aspirations which are common, if in varying degrees, to all their parties. Some of the subjects on which they have felt most acutely, such as the occupation of the Ruhr, the encouragement given by the French to the attempts to set up a Rhineland republic, and recently the delay in the Allied evacuation of the Cologne region, now belong to the past. They have also other grievances of a temporary nature. As they begin to recover from the war they become increasingly desirous of being masters of their own household and bringing to a close the desecration of the soil of the Fatherland by a hated foreign soldiery whose expenses they have to pay. This is natural enough, and we may expect that negotiation will lead to a shortening, and perhaps to a speedy end, of the term of the military occupation of the west bank of the Rhine fixed by the Peace Treaty.

Another thing that has aroused deep resentment throughout Germany and some fear as to the future is the special régime of the Saar region. We need not

enter here into the question of this complicated arrangement and of how it has worked. There have undoubtedly been hardships and abuses and these have been magnified by propaganda literature. It is interesting, by the way, to note how much attention the Saar question has received from outside. Several works on the subject, all from the same point of view, have been written in English alone. The temporary plight of the population has attracted far more sympathy than has the fate of the Germans of the South Tyrol, who have been handed over permanently to Italy and are being subjected to a severe process of denationalization. But the world is usually quicker to blame the French than the Italians for actions of the same sort.

At any rate, although troubles about the Saar region may well continue till the end of the fifteen-year period and the plebiscite that is to follow, as prescribed by the Peace Treaty, the situation should some day clear up of itself.

Far more serious and lasting than any of the above grievances are the feelings which Germans entertain and will continue to entertain as to the justice of their present frontiers. They may have to submit indefinitely, time may heal their wounds, but it will be a long time. Forty years and more did little to heal similar wounds in France. It would be folly to expect acquiescence of the heart at least in any near future. Even those Germans most opposed to trying again the hazards of war will continue to hope that through the League of Nations, or by some turn in the wheel of

fortune, at least some of their lost lands and brethren will come back to them.

On the western frontier, it is true, many Germans, including the government now in power, are ready to make a great concession. They are prepared, in return for recognition of their claims elsewhere, to accept finally the reunion to France of Alsace-Lorraine. Although such a concession horrifies those of more nationalistic tendencies, we may take it as having been brought forward in good faith and not merely as a painful sacrifice consented to as part of a profitable bargain. The experience Germany had for almost half a century in her recent possession of Alsace-Lorraine was unsatisfactory from beginning to end, and was not an episode which she can look back upon with pride, or wish to repeat. If the Alsatians, German-speaking though most of them are, prefer to belong to France, of which they have given abundant proof, we can understand why public opinion in Germany, supposing it to be desirous of a termination to the centuries-old feud between the two countries, should be willing to accept as permanent the frontier of 1815 which now corresponds to the wishes of the populations on both sides. The world can only applaud if this is the case.

To the east and the south the situation is different. The Germans demand that there shall be a rectification of their eastern frontiers, that is, that the continuity of their territory shall be restored, that they shall be given Danzig, that the millions of Germans under

Polish rule shall be freed, that they shall get back the portion of Silesia which has been taken away from them, robbing them of valuable resources and arbitrarily breaking up a natural economic unity. There is no doubt that strong arguments can be put forth in support of their contentions, so strong indeed that they have appealed to many outsiders, and especially to the English. We can understand, too, that most Germans, one might perhaps say all, even if resigned to the peace settlement on their western border as last-
ing, cannot conceive of its remaining unchanged in the east. But how are changes to be brought about? Can Poland, a country as large as Germany and with a people noted for courage and extreme patriotism rather than for calm reason, be expected to make any considerable concessions? The two populations are so inextricably mixed up that, whatever the boundaries, there have got to be either a large number of Germans in Poland or of Poles in Germany. The present situation is the result of a thousand years of national contact, not to say conflict. The Germans may feel, and a good many others with them, that it is a smaller hardship for Poles to be reluctant German citizens than it is for people who belong to one of the great cultural nations of history and who speak one of the chief world languages to be exposed to denationalization in a state whose history and language have seldom had more than local importance in the past, and are not likely to have in the future. Yet, however much may be said for this view, we can scarcely expect it to commend

itself to the Poles, any more than a somewhat similar view did to the Irish. The Poles also declare that for them to be shut off by foreign territory from the Baltic would be a worse hardship than it is for Germany to be divided by the Corridor. Their need "of a free and secure access to the sea" was recognized in the Fourteen Points (Number XIII) and was accepted by the Allies and by Germany herself. Supposing even that the economic arguments balance each other, the guiding principle should be that of self-determination, and the large majority of the population of the Corridor are and wish to remain Poles. As for Silesia, it has no necessary unity. The Austrian part was separated from the Prussian long ago, and the final division between Germany and Poland was based on the votes of the districts — and thus the old arguments thrashed over so many times in Paris and elsewhere in the last half dozen years are repeated again without getting us further. In England public opinion is on the German side, in France on the Polish. But though England is utterly unwilling to guarantee Polish security, and is under no obligation to do so in regard to the frontiers of Poland and Russia, which were drawn in a way that did not meet with her approval, those between Poland and Germany, much as she may disapprove of them, were fixed by the peace treaties which she helped to make and to which she has given her signature. Still, treaties or no treaties, we need not expect just yet that the Germans will bring themselves to accept as final the present delimitation of their eastern frontiers.

The question of a union between the Germans of Germany and the Germans of Austria is even more important and immediate. The enthusiasm for it may wax and wane on the two sides of the line in accordance with varying political or economic conditions, but these are mere temporary factors. The motive of common nationality and history on which the aspiration rests is as strong and as justified as is that of any other people. United Germany is as legitimate an ideal as United Italy, and, in spite of the differences in creed, there is no more incompatibility between the Austrian and the Prussian than there is between the Neapolitan and the Piedmontese. Certainly they are more alike than are the Breton and the Provençal. It is a question, too, not of union but of reunion. Save for a short period, German Austria has been during her whole existence a political as well as national part of Germany, and still was so in the memory of men now living. To refuse her permission to return to the fold is to fly flat in the face of every principle of self-determination.¹

Yet, on the other hand, who can wonder that France and Belgium, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia — and possibly Russia — would view such a consummation with the liveliest alarm and may go far in their efforts to prevent it? Their reasons are plain and cogent enough. They are convinced that they would be en-

¹ The province of Vorarlberg might well go to Switzerland, with which it belongs better geographically, and to which its inhabitants have shown a desire to be annexed.

dangered by such an accession of power to the German state. Poland would feel that her already existing peril was increased; Bohemia, with her large minority of dissatisfied Germans, would be surrounded on three sides by a Germany which would threaten to engulf her, or at least absorb her German fringe; Italy, though better able to defend herself and possessing in the South Tyrol but a fragment — and a particularly unjustifiable fragment — of *Germania irredenta*, would find her possession of it more precarious than now and also would dread German approach to the Adriatic. The reasons of France and Belgium for opposing the annexation of Austria are too obvious to need pointing out. We may indeed doubt whether any other country in Europe wishes to see the rebuilding of a German state more populous than the Germany of 1914.

Such being the case, and self-preservation still being the first law among nations as among individuals, there would seem to be little prospect that the wishes of Germany and Austria will soon be acceded to, especially as the peace treaties have put obstacles in the way. But it is an awkward and dangerous thing to have one's security permanently dependent on a wrong done to another. Time and accident offer opportunities, and a cause which is dear to millions and which is right and natural in itself is apt to triumph in the end — witness the resurrection of Poland. Everyone who is not threatened by German power will probably recognize the inherent justice of the German claim. Great Britain may feel sure enough of herself to sym-

pathize with it some day, and even those whose security appears menaced may not be in a position to face the reprobation of the rest of the world by using force to oppose the voluntary coming together of free peoples who wish to restore their national unity. If the peril of future aggression and war could be eliminated, there is no moral ground on which the wish could well be opposed.

Some have suggested that a possible union or, at least, close association between Belgium and France might serve in the nature of a counterpoise. There is no immediate likelihood of such a consummation, for never has Belgium been so conscious of her individuality or so justly proud of herself as she is at present. She is a monarchy, not a republic, and the Germanic-Flemish element of her population, already the larger of the two, appears to be gaining ground on the French. Nevertheless, an ultimate fusion, more or less complete, of Belgium and France is conceivable. The idea has come up before and may come up again. Needless to say, the mere thought of it would horrify Great Britain, which has gone to war again and again to keep the French out of the Low Countries. Indeed the necessity of doing so has been one of the cardinal, fixed features of British foreign policy for the last two hundred and fifty years. Yet, if the French and the Belgians were in favor of a union of any kind, political or commercial, the British would have no more right to keep the French out of Antwerp than the French have to keep the Prussians out of Vienna.

One German demand which has attracted but little attention abroad stands a fair chance of partial satisfaction some day. Few of us realize that many Germans have not resigned themselves to the loss of their colonial possessions. On the contrary, they are still keenly interested in these territories, where they believe they achieved much, and of which they declare they have been deprived by barefaced robbery on a trumped-up charge of misgovernment. On the first favorable occasion they mean to ask for at least some of them back, for a moral vindication if for no other reason. When once Germany has been admitted to the League of Nations, she can easily propose that the mandates of her former colonies be transferred to her hands from those of their present holders. Such a request may be heeded. She will hardly regain possession of Southwest Africa or of her Pacific islands, — South Africa and Australia will see to that, — but it is quite on the cards that England may sooner or later abandon Tanganyika to her.

To all the above the cynic may reply with the query whether, if the Germans obtain these various things they are asking for, they will then be satisfied or any happier than before. Perhaps not, but doubt of that sort should not prevent the performing of an act of justice nor interfere too much with what seems to be clearly expedient. If Germany is deeply discontented — and she is — this is reason enough for other countries, and especially for her neighbors, to take stock of the situation from the point of view of their own inter-

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

ests as well as that of the public welfare, and make up their minds accordingly. The demands of Germany may require too much sacrifice of the rights of others for them to be granted, but for the peace of the world they must be considered with the utmost seriousness, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that sooner or later some of them will have to receive satisfaction.

THE GROUPING OF NATIONS

IN the fourteenth chapter of the Book of Genesis, we learn that the prophet Abraham aided four "kings" to defeat five others and was rewarded by a blessing from one of his associates. This early instance of alliances has been followed by many more. As the world has grown smaller, thanks to improved means of communication, and as the interests of every country have tended to become far flung, regions remote from one another and of the most various character have been brought into close relations in war and peace. Under modern economic conditions the advantages of vast political and commercial aggregations are becoming ever greater, and this has only been emphasized by the increase in the number of small states owing to the World War, for it is but too plain that, however independent, they cannot be completely self-reliant. Everywhere to-day we find a tendency towards large groups which would fain be self-supporting.

Associations between nations, like those between private citizens, may be based on principles of widely different kinds. A man may belong with equal loyalty to all sorts of organizations corresponding to his diverse interests. He can be at the same time an enthusiastic member of the Sons of the Revolution, of the Knights of Pythias, the Republican Party, the Association of Amherst Graduates, the New York Bar, the Methodist

church, the local golf and dramatic clubs, etc., etc., etc. Such activities may interfere with one another and constitute too heavy a drain on his resources, but there is no incompatibility between them. Whole peoples have not the same range of choice, but they may be drawn together by sympathies due to religion and culture, to similarity of political institutions, to ties of blood, real or fancied, and the use of the same or similar languages. Or they may be mutually attracted by the fact that they are neighbors and as such have identical interests, or that they can supplement each other economically to the profit of both, or that they have the same enemies. Their motives, like those of individuals, are mixed and sometimes contradictory, and they are equally fickle in their affections.

The great empires of history have been built up by conquest and colonization and have represented the supremacy of nations as well as of individuals. They have rested on brute force, but also on other and on widely differing principles. The Roman Empire at its height, like the Chinese one, comprised, if not the whole known world, at least all the world that its inhabitants thought worth knowing. After its fall, the recollections of its culture and the common religious faith accepted by its citizens and taught by them to the barbarians, maintained for centuries a certain unity of the Christian world, though this was sadly marred by its division into an eastern and a western half. Even now the idea of "Christendom" as one religious brotherhood of peoples is not quite extinct, in spite of the further en-

feeblement produced by the Reformation and its wars and by the dissolving effect of modern toleration and indifference. Pan Islamism as a political bond due to creed has more vitality. A good deal was heard of it a few years ago, and there is no doubt that a Mohammedan power in conflict with a Christian one can count on much warmer sympathy from co-religionists than can its adversary. Both England and France in their dealings with the Turks since the World War have been affected by the necessity of not offending too deeply the feelings of their own Mohammedan subjects; nevertheless, a Jihad would be almost as out of date as a Crusade, and Pan Islam as an imperial dream need not be taken too seriously. The Turks have turned their backs on it and have shown how little they care for its supreme lord, the Caliph, by deposing the one under their control and putting an end to the office for the time being.

Akin to and including religious ties are cultural ones, for instance, the whole group of conceptions which arise in our minds when we speak loosely and melodramatically of the "West" and the "East." Similarly such phrases as "The Holy Alliance," the "League of the Three Emperors," "the war to make the world safe for democracy" suggest associations with some spiritual principle common to all concerned. "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is a recent example, and "Pan Americanism" is not based solely on geography.

In the course of the last hundred years the desire of people of more or less the same blood and language to

form national states of their own has led to many convulsions and to extensive changes in the political geography of Europe. Since the World War and the Russian Revolution, this principle has triumphed almost everywhere, though there have been flagrant violations of it in the drawing of the new national boundaries. But long ago broader movements of the sort had been started, movements to bring about the union not only of all who use the same tongue, like the Pan German, the Pan Angle and the Pan Hispanic, but also of all who belong to the same great linguistic group; hence we have Pan Teutonism (that is, "the Nordic Races"), Pan Latinism, Pan Slavism, and the like. Nebulous as these ideals have been, they are real forces which we have not heard the last of. To be sure, they are not much the fashion at this moment. The communion of the so-called Nordic peoples has not yet reached the stage of practical politics; the union of hearts of the Latin sisters, or at least of the chief European ones, has seldom been less in evidence than it is just now, when one of them seems to be the pet aversion of the other two; and Pan Slavism is quite irreconcilable with the doctrines of communist Russia, at any rate at their present stage.

Radically different and in many cases at hopeless variance with such ideas are the political conceptions and ambitions based on principles of geography and economics. It is true, these two are by no means identical, for the geographical motive is based chiefly on contiguity and on natural boundaries while the eco-

nomic motive rests rather on a proper supply of the necessary resources, some of which may have to be controlled from a distance. Still they may be taken up together, for ordinarily they coincide enough for rough purposes and they represent tangible material interests as opposed to mere sentimental claims. To many economists, indeed, such things as nationalism represent nothing but aberrations which prevent foolish mankind from following the path of its real advantage. According to them the only salvation lies in conforming in political matters as closely as may be to the inexorable physical laws and limitations prescribed by nature. Therefore the proper basis for the grouping of countries is regionalism. This doctrine is in truth all the fashion, especially in Europe. The Little Entente is seeking neighborhood extension; the Baltic states also are trying to draw together; a Danube Confederation and a Balkan Pact both have many advocates; and over and above them all, Pan Europe can count no small number of ardent partisans.

Certainly at first sight "Pan Europe" would appear to have much to recommend it. To a disjointed and morselled-up continent where trade and enterprise are interfered with every few miles by artificial barriers and senseless regulations, it holds out a hope of economic unity with a field for internal industries comparable to that of the United States. It also appears to many people in the victorious, in the vanquished, and in the neutral countries of the late war to offer the best protection against an increasing menace of slavery at

the hands of the American capitalist. But though part of the popularity which the plan has met with is due to fear of America, the idea of Pan Europe does not in itself imply hostility to anyone. On the contrary it is analogous to Pan Americanism and looks forward to other similar regional understandings and agglomerations. The Soviet Republic is already one of these, the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations another, the Far East might be a third, and so on till the whole globe is apportioned among a few main divisions, each of which can look after its own peculiar problems, Enemies of the League of Nations may accept this solution as a substitute, a better and more practical arrangement, for it would free people from care and responsibility for distant territories and vexed questions which do not belong to their region and in which they have no interest. Friends of the League, on their part, can maintain that Pan Europe would be no more incompatible with a general association of nations than is the existence of individual states to-day. They can say that such a system would strengthen the League and improve its machinery by introducing a court of first instance which could deal with local problems, leaving the general Assembly freer for large undertakings.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the British Empire are already existing political entities. Pan America is at least an affiliation of sorts, with certain official organs. Pan Europe is still only a dream, but it is beginning to be widely discussed and it has

THE GROUPING OF NATIONS

just had its first "congress," replete with the enthusiasm and the eloquence customary on such occasions. The project may therefore be regarded as fairly launched. What are we to think of it?

A question which immediately arises and which made trouble at the congress itself is, what is "Europe"? Surely it means something more than an arbitrary block of territory called a continent in geographies, and no more really separate from Asia on its eastern side than the American east is from the American west. Culturally, indeed, Europe is an old conception, that of a region with a common past and civilization which have given its peoples a character and place of their own with common political and other interests. But where does this Europe begin and end? Turkey was not regarded as part of it as late as the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Russia belonged to it for only two centuries and now is to be placed in a separate group. But this is not all. It is proposed that Great Britain shall be de-Europeanized and left to her own belongings.

For the exclusion of Russia from the proposed confederation, even if she does still occupy about half the surface of Europe, there is much to be said both on cultural and other grounds. If the world is to be parcelled out into large divisions, the Soviet Union or whatever may succeed it makes a good enough block in itself. It forms a huge mass of contiguous territory, with vast resources of diverse kinds, it has a certain historical and geographical unity, and in the main

tolerable frontiers. From Poland to the Pacific it is not real Europe or Asia, it can claim a character of its own, but its exclusion means a Pan Europe dependent on other groups for much of its food supply.

The shutting out of England is more startling. We can see, to be sure, on what the conception was based. The British Empire by itself comprises such a large portion of the globe and so many people that it does not need to be included in any other unit. The English, too, have often been looked on by the nations of the continent as outsiders, and in return there has been among many Englishmen a feeling, never perhaps stronger than at the present day, that England should keep away from continental affairs and that her primary interests lie in the development of her splendid territories and in closer relations with her offspring beyond the seas, including those in the United States. If she must choose between "Europe" and "Empire," let it be "Empire." The "silver streak" still separates Dover from Calais.

This is all very well, but there is no escaping the fact — and all it implies — that a channel which can actually be swum across is small protection against an aeroplane or a submarine and that London itself is or soon will be within the range of heavy artillery from the other side of the strait. England cannot disinterest herself from what is going on in her immediate vicinity, a vicinity which modern means of communication is making ever closer. As long as she remains the heart and head of the British Empire, that Empire will and

THE GROUPING OF NATIONS

must be primarily European, even if its more distant parts refuse to take a hand in what is going on overseas. Commercially, too, though the fields of British export and import will vary from time to time, the trade of Britain with the continent can hardly fail to be vital to her. Culturally she has always been an integral portion of Europe since the days of Roman rule, indeed, notably in the Far East, she has more than once been the chief representative.

Of course the reply will be made that the non-inclusion of Britain in Pan Europe does not mean that her intercourse with the mainland need be any the less intimate but only that she will not form part of the same politico-geographical group, and will not concern herself with questions peculiar to it. But are there any such questions? Is not England more deeply interested in each and every European problem that comes up than is one or another of the continental powers? Is she not, for instance, more closely connected with the Baltic states than are three quarters of the other nations of the continent? A Pan Europe which does not include Great Britain will not be Europe.

Moreover, as it would be hardly feasible to treat states as politically separate from their possessions, it is proposed that Pan Europe shall include the lands belonging to its various members wherever they are situated. This means that four fifths of Pan Europe and a population larger than that of the United States will be located not in Europe but in Africa and the East. It may be well that, as thus provided, Esthonia

shall share in the destinies of the Belgian Congo and of the western or Dutch (yet not the eastern or British) half of New Guinea, but the inclusion of colonial territories in the European complex makes the exclusion of the British Empire even queerer geographically. Not only are England and France to be regarded as having separate sets of interests, but the same applies to the English and French portions of the Togo and Camerun mandates.

On the other hand, if the British Commonwealth of Nations were to be included in Pan Europe, this would bring in Australia, Canada, and South Africa, not to speak of the 300,000,000 Asiatics in India. The sum total would then be less European than ever and would constitute a group comprising so much of this terrestrial sphere that it would have little unity or purpose of any kind. Whatever it could accomplish might better be left to the League of Nations.

The deciding of what Pan Europe should include is only a first step and gets over none of the difficulties. Partisans of the project draw much comfort from the example of what happened on this side of the water. Why, they ask, if thirteen jealous and independent communities were able in 1787 to form the United States of America, should not the nations of the old world, with the example before them of our splendid success, taught by their own mistakes and sufferings and urged by their disastrous economic situation, form the United States of Europe? They forget that whatever may have been the quarrels, dislikes, selfish-

ness, shortsightedness of the thirteen American states, when all is said and done they were inhabited by people of essentially the same stock, the same language, history, traditions, and civilization, who had recently been cemented together by years of warfare against a common foe. They had nothing to forgive or forget and they had not yet built up industries to compete with one another. Great as were the obstacles that had to be overcome in detail before their political union was achieved, there has seldom been one more clearly indicated by nature.

None of the above facts is true of Europe. A federal union similar to our own never was more unlikely than it is in this day of intense national consciousness and warring passions. Even a commercial union, however imperiously demanded by the present critical condition of industry, by American competition and by the economic progress of the world, bristles with difficulties; indeed the recent manifesto of the great bankers sounds sadly like a counsel of perfection. Doubtless we may hope for alleviations of the existing situation, for more reasonable tariffs, and we may look for an increasing number of cartels and of commercial and industrial conventions in which several states will take part, but many of these arrangements will hardly be confined to members of a single group. The new steel agreement, though a regional understanding which at this moment affects and is affected by the political situation, does not differ intrinsically from a deal between, let us say, the Standard Oil and the Dutch Shell Com-

pany. At any time it may be extended so as to bring in American or other interests and thereby lose its fortuitous European character. Actual tariff unions between two or more independent states, though less likely, may be brought about. If so, the result will be watched with curiosity, for they will constitute an interesting not to say novel experiment. The German Zollverein is the only successful example of this kind in the last hundred years, and it was not so much an agreement between equals as a grouping of small units about a great one. If a tariff in a federal country like the United States is a matter of infinite complexity, with hundreds of items representing countless bargains and adjustments, how much more difficult to arrange will be one where the bargainers represent whole nations. Just now, in spite of all the talk about the manifest advantages of throwing down customs barriers, there are few real indications of any such tendency. The self-governing dominions of free-trade Britain have tariffs which they jealously look after and show no signs of abandoning or greatly mitigating in favor of each other or of anyone else. As for Pan Americanism, its first congress was called a century ago at Panama, an event which has just been celebrated by another meeting on the same spot, but the peoples whose representatives have once more been expressing their fraternal sentiments are no nearer to a commercial union than they were when they started.

Pan Americanism is, however, a living force to-day, though its real strength is difficult to gauge. Like the

THE GROUPING OF NATIONS

Monroe Doctrine from which it is descended, Pan Americanism is based in part on a geographical conception, namely that the countries of the western hemisphere constitute a unit, and in part on the spiritual one that the populations of these countries are distinguished by certain characteristics and aspirations which make it meet that they should compose a group with a regional understanding of their own. To be sure, it is easy enough to pick flaws in these theories: to point out that New York is much nearer not only to London but to Constantinople and everything between than it is to Rio de Janeiro; that the white inhabitants of the United States have far more in common with those of the other English-speaking lands than they have with any Latin Americans, who are hardly as close to them as are many Europeans, besides which the "old world" and the "new" are getting more alike every day, now that there are about as many republics in the eastern hemisphere as there are in the western and the whole globe is becoming "Americanized." Nevertheless, Pan Americanism as a principle of solidarity is believed in by a goodly number of people in both the northern and the southern continent, it is accepted by all the governments concerned, it is popular with public opinion, and even if the tangible results of the various congresses have so far not been imposing, they have at least helped to create better feeling all round.

Whether the sentiment has any deep roots is a point on which many will remain skeptical. In Latin

America suspicion and fear of the United States are aroused at the slightest provocation. Even now the League of Nations is welcomed by some of our friends to the south of us not only as a counter-attraction to Pan Americanism but also as a make-weight against Yankee domination. As for the efforts which have been made to promote closer Pan-American cultural relations, their results so far are meagre. When an American, whether of Anglo-Saxon or of Latin stock, wishes to go outside of his country for literature, music, art, or mere variety and amusement, he turns first and foremost to Europe. There is little reason to foresee much change in this respect.

A curious feature and anomaly of Pan Americanism is that so far it rarely includes the largest of American countries, the Dominion of Canada. This appears even more absurd than leaving England out of Europe. It has been based, of course, on the idea that Canada is theoretically not independent but is a British possession. If in the past this reason has been hardly an adequate one, especially when applied to scientific congresses, to-day with Canada a self governing state, making her own separate treaties and with a representative of her own at Washington, it is ludicrous to ignore her in Pan-American questions and to treat her as if she were situated in another hemisphere. It is also unwise, from the point of view of the United States. The possibility that Downing Street might acquire some influence in Pan-American affairs is negligible compared with the consideration that it is bad

for the United States that Canada should be encouraged to think herself not so much an American country as a member of the "third British Empire."

The development of the British Commonwealth of Nations is indeed a matter of more than academic importance to the American people. That the Empire must some day go through a process of transformation if it is to hold together at all has long been evident, but until recently almost nothing was done to prepare for the transformation and to determine its character. The idea of imperial federation has often been suggested. A beginning might have been made generations ago, and seats in the House of Commons given to Canada and Australia, as they are to Algeria in the French Chambers, though the examples of Cuba and Ireland among others, not to speak of our own Civil War, prove that representation in the central parliament does not necessarily preclude armed attempts at secession on the part of dissatisfied territories. At any rate, Great Britain took no steps to meet the future, except to recognize the necessity of granting ever greater powers of self-government to her colonial subjects and thereby avoiding the discontent which led to the American Revolution. Her statesmanship and liberality in this respect were rewarded by the magnificent support she received from overseas during the World War.

The very magnitude of this support, however, inevitably stimulated the consciousness of the self-governing dominions, as did their participation in the

peace negotiations and their admission as independent members to the League of Nations. They now have a feeling of their strength and of their importance as never before, and they have every intention of henceforth managing their own affairs. Ireland has been granted at least semi-independence. In India, nationalist discontent has assumed alarming proportions. The British Empire is obviously in a state of rapid transition. At the present moment it is moving in the direction of a British Commonwealth of self-governing nations. What will be the final outcome is still uncertain. The obstacles to be overcome are formidable. The question of India by itself presents appalling difficulties; and even leaving aside all the problems connected with the dark-skinned and dependent races, the ultimate form of adjustment between the self-governing English-speaking members cannot be predicted too confidently.

In the League of Nations, the British have at present a plural representation. This has often been criticized, even if there are those who say that one effect of participation has been to weaken among the dominions the feeling of the necessity of their continuing to maintain a political connection with the mother country. As matters stand, Britain practically appoints two of the delegations to the Assembly — her own and the Indian. It might be claimed likewise, that the various dominions have been doubly represented, for besides their own delegations there has been the delegation, not of Great Britain, but of the “British Em-

pire" of which they are component parts. This, however, is only a matter of wording, easy to change, and so far each of them has spoken and voted according to its own independent ideas, though a certain feeling of general solidarity between them is only natural. Permanent coöperation might easily arouse in other members the sentiments and arguments against overrepresentation which had so much to do with keeping the United States out of the League. The arrangement is at best illogical. If Russia were to apply for admission, why should she not by analogy ask for six places for the six republics which constitute the Soviet Union?

Be this as it may, the rest of the world will be affected by the development of the British Commonwealth, and no country more than the United States, little as Americans bother about whether the various British territories are drifting off separately or drawing closer to one another in some new understanding. The time has passed when the House of Representatives would have the impertinence to pass a vote, as it did in 1867, protesting against the formation of the Dominion of Canada. But there was at least this much sense in the impertinence, that it showed a recognition too often lacking to-day of the fact that what goes on north of the four thousand miles of artificial border which separate us from Canada is of real consequence to us. Of course on higher grounds we should not only welcome the prosperity of all our English-speaking kin but should look with sympathy on their efforts to form a brotherhood. We recognize the right of the

Canadians to regulate their destinies as they please, and wish to see the best of feeling prevail between Canada and the mother country. Are we, however, to welcome the formation of a British Commonwealth of Nations, if one effect of it is to be the drawing of Canada further from the United States and closer to Britain? "Imperial preference," one of the essentials most insisted upon by the enthusiasts for such a commonwealth, would mean among other things an attempt to benefit British and Canadian trade reciprocally at the expense of American. This is doubtless legitimate, but so might be retaliation on the part of the sufferer. The fact that the preference granted so far has had insignificant effects does not necessarily prove that more drastic measures would be inefficacious. If they are introduced, what are we to do about it?

There are people who believe that the best of all regional understandings for the United States would be union with Canada, and that sooner or later it will come to pass, because it is in the nature of things; that it would be a blessing to all parties as was the union of the American states in 1789; that the patriotic attempts of the Canadians to build up industries which do not naturally pay for themselves and to send trade along their own routes and from their own ports at greater cost than is incurred by using American ones are like making water run up hill. To be sure, there is very little active sentiment in the United States in favor of annexation, much less any plot to bring it

about, though some Canadians cannot get over imagining the contrary. In Canada, too, there is no real movement in this direction. The crude truth is that the attitude of one side is not infrequently characterized by deplorable indifference, that of the other by rank dislike. Yet, in spite of this, the lack of good frontiers, the essential unity of the two peoples, and the workings of modern economic forces which bring them nearer together every day may prevail in the end. At any rate, one can hardly blame Americans who regard union with Canada as not only natural but desirable, if they look somewhat unsympathetically at efforts to bind her more closely to Great Britain.

It is far from sure that any such efforts will be permanently successful. On the contrary, it looks more probable that the British Empire will evolve or disintegrate, not into a real commonwealth, though that may be the title, but into a loose confederacy of independent English-speaking states, bound together by ties of blood, language, culture and ideals, with a common sovereign and his governor generals as figureheads, but each free to follow its own interest in whatever way it thinks fit, which means that no one will be required to support the other in a war unless it chooses to. The recent imperial conference marks a long step in this direction. When it has been ratified, the "United Kingdom" will have ceased to exist in name as well as in fact. The Empire remains, but henceforth Great Britain and the Dominions will be "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status

and in no way subordinate one to the other in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Time alone can show how much "unity" will remain under this new dispensation and how things will work out in everyday life. Even a substantial imperial preference in the matter of tariffs is doubtful in the long run. Other countries will resent being excluded from "most favored nation" treatment and will have ways to hit back if need be. Not only will there be no reason why the distant dominions should be included in Pan Europe, but very possibly it may be to the interest of a member of the Commonwealth to entertain more intimate economic and political relations with some outside country than it does with its fellow members. A British Commonwealth of Nations so constituted will hardly represent a much closer entente than the sentiment of community which, marred though it be by jealousies, attaches the different Latin American republics to one another.

In such a group, we may well imagine the United States taking part in some form — indeed, becoming more interested in it than in Pan Americanism and ultimately playing somewhat the same sort of a rôle that it now does there. Even now Canada, though not included in the Monroe Doctrine, is at bottom protected from foreign conquest fully as much by America as by Great Britain. She has no need to contribute to imperial defence.

So much for the white populations of the British Empire, but how about the colored ones who are more than five times as numerous? Are they to form independent nations in the British Commonwealth? In the case of India, the question is likely to become acute at no distant date. The example of the dominions cannot help having an influence on her, and some day — though it may be far off — Nigeria and other regions will have aspirations in their turn. Even if India were let go, as Egypt has been, and left to struggle out her own salvation like China, and if gradually the same were to happen to other British lands in which the colored man predominates (except in South Africa where the whites, though in a minority, are too numerous to be abandoned), even then the British Commonwealth would occupy one of the first places in the world and a league of English-speaking peoples would occupy almost a dominant one, though its centre of gravity would not be in the eastern hemisphere. Whether such a consummation is to be desired is a question we need not enter into here. Some would say that before it can be brought about the development of the League of Nations will have rendered it purposeless. To others it is an ideal to be aimed at, to still others a peril to be feared.

Finally, we must not forget that the tendency towards forming groups of nations is no longer confined to the white race. "Pan Asia," that is to say India as well as China, Indo-China, Japan and perhaps the East Indian islands, would constitute a tremendous

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

mass of humanity. It may be a wild dream but it has its partisans in all the countries named. Even in the reduced form of a Pan Mongolian federation it is enough to frighten all the other nations bordering on the Pacific. In Africa the Ethiopic movement is insignificant as yet, but it has large possibilities and we have not heard the last of it. Altogether, hazardous as it is to prophesy in regard to any one particular movement and hopelessly as these movements conflict with one another, and in spite of the fact that we have been witnessing the break up of empires, the tendency throughout the world towards great combinations, political as well as enonomic, is unmistakable. Such combinations mean chances of future conflicts on a gigantic scale. They also suggest possibilities of bringing us one step nearer to a world-wide fusion of international interests.

THE EUROPEAN RECONQUEST OF NORTH AFRICA¹

THE region we commonly call North Africa, using this designation in its narrowest sense, comprises the territories of Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli. In almost every respect it is clearly separated from the rest of the huge continent of which it forms a part. Geographically, it is cut off from the Sudan by the Sahara, a greater obstacle to communication than the broadest ocean. Ethnographically, it is the home of a Mediterranean people and not of the typical African race, the negro, who is represented here only by some scattered descendants of slaves, brought in, like those of our own South, against their wills, and less numerous in proportion to the rest of the population than is the case in the United States. Historically, Africa Minor, as some call it, has been in its economic and political relations, in its culture, and in its civilization, at times a part of Asia, at times a part of Europe, but never to more than a slight extent a real portion of its own continent. Its influence has indeed penetrated to the south, but in return it has received little more than the products of a scarce, though long-continued, caravan trade, mostly in human flesh, taking months to crawl painfully across the scorched wastes of the desert.

¹ Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1911.

Even with the valley of the Nile it is connected by sea rather than by land, for east of Tunis the Sahara advances to the very waters of the Mediterranean, forming in spite of its scattered oases a barrier which has been crossed by but few armies and by only one considerable migration¹ in the last three thousand and more years.

The chief structural features of Africa Minor are simple. The territory consists of a long strip of land bounded on the north by the Mediterranean, on the south by the Sahara, on the east by the Gulf of Tripoli and the Libyan Desert, on the west by the Atlantic. From the Straits of Gibraltar almost to the Gulf of Carthage the mountains continually skirt the sea, rising sharply from it in their western portion, the Rif, but gradually becoming lower and less severe as they proceed eastward. They are intersected by river valleys which form lands suitable for cultivation and settlement and also offer the means, but not always easy means, of communication with the interior. Ordinarily a sharp ascent leads from the coast to the high inland plateaus. The plateaus are terminated on the south by another range of mountains from which there is a sudden descent to the desert. North Africa thus consists of three main regions — first, the littoral or Tell, with its slopes and valleys, numerous disconnected sea-ports, a sedentary population, and south European climate and products; second, the plateaus,

¹ That of two large Arab tribes, the Hilal and the Solaim, in the eleventh century.

with greater extremes of temperature and scanty rainfall, a region suitable to pastoral rather than to agricultural life, with a population as yet largely nomadic; and third, the torrid Sahara, a waste of stone and sand, stretching indefinitely to the southward, for the most part uninhabitable, but dotted here and there with oases. This threefold division is most plainly marked in Algeria. In Tunis the mountains are lower, the transitions are less sudden, and there is sea on two sides. Accordingly the country is more open and accessible, and is in natural, easy communication with Sicily and Italy. Tripoli is nineteen twentieths desert except in the peninsula of Cyrenaica. In Morocco the wild mountains of the Rif, which have long proved an effective barrier against the advance of Spain, are nevertheless nothing but an offshoot. The true ranges of the Atlas here run to the southwest till they meet the ocean, enclosing between them and the Rif a territory which looks not to the Mediterranean but to the Atlantic. This explains why Morocco has not been preëminently a Mediterranean state. Only a part of it was ever occupied by the Romans, and the whole proved beyond reach of the Turks. Morocco until lately has had little to do with any European country outside of the Spanish peninsula, and in the hour of its weakness in the sixteenth century it was threatened by Portugal rather than by Castile. On the other hand, it has more than once drawn fresh strength from the desert tribes dwelling to the south of it,¹ and for a

¹ The Almoravides came from the region of the Senegal.

moment its dominion was acknowledged on the banks of the Niger.¹

The recorded history of North Africa begins with its colonization by an Asiatic people, the Phoenicians, whose earliest settlements there appear to have been made somewhat less than a thousand years before the Christian era. Carthage, the most important of them, was founded not far from 800 B.C., and from that time for some six and a half centuries the history and civilization of Africa Minor may fairly be regarded as Asiatic. From the frontier of the Greek territory in Cyrene to beyond the Straits, the whole coast, besides much of the interior, was under the sway of the great Tyrian colony with its sanguinary Oriental gods and its Semitic talent for mercantile enterprise.

The Third Punic War marks the end of this first period of Asiatic rule although the Punic language did not disappear for many generations. As late as the time of the Emperor Septimius Severus it was the native tongue of the district in which he was born. North Africa gradually passed under Roman domination, but we may date the new epoch in its culture as beginning with the refounding of Carthage by Julius Caesar. Thenceforth the region was in reality a part of Europe and remained so for seven hundred more years. The provinces of Africa, Numidia, and the Mauretaniae were integral portions of the empire, partaking in the common life and civilization and contributing their quota of celebrated men to the glory of

¹ Timbuktu was captured by a Moroccan army in 1591.

Rome. St. Augustine, the greatest of all Latin church fathers, was born in the present Algerian department of Constantine.¹ So little were these provinces regarded as forming a territory unto themselves that they were later distributed between the prefectures of Italy and of Gaul. It is true that in the rural districts the mass of the people, like those in Britain, were never Latinized, and that the Berbers of the mountain and desert remained as independent as did the Picts and Scots, and like them grew increasingly troublesome in the days when the strength of the empire had decayed. But the land was studded with prosperous towns whose ruins attest to the splendor which was once theirs. The amphitheatre that still looms up near the village of el Djem in Tunis is larger than that at Pompeii or at Arles. To all intents and purposes Roman Carthage was long the second city in western Europe.²

For a brief space North Africa came under a new foreign master when, like the rest of the Western Empire, it was overrun by German barbarians. But the rule of the Vandals was short, leaving no traces behind it except that it accelerated the process that had already set in, of decay of the civilized portion of the community and of recrudescence of strength on the part of the untamed Berber tribes.

In the latter part of the seventh century there burst

¹ The emperor Macrinus was a Berber.

² Herodian (vii, 6, 21) calls it second in the empire only to Rome, and the rival of Alexandria. Ausonius in his *Ordo Nobilium Urbium* (xi, 2 and 3) puts Rome first and Carthage and Constantinople in the second place.

a storm from the east that swept all before it. An Asiatic people new to history, the Mohammedan Arabs, in the first fervor of their conquering zeal, made their way across from Egypt, subduing, though not without struggles, Romans and Berbers alike, till within a generation they had penetrated to the Atlantic and across the Straits into Spain. Their own numbers were few, but their creed was speedily accepted by their new subjects who hastened to enroll themselves under the banner of militant Islam. Then for a second time North Africa became Asiatic. The Latin tongue and culture vanished from the land as completely as had the Phoenician. Its place was taken by Arabic, and though the Berbers, thanks to superior numbers, soon reasserted themselves politically, for them, too, Arabic has ever since been the language of religion and of law, of learning and of civilization. From about the beginning of the eighth century until the year 1830, and in a measure until the present day, North Africa under Arab, Berber, and Turk, in its life and its thought has formed a part of Mohammedan Asia. The medieval universities of Fez and of Samarkand, despite the two thousand miles between them, were as fundamentally alike as were those of Oxford and Paris.

On the fourteenth of June, 1830, when the French army landed at Sidi Ferruch near Algiers, a new period of North African history dawned. The process of European reconquest had begun, yet this process, considering the greatly accelerated pace of events in our day, has till recently been slow, slower indeed than was

the advance of the Arabs twelve hundred years ago. The first step, the subjugation of Algeria, took more than a quarter of a century to complete; the last ones, the partition of Morocco and the conquest of Tripoli, are being carried out at the present time. Now within a few years, perhaps even months, the whole of Africa Minor will have come, at least nominally, once more under European rule.

As we muse over these latest transformations, we wonder not so much that they have occurred as that they did not occur centuries earlier. Why did such weak, barbarous states, lying closer to many parts of Europe than these do to each other, remain so long unconquered, when the vast and remote empires of the Incas and of the Moghuls had for generations been in European hands? It is true that in the Middle Ages North Africa was usually more than able to repel attack. The great empires of the Omeiads, the Abbassids, the Fatimites, the Almoravides, and the Almohades, and even of some of the minor dynasties, were on the offensive, not the defensive, as regards Christendom, and as late as the thirteenth century more than once threatened the reconquest of Spain. But by the end of the fourteenth, the Mohammedan world of North Africa, like that of Spain, had lost its vigor. It was nominally split up into three effete kingdoms,¹ not one of them even as strong as that of Granada. In reality most of the country was in a state of tribal

¹ Tunis, Tlemçen, Fez.

anarchy. And now the Christians literally began to carry the war into Africa. The Portugal of John II, and Emanuel and the Spain of Isabella and Ximenes, not satisfied with dividing the unexplored regions of the new world, also agreed on a line of delimitation in the nearer field of African conquest.¹ Here both Christian states for a time met with brilliant success. By the year 1513 the Portuguese had possessed themselves not only of Ceuta and Tangier in the north but likewise of almost all the west coast of Morocco as far as the edge of the desert, and their influence extended into the interior where they had native chiefs in their employ. At the same date the Spaniards had made even greater progress along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Oran, Algiers, Bougie, Tunis, and in fact nearly the whole shore as far as Tripoli, was in their hands or recognized their supremacy, as did the interior kingdom of Tlemçen. Weak and distracted, Mohammedan North Africa seemed destined to speedy subjugation.

But by the close of the sixteenth century we have a different picture. King Sebastian of Portugal with his army had been destroyed at Kasr el Kebir ² and, one after another, the African posts of Portugal on the Atlantic had fallen into the hands of the enemy or had been abandoned. Spain on her part had fared little better, for she had lost everything east of Oran, and her few remaining African possessions were confined to the coast and subject to constant attack.

The usual explanation given for these changes of

¹ In 1509.

² In 1578.

fortune is the revival of militant Islam under the new Saadian dynasty in Morocco and the intervention of the Turks at Algiers and elsewhere. This explanation may be correct as far as it goes, but it is manifestly inadequate. We may perhaps admit that Portugal was too weak a state to hold her African conquests against a rejuvenated Morocco. It is also true that Charles V, who made two great North African expeditions, a successful one against Tunis, an unsuccessful one against Algiers, had none the less by the end of his reign lost the control of the Mediterranean, which had passed to the Ottoman fleet. But after Lepanto and the decay of Turkish power, Philip II, had he so wished, was in a position to reëstablish, consolidate, and extend Spanish rule south of the Mediterranean, following the last behests of Queen Isabella. The armies that under such leaders as Don John and Parma fought so long and obstinately against the insurgent Dutch, that threatened the independence of England, and that actually occupied Paris, were more than sufficient to overcome the resistance of a handful of Turkish Janizaries, or of Berber chieftains, or of Moroccan sultans. The real strength of the Barbary States was indeed far inferior to what Europe supposed it to be, and their reputation was mostly due to the scandalous immunity they enjoyed for generations. Had Philip II and his successors pursued a different policy, North Africa might well be a great Spanish territory to-day and Spain still one of the first of European powers. Now that she is striving to obtain a mere fraction of what

might once have been hers, Spaniards complain bitterly that the negligence and folly of their forefathers have deprived them of their birthright.

But in the second half of the sixteenth century they had fixed their eyes elsewhere. They were absorbed by the task of conquering and exploiting their immense territories in the New World, which attracted their most adventurous spirits and which promised untold wealth. They were also intent on preserving at any cost their predominance in Europe, for which they poured out blood and treasure without stint, leaving them with scant attention or resources to spare for African enterprises, however near home. Africa offered nothing to tempt them, no mines of gold and silver, no possibility of rich tropical cultures with slave labor, no primitive pagans, whose souls their ardent missionaries might save, no real glory to be won or immediate increase of power and prestige in Europe. Instead there was a country whose jagged coast was difficult to hold, a land that grew ever worse as one penetrated into the interior, a warlike population animated by intense and ineradicable hatred of all Christians and especially of their hereditary enemies, the Spaniards. We need hardly wonder, then, that Spain paid small heed to the feeble garrisons which she still kept isolated as a matter of pride in her few remaining posts, often unpaid, short of food, and continually harassed by indefatigable enemies. In 1792 she actually abandoned Oran, her most important African presidio, though she had owned it almost as long as she did Mexico or Lima,

and longer than the English have held Gibraltar. To-day she regrets it, now that Oran is a flourishing city of well over one hundred thousand inhabitants, many of them Spaniards, but alas! under the French flag.

Spain, however, was not the only state that in those days failed to recognize the value of North African possessions. France remained equally indifferent and confined herself to occasional chastisement of the Barbary pirates and to maintaining a precarious trading-post at the port of La Calle. Louis XIV repeatedly sent his fleets to bombard Algiers and other piratical dens, but he made only one futile attempt to get a permanent foothold.¹ The conduct of England, judged by our present lights, was yet more extraordinary. She retained, wisely enough, of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the far-distant port of Bombay, but after an occupation of twenty-two years, she abandoned to the Moors Tangier at the very mouth of the Mediterranean. Sixteen years later the English captured Gibraltar from the Spaniards and have held it ever since, yet strange to say they have never tried to tighten their grip on the Straits by seizing Ceuta or the other presidios in Morocco, easy as this would have been for them on several occasions. They, too, suffered from the Barbary pirates, if less than did some others, and even the punitive expedition of Lord Exmouth in 1816 resulted in only one more bombardment.

¹ The expedition of the Duke of Beaufort to Djidjelli in 1664.

In the years immediately following 1815 the naval, commercial, and colonial supremacy of Great Britain all over the world was more overwhelming than it had ever been before in her history, or indeed than it has been since. In the Mediterranean, where she carried on a flourishing trade, Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands served as bases for her all-powerful fleet and helped to secure her predominance. The one thing surest to awaken her alarm was any symptom of ambitious designs on the part of her old rival, France. She was therefore violently opposed to the French expedition to Algiers, making every effort to prevent it except the actual use of force; in fact she might not have shrunk from this last extremity if she had been more convinced that the enterprise of the French would succeed.¹ When it did so and it had become evident that they were in Algeria to stay, she had to reconcile herself to the new situation as best she might, but she saw to it in 1844 that they should not acquire fresh territory by their war with Morocco, and both England and France took care that Spain should gain nothing by her hostilities with the same power in 1860. Soon afterwards the digging of the Suez Canal, by deflecting European trade with Australia and the Far East from the Cape route to that of the Mediterranean, added still more to the importance of the

¹ The English consul at Algiers prophesied its failure, and the Duke of Wellington seems to have been doubtful of its success. See Darcy, *France et Angleterre: Cent Années de Rivalité Coloniale* (1904), p. 105.

Mediterranean, and particularly of the Straits, in English eyes.

Like most beginnings of modern colonization, the French conquest of Algeria was a curiously haphazard affair. Charles X and his ministers vacillated many months before they decided to despatch an army to obtain satisfaction for the insults France had received at the hands of the Dey. For a while they entertained the marvellous project of letting their friend Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt, avenge their honor for them and pocket the incidental profits. When at last they did decide to act for themselves, although they refused to tie their hands for the future by promises to England, they were quite uncertain as to how far their action should extend and anxious to have it ratified by the powers. Throughout they were thinking less of founding an African empire than of gaining a little military prestige for the Bourbon monarchy, and of giving malcontents in Paris something to talk about besides grievances. In these last objects they failed signally. The success of the Algiers expedition excited no popular enthusiasm in France and availed nothing to prevent the Revolution of 1830. The government of Louis Philippe, however, after some hesitation resolved to keep the conquest made by its predecessor and ultimately to extend it until the whole of Algeria was subdued. A beginning was also made of European colonization, but this came almost to a standstill for a while in the next reign when the emperor Napoleon III indulged in the dream of a native Arab empire.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the creation of United Italy brought into existence a new Mediterranean power of the first rank. That power had scarcely established itself before it began to turn covetous glances towards the shores of Africa lying so close to its own. The first object of desire was the territory nearest at hand, the weak and tempting regency of Tunis, where there was already a considerable Italian colony. The dream that Rome should again rule over Carthage appealed to patriotic imaginations and seemed not impossible of fulfilment. The chief obstacle in the way was the interests of France. Napoleon III, ever favorable to the sister Latin nations, might possibly have been persuaded to let the Italians have Tunis and the Spaniards Morocco, contenting himself with the possession of Algeria, but the statesmen of the Third Republic proved less sentimental. They realized how much the position of the French in North Africa would be altered for the worse if, instead of rounding out Algeria by taking Tunis for themselves, they were to get the Italians on their exposed flank. Rivalry between the two nations was therefore inevitable. In 1878 France was fortunate enough to have England and Germany intimate to her at the Congress of Berlin that they would not oppose her preponderance in Tunis. This action on the part of England, which was in striking contrast to her attitude half a century earlier, may have been due to a desire to prevent French opposition to her own establishment in Cyprus, and also to an unwillingness to see

the Italians hold both shores of the narrow Straits of Sicily. As for Germany, Bismarck doubtless cared little which got Tunis, Italy or France. In either case he could count on an estrangement between the two which would be favorable to his policy. Under these circumstances the noisy activity of the Italians in regard to Tunis during the next three years was a fatal blunder, for it roused France to take the step they dreaded most, yet were too weak to forbid. In 1881 the French, with sound reason, if on trumpery pretexts, sent troops into Tunis and reduced it to the position of a protected state. The Italians could only frantically protest and justify Bismarck's calculation by joining Germany and Austria to form the Triple Alliance. They also began to turn their eyes more towards Tripoli, where the Turks had regained control in 1835, a much less tempting prize, but the best thing attainable.

For the next twenty years there was little apparent change of the situation of the European powers as regards North Africa, except that England by her occupation of Egypt in 1885 deepened still further her interest in Mediterranean affairs and entered into a new period of strained relations with France, whose influence in Morocco she actively combated. Gradually, however, with the opening of the twentieth century things took a different turn. Algeria, emerging from the difficulties of its earlier colonial days, was now on the high road to prosperity, and was clearly of the utmost value to France. Tunis had prospered from

the first under French rule. France had also acquired immense tropical territories south of the Sahara and had begun to control the desert itself, thus binding together her scattered African possessions into a splendid empire with only the cornerstone lacking, namely Morocco, whose importance to her became more and more evident. Accordingly, under the guidance of M. Delcassé as foreign minister, she set about to acquire it by coming to terms with her rivals. In 1904 she settled her outstanding differences with England, abandoning her own historical position and sentimental claims in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. In another treaty she obtained the same assurance from Italy by a recognition of Italian interest in Tripoli. But Spain also had to be taken into account.

The interest of Spain in her African presidios dwindled down to very small proportions after the evacuation of Oran. She even contemplated abandoning what was left of them. In 1844, however, she anticipated France by a few hours in the seizure of the Zaffarin Islands, and her victorious though fruitless war with Morocco again turned the attention of her people to African affairs. Then, too, the success of the French in subduing Algeria and later in colonizing it, partly by the aid of Spanish settlers, was an impressive object lesson. The fear that France might in time extend her North African conquests further to the westward soon filled the minds of Spaniards with increasing anxiety. They began to proclaim that by right of geography and of history they were the only legitimate

heirs to Moroccan territory, that the lands north and south of the Straits ought to be in the possession of one and the same nation as in the days of the Romans and the Arabs. It is a noteworthy fact that whereas in the sixteenth century the greater interest that Spain took in the New World had turned her away from Africa, now at the opening of the twentieth, scarcely had she been deprived of Cuba and the Philippines, the last considerable fragments of her once magnificent colonial empire, than she eagerly entered again upon a policy of African expansion. This was the only goal left for the ambitions of her restless military leaders and of all who still cherished the traditions of Castilian imperialism. In one respect the moment was favorable. The empire of the Sherifs was rapidly disintegrating, but on the other hand Spain had to recognize that, instead of being the sole claimant to the succession, she must make what terms she could with a neighbor stronger than herself, namely, France. This she succeeded in doing, thanks to English support and to the conciliatory policy of M. Delcassé; but owing to recent events the exact extent of her share of the spoil is still a matter of negotiation.

Thus by the end of 1904, the various European powers holding lands in the Mediterranean had concluded a series of agreements with one another concerning their respective future domains in North Africa. Their projects, however, had yet to be carried out. The sudden intervention of Germany introduced unexpected complications which have more than once

in the last few years threatened the world with a great war. Finally, France bought off Germany too by concessions elsewhere, but the international storm-centre passed from Morocco to Tripoli. In the autumn of 1911 the Italians, weary of waiting for a prize that seemed in no hurry to fall into their lap, excited by the gains of their neighbors, and perhaps alarmed by the thought that the Germans might discover that they had interests here also, determined to delay no longer. Without wasting time in controversy they proceeded to declare war on the Turks and they have, somewhat prematurely, notified the world of their annexation of the Tripolitan territory, rechristening it with the classical name of Libia.

Before long now, Europe will once more be supreme throughout North Africa, where her domination will be more complete and more extensive than it was in the days of the Roman Empire. Although there are parts of Morocco as unexplored as if they were in the innermost recesses of Asia, and there are oases in Tripoli where no European has been seen for many years, they will soon have their wireless telegraph stations and be accessible to the aeroplane if not to the automobile. Europe has come equipped with all the paraphernalia of western civilization. The resources of modern science will enable her to triumph over material obstacles, tap new sources of wealth, and in spots at least make the desert blossom like the rose. They will not, however, speedily change the spirit of Islam. Under French rule in Algeria the native popu-

lation has multiplied, and it will multiply elsewhere under the same conditions, and though we may still expect a considerable influx of European colonists into North Africa, the whole of which is now open to them, they are not likely ever to constitute the majority of the inhabitants. This will continue predominantly Berber as it was under the Romans, and may resist assimilation to the conquerors as successfully as it did then. Even to-day there is a young Tunisian party as there is a young Egyptian. On the other hand, in Egypt the Europeans are but a handful compared with the natives, in Tunis they are an important element, and though only the minority of them are French, they will all, as will likewise the Jews, contribute to the growth of French influence. Already Africa Minor contains a million Europeans ¹ and Algeria is regarded not as a colony, but as a prolongation of France, with representatives in the national chambers and its good share of ministers and other high officials.² It is France that in these regions has succeeded to the heritage of Rome. Compared with her, Italy and Spain have but meagre portions, and their own emigrant children add to her strength. It is France first and foremost that seems called upon to demonstrate whether the European reconquest of North Africa, after more than

¹ Algeria (1911), 795,522; Tunis (1908), 158,293; Morocco (including Spanish possessions), perhaps 30,000; Tripoli (before the war), *ca.* 5,000. These figures include a few natives and part of the Jews.

² For instance, in recent years, Messrs. E. Etienne, G. Thomson, and R. Viviani.

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

eleven hundred years of Asiatic dominion, is to be merely a material or also a moral one. Granting that the majority of the people will always be of the primitive native stock, what will be the expression of their civilization, the French of advanced modern thought or the Arabic of the Koran? Time alone can furnish the answer to this fateful question, which is of immeasurable importance to the future of France and thereby of consequence to the whole world.

NATIONALITY AND THE NEW EUROPE

APART from whatever sympathies we may feel in regard to the war now devastating Europe, most of us fervently hope that at least it may not soon be followed by another; that is to say, that when peace is concluded, the settlement arrived at may contain the elements of some sort of permanence. This does not mean that everyone can be or will be satisfied, or that many seemingly reasonable desires, even of the victors, will not have to be relinquished. It does mean that in as many cases as possible the settlement shall be based on broad grounds of human rights and legitimate interests, which will content those who profit by them, while not appearing too unjust to the rest of the world.

A first condition of this is that in the Europe of the future, as far as may be, no people and especially no great people shall be forced to live in a manner to which it cannot be expected to resign itself. The defeated parties in the conflict will doubtless have to give up or postpone indefinitely what are to them natural and proper ambitions. This is the common lot of the vanquished. Nevertheless, if peace is to be lasting, existence must not be made intolerable for them. For instance, such a régime as Napoleon imposed on Prussia cannot in the long run be fastened on a defeated

enemy, nor can any complete economic or geographic servitude. Thus it is safe to predict that if Germany, as a result of victory over Russia, were to hand over Finland to Sweden and to take the Baltic provinces for herself, Russia would sooner or later risk another struggle in order to regain a sufficient shore on the Baltic. Conversely, in the case of the triumph of the Allies, a treaty of peace which should deprive of direct access to the Adriatic the German populations not only of Austria but, through her, of the German Empire, might be pregnant with trouble for the future. Even the retention of certain isolated positions of vantage, however tempting as immediate booty, might mean such serious consequences that the advisability would be more than questionable. Could any good that Germany might obtain from the possession of Constantinople compensate for the permanent hostility of Russia, which such possession must engender? Would it even be wise for England to take back Helgoland when experience has shown that Spain can never get reconciled to her owning Gibraltar, which will always remain a stumbling-block to good relations between the two countries? A permanent sore spot should not be lightly created even by the most successful power.

Another class of considerations turns on the desire of the populations themselves in any future determination of frontiers. We Americans in particular believe in government with the consent of the governed. When exceptions must be made, we think of them as

justified only by temporary necessity, as in the South after our Civil War, or by the racial inferiority of the governed, as, let us say, in the case of the negro. None the less, we hold to the general principle, and it is one that is admitted even by the most reactionary autocracy as being desirable. Now, in the disputed regions of Europe to-day, not only the consent but the ardent aspirations of the governed on the whole correspond with what we call nationality. And aspirations of the nationalities to shape their own destinies are not a matter of internal politics only. In the last hundred years, the strivings of Greeks, Italians, Germans, Magyars, South Slavs, Alsatians, and others against foreign rulers have been of the utmost international as well as national consequence. It is true, the discontent of the Irish has seldom, owing to the insular position of the United Kingdom, been of more than local importance, but the Polish question has been a running sore in general European politics ever since the partitions in the eighteenth century.

Let us hope, therefore, that in the reconstruction of Europe the wishes of the various nationalities will be important factors in determining the bounds of the different states. There may be confederations among the smaller ones for the common advantage, but such unions should be voluntary and should leave sufficient play for the individuality of each. At first sight this seems simple. We take a race map of the Continent, note the chief splashes of color on it, and evolve the ideal Europe of the future to correspond with these

splashes, leaving out of account the little detached ones that interfere with the general scheme. This kind of map-making has been popular of late. Any imaginative contributor to a newspaper may indulge in it, it can be understood by the meanest intelligence, and it appeals to the sympathies as a generous attempt to reconstruct society in accordance with the fundamental rights of man. Unfortunately, when we come to look at solutions of this sort with a little care, we perceive that they bristle with difficulties. We soon learn that our race map alone is not a safe guide, for it leaves out such physical features as mountains. Ethnical and natural physical frontiers seldom coincide exactly. For instance, they do not in a good part of the western Alps, or of the Pyrenees, or of the Carpathians. To which frontier are we to give the preference, the geographical or the racial? This is perhaps a minor problem that can often be solved by a few mutual concessions; but it is a part of the general question, to what extent rights of nationality are superior to those based on other considerations.

At the very outset, we are faced by uncertainty as to the meaning of our terms. What is nationality? On what is it based? Not on race — most of the nations of Europe are of too mixed and uncertain origin to have blood count for much. The skull measurements in the different parts of the Continent suggest totally different divisions from the modern political and linguistic ones. It is worth remarking here that an imaginary descent may be of more importance than the real one.

It matters little whether the modern Greeks are or are not descended from the ancient Hellenes. What is of consequence is that they believe they are. This belief affects them profoundly; it permeates their national consciousness and is a fundamental part of their psychology. In the same way, we need not care to what extent the modern Rumanians are the children of the Roman legionaries and colonists and to what extent they are of Dacian, Slavic, or other origin. The thing that counts is that, speaking a Latin language, they regard themselves as a Latin people, akin to the French, Italians, and Spaniards, something different from the Slavs about them, something more western, the heirs to an older civilization. Although they belong to the Greek Orthodox church, they turn for inspiration not to Constantinople and Moscow, but to Rome and Paris.

We know that the Swiss are a nation though composed of several nationalities, and that as long as these prefer to remain in their present glorious little republic no one has a right to interfere with them, though this doctrine is hardly acceptable to the extreme partisans of Pan Germanism or of Italia Irredenta. We apply the same principle to the Belgians though they speak two languages; but of what nationality are the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine? The Germans claim the Alsatians as German by speech and descent as well as by most of their history. The French base their arguments on what they regard as a more modern conception—that of national consciousness and desire, of

common ideas and aspirations. They declare that, though the French language is that of the great mass of the people in France, and is the official and literary vehicle of expression,—one they believe superior to any other,—nevertheless a Basque, a Breton, a Fleming, an Alsatian, may be a genuine and most patriotic Frenchman even if he knows nothing but his local dialect. It must be admitted that in this instance the claim to a nationality, as based on language and history, cannot well be reconciled with our belief in government with the consent of the governed. Had the Germans, during the last forty years, been as successful in Alsace-Lorraine as the Americans have been in our own South, the situation would be different. As it is, compromise or reconciliation has not been reached, and the question of the future allegiance of Alsace-Lorraine has once more been referred to arbitrament of the sword.

In many European countries, ethnographical statistics are to be accepted with much caution. To be sure, partisan guesses are still more unreliable, for where no official figures exist, the widest play is left to passion and imagination; witness the extraordinary estimates that have been made frequently in good faith of the strength of the various elements in Macedonia. In lands where there are official statistics, we may take it for granted that the nationality which has charge of the census will get more than its share in the returns. Doubtful and neutral elements can always be used to swell the figures. For instance, in the Austrian

province of Galicia, 808,000 out of a total of 871,000 Jews are officially recorded as speaking Polish, which assures to the Poles a good majority of the population. In the neighboring province of Bukowina, out of 192,000 Jews, 95,000 are put down as Germans. In both cases the real language of most of the Jews is Yiddish. Now if, as a result of the present war, Russia keeps Galicia, the Jews of the eastern half of the province will no longer be reckoned as Poles; and if at the same time Rumania gets Bukowina, the Jews there will soon go to swell the Rumanian element in that province, and there is no reason why they should not. Why should not the Jew in the Dual Empire transfer his linguistic allegiance? It is often transferred for him. If he lives in southern Hungary, he may be to-day an ardent Magyar, though his father was counted as a German; and it may be the duty of his son to be a good Rumanian or Serbian without his wishes being consulted in any event. This does not mean that the Jews as a race are always prompt to change their linguistic or other allegiance with each shift of their political fortune. There are plenty of cases to the contrary. Many Jews have, for example, been good Polish patriots. A more surprising recent instance of their abiding loyalty to one country is the obstinacy with which the colony of Jews from Livorno, settled in Tunis, have remained irreconcilably Italian in their opposition to French rule.

But even after admitting language to be the chief though not the only determinant of nationality, we

still have to inquire what constitutes a language, and the answer is sometimes far from easy. Whatever the philologists may have decided, there is sometimes from a political point of view great difficulty in distinguishing between a language and a dialect. Such things may be matters of national consciousness rather than of grammar or vocabulary; indeed, practically the same tongue may be regarded as a dialect or as a language, according to where it happens to be spoken. Dutch is a language, but the claim of Flemish is a little more doubtful; and they are both mere branches of Low German, which is admittedly nothing but a dialect. In the same way, Portuguese is a language, but Gallejo, which hardly differs from it, counts as a dialect of Spanish. Modern languages have grown out of certain local dialects, and the process is still going on. Astonishing as it may seem, the tendency in Europe to-day, in spite of the tremendous increase of the ease and the need of communication throughout mankind, and in spite of the strength of such cosmopolitan movements as socialism, appears to be rather towards the multiplication than towards the diminution of tongues. Within recent years, written Norwegian has been drawing further away from written Danish, with which it formerly was almost identical. Slovak has come to regard itself as an independent speech, not as a dialect of Bohemian, and Moravian may possibly do the same. All the efforts of the Russian government to maintain the unity of the national language and to keep Little Russian in the position of a mere dialect, like Platt-

deutsch in Germany, have not prevented the growth of a strong Ukrainophil party in southern Russia, which in time may menace the political as well as the linguistic unity of the empire; indeed it is one of the most serious perils that threatens its future. The Little Russians have among themselves local differences that may develop, and to the north of them are the White Russians, as yet without a separatist consciousness, but capable of finding one. In Ireland, Irish still lingers, and at least the teaching of it is on the increase; and even in France all the intense patriotism and pride in *la patrie* and her language that every Frenchman feels, have been required to keep the Provençal movement in the nineteenth century within the bounds of a harmless literary cult, and prevent its getting into politics and weakening the unity of the French nation.

Enthusiasts for liberty are apt to overlook the sad truth that, however admirable the development of national and linguistic consciousness may be of itself, it does not necessarily make for peace among nationalities any more than do free institutions and advanced civilization. On the contrary, in mixed districts, as long as there are neither schools nor legislative bodies, the question what language shall prevail in such institutions does not come up. When, at least in the form of newspapers, posters, and shop-signs, the written word becomes a necessity for the most inert minds, the need of a common medium increases. Here progress and friction are apt to go hand in hand. The

very fact that men are thrown together so much more than they used to be makes it the more irritating if they are unable to understand one another. To admit that any other tongue has superior merits to your own or should enjoy greater privileges, argues a sad want of patriotism. All the European movements of emancipation and unification of the last century have been accompanied by higher national consciousness and have meant keener national rivalries if not hatreds. The awakening of modern Russia was accompanied by fierce nationalistic strife. It was also in the usual order of things that after the Turks and Christians in the Ottoman Empire had combined to overthrow the despotism of Abdul Hamid the Second, their antagonisms towards one another should have soon become more acute, for they were relieved of the pressure that had kept down their vitality and desire for expansion. Like all such parties, the Young Turks have been ultra-nationalists.

Everywhere in Europe to-day where we find two nationalities in considerable numbers in the same state, the outlook is discouraging. In Russia and Germany, the minorities have been frankly oppressed; in Austria-Hungary, the various peoples are in fierce antagonism with one another; in Belgium, the Flemish movement, however justified, has threatened the future of the kingdom; and even in Switzerland, where, thanks to a federal constitution and a splendid common patriotism and pride, representatives of three great nationalities have lived on an equal footing in

such harmony as nowhere else, there has been increasing friction in the last few years between the French and the German elements. The circumstance that in the present war their respective sympathies are, as is natural, on the side of the belligerent whose language they speak, can hardly contribute to good feeling between themselves.

But granting that it would be desirable that in the Europe of the future each national group should be as far as possible self-governing, there is an obvious limit to the principle. Under modern conditions, a state, and particularly an inland state, requires a certain size for independent political and economic existence. In these days of large countries, such isolated groups as the Saxons in Transylvania, the Slovaks in North Hungary, the Wends in the Lausitz, the Basques in France and Spain, cannot be expected to exist as independent communities; indeed they have no desire to. All they ask for is certain local privileges, but it is doubtful whether these can be preserved much longer. The future seems to offer little promise to small detached minorities, however historically or culturally interesting.

The claims of historical possession cannot always be lightly dismissed. Has a people no right to maintain its supremacy in the homes and the lands that have come to it through long generations? If it has been too hospitable to strangers, is it therefore a fit subject for dismemberment or conquest? In any equitable territorial adjustment, the historical unity of a country

may legitimately demand consideration. For instance, the Czechs in Bohemia do not desire an independence, or greater self-government, that would sever them from the frontier portions of their territory which have a German population. In like manner, to deprive Hungary of all the parts of the kingdom where the Magyars do not form the majority of the inhabitants would be to sin against a state which, though its boundaries may have varied, has had a unity and fixed abode in the same region for over nine hundred years, during which its history has counted many glorious pages.

But by and large, accepting the principle of nationality as representing legitimate aspirations which command our sympathy, it is interesting to see how some of them may be expected to fare in case of the decisive triumph of either side in the present war.

Let us suppose, in the first place, Germany to emerge victorious from the contest. There is little prospect that she can add to her citizens any considerable number of German-speaking inhabitants, for none such are to be found in her neighborhood, except in the dominions of her ally Austria, or in Switzerland, which is not likely to be menaced. Austria may possibly be induced to give up some of her German lands in return for larger Slavic ones, but this is doubtful. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg would be taken into the fold, but is hardly big enough to count. Annexations in the Baltic provinces would bring in territory of German history and civilization, but where the German-speak-

ing population makes up only about eight per cent of the whole and is not popular with the rest.

If Germany were to keep Belgium, she would get a country the larger half of whose people speak, as their native language, Flemish, or generally a low German dialect, and who therefore may become thoroughly German and within a few generations through the memory of the circumstances of their annexation might perhaps forget. It is worth noting that many of the places in Belgium that have suffered most by the war, Louvain, Malines, Antwerp, Bruges, Ypres, are situated in the Flemish part of the kingdom, that is to say, in the region that has appealed to the imagination, sympathy, and hopes of the Pan-Germans as being haunted by their heroes, and whose terrible annexation they are quite ready to justify. Any acquisitions made by Germany at the expense of southern Belgium, of France, that is the small Flemish district south of Brussels, or of Flanders, would add to the temperate lands with population not of German speech, and difficult to assimilate. It has been suggested that the present owners in such annexed regions might be exterminated en masse and thus make room for German immigrants, but such a return to the practices of ancient Assyria is, not to hope, not to be expected.

In order to weaken Russia, Finland might be made independent. It has been suggested that she be given back to Sweden, but the Finnish element, which now numbers more than seven eighths of the population, has completely overthrown the ascendancy of the

dwindling Swedish minority once dominant. To-day the mass of the Finns are little more desirous of becoming Swedes than Russians. A close federation of Finland with the Scandinavian kingdoms would be much more to their taste.

The triumph of Austria, the partner of Germany, would be at the expense of at least one nationality, the Serbian, and would probably mean for a time the maintenance of certain others in the Dual Empire itself in their present subjection. It is true, the revival of the idea of "Trialism," that is, of the erection of a Serbo-Croatian state under Hapsburg rule, which the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand is said to have favored, is by no means inconceivable, but there are many difficulties in the way. The Hungarians especially will be loath to consent to it, for to them it would mean the surrender of Croatia and the loss of direct access to the sea; and though the port of Fiume might remain as now, immediate Hungarian territory, not a part of Croatia, Hungarian access to it would always be at the mercy of a foreign state.

If, on the other hand, the Allies are successful, Alsace-Lorraine will go back to France. Luxemburg also may be given to her or to Belgium as being too small to defend itself and too strategically important to be left in a position of neutrality which experience has shown is not respected. Schleswig-Holstein is in a different situation. People who propose that it be handed back to Denmark are presumably ignorant of the fact that the Germans in the duchies far outnumber

the Danes, being over a million strong. That is to say, they would make up more than twenty-five per cent of the population of the enlarged Danish kingdom, and would be as restive under Danish rule as they were in the past when they so often revolted against it. Sooner or later they would return to Germany. On the other hand, the cession to Denmark of the Danish-speaking region of north Schleswig, as looked forward to in the Treaty of Prague in 1866, but never carried out, would be quite within the bounds of reason and right.

The defeat of Austria would doubtless mean the building up of a greater Serbia, including Bosnia, and if the defeat were complete, Croatia and all or most of Dalmatia and perhaps the Slovenian regions. If this happens, Bulgaria, with the aid and friendship of the Allies, may recover the larger part of Macedonia, which would be another satisfaction of the principle of nationality and of the desire of the inhabitants.

No people, not even the Belgians, are more to be pitied in the present war than are the Poles. Not only is a great part of their country the fighting ground for huge armies and suffering terribly in the process, but they themselves, whatever their sympathies may be, are forced into the hosts on both sides and are killing one another at the behest of foreign masters. It is at least some compensation that, whichever side wins, the Poles may hope for an amelioration of their present lot and perhaps the revival of a Polish state — though hardly an independent one, and not in either case with the boundaries desired by Polish patriots. If the

victory goes to Germany and Austria, it is quite likely we shall witness a new kingdom of Poland as part of the federal empire of the Hapsburgs or under a Hapsburg prince. This kingdom would be made up of Galicia and of such part of Poland as could be taken away from Russia. To be sure, Germany would scarcely view the new state with favor on account of the attraction it would exercise on her own Polish subjects, and she certainly would not give up any of them for its sake. This Polish kingdom would also include a considerable disaffected element, the Ruthenian or Little Russian population of the eastern half of Galicia, which in recent years has been growing increasingly anti-Polish in spite of its Polish aristocracy. On the other hand, Russia has promised, in the event of her success, an autonomous Poland to include and unite practically the whole Polish nation. This would mean, in addition to the strictly Polish provinces of Russia, much at least of the Polish parts of Prussia as well as western Galicia, but it would not include eastern Galicia, which would be treated as being Russian, not Polish. Such a provision would not please the Polish upper class there, nor the Poles anywhere, and probably none too well the mass of the population, for to-day the language of the Little Russians enjoys greater rights in Austria than it does on the Muscovite side of the frontier, where it is treated as a mere dialect of Russian proper, and suppressed as far as possible for fear it may endanger the unity of the national language. Besides that, the Little Russians in eastern Galicia

belong not to the Greek Orthodox, but to the United Greek church, one which the Russian government has in the past treated as having no real right to exist.

In the case of Rumania also there are two opposite possibilities of expansion which have tempted ardent and acquisitive patriots. Had Rumania joined Germany and Austria in the war, as she would have done up to three years ago, and as her former king, it is said, still wished to do last summer, she might perhaps have acquired the province of Bessarabia, which was hers historically until 1812, and where still about half the population are Rumanians. Should she now take sides with the Allies, she will hope for the Austrian province of Bukowina (where a large percentage of the people are Rumanians), and a bit of southern Hungary as well as Transylvania. The case of Transylvania is peculiar. The Rumanians there make up not far from two-thirds of the inhabitants, and they claim to be the oldest settlers, though the claim is disputed. Yet for the last nine hundred years, Transylvania has almost without interruption been a part of the kingdom of Hungary. The whole story of its past in that time, its rulers, its civilization, its articulate life, have been Hungarian, save in the regions where the German colonists of the twelfth century, the so-called Saxons, have had special privileges and have maintained their individuality. To every Magyar, Transylvania is as much an integral part of Hungary as Wales is of Great Britain or as Brittany of France. We have here a

striking instance of the conflict between historical right and the predominance of nationality.

Italy, too, has dallied with rival attractions. She has now apparently rejected once and for all those held out to her by her former partners; that is, Tunis, where the Italian element is larger than the French, and Nice and Corsica, which she still regards as fundamentally Italian. On the other hand, she expects, in return for assistance to the Allies or as a reward for mere friendly neutrality, to obtain Italian-speaking territory to the north and east of her; namely, the Trentino, Trieste, and perhaps the Dalmatian coast. But there are certain obstacles besides the military ones that may interfere with her desires. The Trentino, or Italian-speaking southern Tyrol, could be handed over to her with little difficulty, though she has no better historical or linguistic right to it than she has to the Swiss Canton of the Ticino. Still, the preferences of the people count for something, and whereas the inhabitants of Ticino have no wish to become subjects of King Victor Emmanuel, most of the population of the Trentino would probably be glad to. With Trieste, the question is more complicated. The city would suffer economically by coming under Italian rule; and restricting ourselves to the question of nationality, we must remember that though in Trieste itself the greater part of the population is Italian, yet if we include with the city its natural background made up of the rest of the peninsula of Istria and the territory that connects it with Italy, we get a majority of Slavs.

In Dalmatia the case is much worse. Most of the Dalmatian towns for centuries belonged to the Republic of Venice, and its atmosphere still lingers about them. Public opinion in Italy regards them as part of Italia Irredenta, and the casual traveller knowing a little Italian and no Slav shares that opinion. In actual fact, if the latest statistics are to be trusted, the Italians make up less than three per cent of the total population of Dalmatia, an absurdly insignificant minority on which to found nationalistic claims. They are in the majority only in the one town of Zara, and even there the rest of the district is Slav. Now, the times are past when Slavs were content with being the docile subjects of a superior Italian civilization. A greater Serbia will claim Dalmatia, and likewise the territory of Trieste, on the ground of nationality; but Italy, although her own unification has been in the name of that principle, has shown that she is quite capable of paying no attention to it when it conflicts with her ambitions. Some day we shall hear more about the question of Italian *versus* Slav in the Adriatic, besides which we must not forget that the strongest geographical and economic considerations would seem to indicate that the Germans cannot be permanently cut off from direct access to these waters.

But all such speculations about the future have an element of futility in them. The great conflict now raging in Europe still has surprises in store for us, and when the time comes to fix the terms of peace, the rulers and statesmen who have to formulate and to

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

agree to them will not be as free to follow their fancies as are irresponsible map-makers. Perchance when peace is at last made, it will be based on no principles except those of common exhaustion and of *beati possidentes*. But the fact that the rights, the aspirations, the dreams of so many nations and interesting nationalities, large and small, are now at stake is one reason why the present gigantic struggle makes such deep appeal to the imagination and the sympathies of all of us.

THE BREAK UP OF THE HAPSBURG EMPIRE¹

THE sudden and complete dissolution of the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs is a political event which, for startling, dramatic character, has had few parallels in the history of the world. That an empire of fifty-three million people, a state which for more than half a millennium had been the seat of a dynasty first in dignity, if not in power, among European monarchies should come to an end almost in a night reminds us of the fall of Babylon or Assyria rather than an event in the more sober chronicles of western history. Austria fell, not as a result of a lost battle, for even the Italian victory in October, 1918, was a consequence rather than a cause of her dissolution. At the moment when she crumbled into pieces almost none of her territory was occupied by foreign troops, while her own armies held in subjection wide areas in Italy, in Poland, and in the Balkans. And yet, when revolution broke out in her borders, it succeeded everywhere without effort and the world accepted it as natural and irremediable. Whatever may happen to the present Russia and Germany, some day there will be a great Russia and a great Germany of some kind, but the empire of the Hapsburgs has vanished forever. Long

¹ Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 1920.

ages ago Emperor Frederick III adopted as his proud device the letters A. E. I. O. U.—*Austriæ est imperare orbe universo*. Now, more than four centuries and a half later, the interpretation of these letters by his adversaries—*Austria erit in orbe ultima*—has suddenly come close to being bitter, literal truth.

The faults and the weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian state have, in recent years, been so palpable that it is now the fashion, at least in England and America, to regard it as having been an artificial creation based from the first on wrong principles, built up by force, and maintained by tyranny. Even those who have realized that it has had a legitimate place in the European political world and have accepted the oft-quoted saying of Palacky (not a German but a Slav, be it noted) that "If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her," have often failed to grasp what have been the conditions of her growth and the sources of her strength.

The territories of the House of Austria were acquired in the course of generations amidst plentiful vicissitudes. A well-known saying points out that they were got by marriage rather than by conquest. The basis was formed by the union in the sixteenth century of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, three states which had had much to do with one another in the past and whose close connection in the hands of one ruling family was natural enough, especially in view of the Turkish peril. It so happened that in the year 1526 Bohemia and Hungary were under one king (Louis)

and that he was doubly brother-in-law to Ferdinand of Hapsburg, the younger brother of Emperor Charles V, who had ceded his Austrian lands to him. Thus it came about that when Louis was killed by the Turks at the battle of Mohacs, dying without children, Ferdinand put in a claim to the succession, and obtained most of it, though a rival in Hungary called in the Turks who overran much of the country and held it for more than a century and a half.

The dominions of Ferdinand I were held only in personal union, but being adjacent to one another they gave him a solid block of territory in which Austria proper served as a link between Bohemia and Hungary. All three, be it noted, were lands that had for centuries been inhabited by more than one nationality. In his Austrian possessions, Ferdinand ruled over Germans, South Slavs, and Italians; in his Bohemian ones over Germans, Czechs, and Poles; in his Hungarian, over Magyars, Rumans, and Slavs of several kinds. These elements lived together fairly comfortably. The Europe of that date was far less conscious of national divisions than it was of social and religious ones; indeed, almost to the very end the diverse nationalities were seldom disloyal to the dynasty. The position of Holy Roman Emperor of the German nation had, since Frederick III, become almost hereditary in the Hapsburg family, and greatly enhanced their dignity and added something to their real power. They were, many of them, far from remarkable men but they possessed certain virtues, particularly that of tenacity. They

made their mistakes; they met with their fair share of misfortune; sometimes they had to bend to the storm and make dangerous concessions; but usually they or their successors came out of their troubles stronger than they went in. Even the prolonged crisis of the Thirty Years' War, although it reduced their imperial authority to a shadow and cost them territory, left them masters as never before in both Austria and Bohemia, with heresy stamped out and the power of the nobility broken. In the case of Hungary they were longer in getting the upper hand, but here they were helped by their victories in their later wars with the Turks. Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century their power was firmly established throughout their dominions, and by the close it had become despotic.

Like their contemporaries, most of the Austrian Hapsburgs followed a policy of expansion whenever this was feasible. In an age when an hereditary kingdom was looked upon by its rulers much as a private estate is to-day, when the right to acquire it by inheritance, not to say conquest, was unquestioned, although a prince might prefer to have his lands touch one another, — as a private owner does his farms, — this did not prevent his cheerful acceptance of scattered properties elsewhere. As land gatherers, at times the Hapsburgs met with marked success, at others they could not even hold their own dominions against the attacks of equally rapacious neighbors. After 1526, during the rest of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries,

they were chiefly on the defensive, indeed until the close of this period they lost rather than gained. Ferdinand I in his later years was unable to maintain himself in Wurtemberg; Ferdinand II in 1635 ceded the Lausitz to the Elector of Saxony in return for an alliance; the peace of Vasvar in 1665 cost the then Emperor a rectification of frontier to the advantage of the Sultan; in 1683 the Turks made their second appearance at Vienna itself and were on the point of taking it. But they had reached their high-water mark. Their famous defeat at the hands of John Sobieski was but the first of a series of disasters in a war that lasted sixteen years, ending with a disastrous peace that deprived them of most of their conquests in Hungary, which was thus reunited to Austria.

In the course of the eighteenth century the extent of the Hapsburg lands varied continually. The dynastic ambition of Charles VI to become king of Spain was balked in the War of the Spanish Succession, but in compensation he obtained the Spanish Netherlands, Milan and Southern Italy. These might be desirable enough in themselves, but as they were unconnected with the main mass of the Emperor's territories, they were difficult to defend. In the following years the rulers of Austria had too many irons in the fire and their power was vulnerable from all directions. Hence, meddling in Poland brought on the War of the Polish Succession which cost them Naples and Sicily. Their alliance with Russia involved them in hostilities with Turkey and they lost the city of Belgrade, which they

never regained permanently. Frederick the Great profited by the weakness of Maria Theresa to wrest Silesia from her, and kept it, despite not only her efforts but those of half of Europe in the Seven Years' War. Later in her reign she found some compensation in the first partition of Poland, but the dreams of Joseph II of the acquisition of Bavaria and of Turkish territories came to naught.

The period of the French Revolution and Empire brought to Austria many gains and losses and temporary changes of boundaries. When the turmoil was over and the frontiers of nineteenth-century Europe were laid down at the Congress of Vienna, Emperor Francis II found himself the lord of dominions not quite as extensive as those of some of his ancestors but more compact and giving him more real power. He wisely did not take back his lost possessions on the upper Rhine or in the Netherlands, regarding them as sources of weakness rather than of strength. Instead, by adding Venetia to his earlier Italian holdings, he obtained a solid block of territory contiguous to his other lands which put him in a position to dominate the whole peninsula.

After 1815 the government at Vienna, relieved of its former care of detached territories and not distracted by colonies overseas, settled down to a peaceful conservative policy in accordance with its tastes and with the reactionary spirit then prevalent throughout Europe. In Germany its aim was to hold in leading strings the smaller states including even Prussia, which

whenever possible should be cajoled and manœuvred into a secondary position; in Italy its authority was almost uncontested; in the Near East, it hoped that the Turks would keep their subjects from rebellion and do nothing that might awaken Russian ambitions, now for the moment dormant. As regards Poland, of which Austria still held the fat slice she had obtained by the first partition, there was little cause for anxiety. All three of the partitioning powers, — in spite of vagaries of Alexander I to the contrary, — were interested in discouraging patriotic agitation there, and as long as they held together, successful resistance was impossible. What the Emperor and his famous Chancellor, Prince Metternicht, desired for Europe and, above all, for Austria was the maintenance of the status quo. They ruled over an empire blessed with rich and varied resources, intelligent and in the main loyal inhabitants, a highly organized government and bureaucracy, and an army which, if in its battles with western opponents it had fewer famous victories than defeats to its credit, had none the less almost always fought well. The Austria which after five wars in which she had faced the greatest of modern soldiers and conquerors and undismayed by crushing blows had in the end emerged victorious and mightier than ever, might well feel assured of the strength of her foundations and the permanence of her position among the powers of Europe.

The fact that this empire was, as it had always been, a polyglot one was not regarded as a serious cause of

weakness; indeed it had certain advantages in rendering a national revolution such as had recently swept away the Bourbons in France unlikely in Austria. In its own eyes the dynasty stood in the same relation to all its subjects. True, the Hapsburgs were the first of princely German houses, German was the language of the aristocracy, of the administration, civil and military, of the towns, and of culture as French went out of fashion, but the imperial government, as such, held itself above national questions. It had troubled but little about them in the past except when, as in the case of the Czechs, they had become too much identified with religious heresy. What it had had to contend against in the age-long process of consolidating its authority was hereditary class and local privileges and traditions, not the aspirations of nationalities. Provided the subjects of the Emperor remained loyal and obedient, furnished good soldiers, paid their taxes and did not inquire into things that did not concern them, why should he care about their local dialects. Even the ill-fated attempt of Joseph II to establish German as the universal language of his dominions was not prompted by special affection for that language or by nationalistic desire to ensure its triumph. The measure was only a part of his general policy of uniformity and centralization in accordance with the principles of the enlightened despotism of the eighteenth century. In his own correspondence he frequently used French.

But in the course of the nineteenth century the several peoples of the many-tongued dominions of

Francis II awakened one after another to a new consciousness of their nationality as well as to a yearning for liberty. The first to agitate were the Italians, roused by French ideas and rule from a political lethargy of centuries and now no longer willing to submit tamely to alien domination. The Magyars, too, had not forgotten their traditional independence. The Czechs presently began to remember that they had a past and a culture of their own; and in course of time Croats, Slovaks, Rumanians followed suit.

In dealing with these new forces, which were to end by disrupting the empire, the government showed a lamentable lack of understanding and of constructive statesmanship. At first it had no idea beyond mere repression. As long as it could, it sternly put down opposition; but in 1849, it was unable to do so alone and had to call in the aid of Russia to overcome the revolting Magyars. Ten years later, after the defeat at the hands of France and the loss of Lombardy, Vienna realized the necessity of change and began to experiment in a hesitating and inconsequent way. Then came the War of 1866 with the disaster of Sadowa, the consequent loss of Venice, and the expulsion of Austria from both Germany and Italy. Everywhere there was discontent. The old system had broken down and something must be found to take its place.

Profiting by the situation, the Magyars now reasserted themselves and after negotiations skillfully conducted by their leaders, they obtained what they

wanted. But the famous Ausgleich of 1867, which changed the empire of the Hapsburgs from an Austrian to a Dual one for its last half-century of existence, was unsound from the start. It was a temporary compact which had to be renewed every seven years with increasing difficulties and friction and hence was never assured of permanence. More fatal still was the fact that it brought peace only between two out of the many peoples in the state, namely, the Magyars and the German Austrians. Most of the others were left worse off than before. We are tempted to speculate on what might have happened if Francis Joseph and his Saxon minister, Count Beust, instead of surrendering to the Hungarian demands, had followed resolutely a federal policy based on nationalities, regardless when need be of historic boundaries. The difficulties to overcome would doubtless have been great and the results might have been in many ways unsatisfactory; but looking back at the events of the last fifty and more years, we may wonder if it was not in that direction that lay the only chance of final salvation for Austria.

Viewed as a struggle of nationalities, the history of the two halves of the Hapsburg Empire from 1867 to 1914 presents a striking contrast in the policies pursued by the respective governments. This contrast well deserves attention, the more so perhaps because the results in the two cases were equally unsatisfactory. In the Austrian half the Ausgleich of 1867 brought no truce between the contending parties.

Those Germans who had hoped to secure for themselves in Cisleithania the dominating position that the Magyars held in Transleithania were soon undeceived. Emperor Francis Joseph gave them no support. On the contrary, he was on the point of going a step further in his policy of federalism and after being crowned king in Budapest having himself crowned king in Prague also. It is true the opposition of the Hungarians, who feared an attempt to turn the Dual Empire into a Triple one with a corresponding reduction of their influence, caused him to abandon this intention, — thereby furnishing the Czechs with a new grievance which they never forgot, — but he soon tired of the nationalistic German Liberal Party with which he had governed for a while. In 1879 he appointed prime minister the friend of his youth, Count Taaffe, who henceforth for many years steered the ship of state with the aid of fortuitous majorities composed of Czechs, Poles, Clericals, and whoever else might be won over to the support of a given measure. It was Taaffe himself who described this system as “fortwüirsteln” or muddling along. And with few exceptions his successors followed in his footsteps, some leaning more to the left, some more to the right, some giving the Germans a preponderance in their cabinets, some making greater concessions to the Czechs. When legislation became impossible, as it tended more and more to do, at least the running expenses of the Empire could be secured by the application of paragraph 14 of the Constitution which, with a view to such

contingencies, provided for an automatic continuation of the budget.

In the course of the long struggle, the Germans lost ground in every direction but they still held a privileged position and constituted the strongest single element when the fractions into which they were split up could be brought to act together. In Bohemia the Czechs had got the upper hand but, the conflict continued and the German minority finally refused to appear in the local Diet, following the example set them by the Czechs at an earlier date. The Poles had much reason to be content. They had obtained full control of affairs in Galicia, and by following what has been termed a policy of "pourboires," sometimes supporting the Germans and sometimes the Czechs, they were able in the Reichsrath to get pretty much what they wanted. They were menaced, however, by growing discontent of the Ruthenian population of Eastern Galicia, who had lately received encouragement from Vienna. The South Slavs, though oppressed in some places by the Germans, were favored in others as against the Italians. Here, as everywhere, the policy of the administration was a hand-to-mouth one of playing one nationality against another according to the circumstances of the moment.

But however skillfully each difficulty was turned or evaded, such a policy was suicidal in the long run. The government could not be carried on indefinitely by makeshifts even if the country was reasonably prosperous and the administration efficient in its way.

THE BREAK UP OF THE HAPSBURG EMPIRE

As the years passed away, constructive legislation became more and more difficult. Every new session of the parliament seemed more stormy and fruitless than the last. All parties were equally violent, all were dissatisfied with the present and apprehensive of the future. The ceaseless strife of nationalities interfered again and again with necessary legislation and with social and economic progress. For a moment men hoped that hatreds might diminish with the introduction of universal suffrage, but this hope soon proved futile. Even the socialists in parliament were divided into national groups. By 1914 every trick had in turn been tried and the failure of the whole system was patent to the world.

Hungary on her part inaugurated her new career with a liberal law of nationalities in 1868 and a special agreement giving autonomy to Croatia. They were largely due to the influence of Francis Deák, and we may believe that this most broad-minded of Hungarian statesmen sincerely intended them to be carried out in letter and spirit. Unfortunately the law of 1868 was not honestly carried out especially after the advent in 1875 of Koloman Tisza who, as prime minister, began a policy of Magyarization which was continued henceforth with ever-increasing intensity. The dominant Magyars, while striving to emancipate themselves more and more from the authority of the Emperor, their king, were determined to make their language and culture not only supreme but in the end exclusive throughout their kingdom — their “globus” or unified

Hungary. In course of time they made substantial progress in this direction if we may judge by the census reports according to which in 1850 the Magyars formed 46.65 per cent of the population of Hungary proper; in 1910 54.50 per cent. This is indeed not to be wondered at in view of the relentless system of official pressure on the minorities, as well as all the social and other advantages that went with membership in the ruling nationality. The Jews rallied to its side, as was natural enough; in fact, Jewish high finance and the Hungarian aristocracy hit it off so well together that there was a modicum of truth in the gibe about the city of "Judapest." Many of the Germans, too,—except in Transylvania,—became Magyarized without much resistance, and a certain number of the more refractory Slav and Rumanian elements were absorbed. We cannot, therefore, entirely reject the statement that if Hungary had not been overcome in a foreign war, Magyarization might ultimately have achieved its objects.

What is much more certain is that this policy, put through with brutal thoroughness, had provoked intense hatreds among the subject peoples. It had likewise injured the good repute of Hungary abroad and interfered with the foreign relations of the Empire, for it rendered real friendship impossible with Serbia and Rumania and increased the tension with Russia. It was also becoming harder and harder to carry out. One menacing question which the Magyar leaders vainly sought to elude was the necessity of broadening

the suffrage. The subject nationalities had never been adequately represented in the Diet; indeed the smallness of the number of members they were able to elect, compared with their proportion in the population, was a crying scandal. Hungary was ruled by the aristocracy, but even in Hungary modern democratic forces had been growing in strength and had begun to assert themselves. With the development of modern industry a new laboring class had come into existence and the peasant was more independent than of old. Ever since, in 1906, universal suffrage had been introduced in Austria its establishment in Hungary too appeared inevitable, but there was no doubt that this would mean a much larger representation in the Diet of the non-Magyar nationalities, a result most obnoxious to the ruling Magyars. Accordingly, while announcing their adherence to the democratic principle, they were anxious to hedge it about with such restrictions that it should not weaken their national supremacy. This was a difficult thing to compass and their hesitations and equivocations weakened all faith in the honesty of their intentions.

In autonomous Croatia, the situation was still worse. At first, things worked fairly smoothly. The aristocracy were mostly Magyars or Magyarized and the Governor, or Ban, was long able by an unscrupulous use of the executive power to maintain a fairly docile majority in the local Diet. But such an arrangement was too artificial to last indefinitely in a period of growing national antagonisms, and there was a funda-

mental discord as to the conceptions on which Croatian autonomy rested. From the Hungarian point of view, Croatia was merely a province of the kingdom with certain local privileges. From the Croatian, she was a state that had joined Hungary in a free union and was as entitled to determine her own destinies as was her larger sister. Any attempt to Magyarize the country — there were such and others were suspected — awoke fierce opposition, often taking the form of disorders which were severely repressed by the authorities. The situation was also affected by what was going on in the neighborhood, particularly by the oppression of the Slavs in Hungary proper and by the increasingly bad feeling between Serbia and the Dual Empire after the first years of the twentieth century. As the relations between Vienna and Budapest on the one side and Belgrade on the other grew worse and worse, those between Budapest and Agram suffered correspondingly. Above all, the growth of the Jugo-Slav movement, the ideal of a union of South Slavs of which Serbia was the foremost exponent, expanded Croatian sentiment from anti-Magyar into anti-Hapsburg and anti-Austro-Hungarian. Matters reached such a pass that by the spring of 1914 Croatia was being held down with a hand of iron by a virtual dictatorship. The people were filled with fierce hate of the Magyars and many of them had become eager for an end to Hapsburg rule and for a union with their brother Slavs of the south in a new state.

To sum up: in both Austria and Hungary, after an

experience of nearly half a century with the Ausgleich, the outlook had never been more unpromising than it was when the murder of Serajevo took place. Everyone expected trouble as soon as the old Emperor should disappear from the scene, and the character of the heir apparent did not augur well for peace or a wise handling of fundamental problems. The exasperation between the different peoples had reached a pitch that endangered the very existence of the state. Even a great official and aristocrat like Count Czernin—writing, it is true, after the event—declares that the Empire was doomed. We can understand the temptation to a reckless statesman to try to find a way out by risking everything on one great throw of the dice.

As soon as the World War broke out, the imperial government assumed absolute authority in both Austria and Hungary. It realized well enough that the conflict was intensely unpopular with certain nationalities, but besides possessing efficient police, it controlled the army, the press, the post-office, the telegraphs and telephones. When necessary it acted with ruthless energy and it was able to prevent any open resistance or dangerous conspiracies. What is more, it got some fighting out of even its most unwilling soldiers by such measures as brigading Czechs with Magyars and Germans, and by using South Slavs against the Italians whose national aspirations conflicted with their own. For a while the Dual Empire held together better than might have been expected, but as the war continued with ever greater suffering and comparatively little

glory, the longing grew for any tolerable peace, whether it was approved or not by Germany to whose ambitions many Austrians believed they were being sacrificed. The death of Francis Joseph still further weakened the cohesion of the peoples of his dominions. Although his popularity had been much exaggerated in the past, personal loyalty to him had been an element of strength in his government and in his armies; he had been an emblem of the former glories of his house, a standard about whom all might rally. His successor, young, inexperienced, well-meaning but easily influenced and, it is said, preferring mediocrity in those about him, was not the man to save a situation which was in truth getting past saving. The new Emperor's attempt at conciliation by releasing political prisoners and calling together the Austrian parliament for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities merely gave the representatives of the discontented nationalities a chance to air their grievances and to organize for future action.

In Hungary as usual there was more consistent determination than in Austria. It was not necessary to close the parliament, for the Magyars were wholehearted in their support of the government in a war which affected not only their supremacy but the very existence of their historic state. But they too suffered from the losses and hardships of these terrible years, and murmured against their leaders and their allies, and were filled with a mighty yearning for peace.

By the middle of 1918 everyone in the Dual Empire,

high and low, realized that things could not go on much longer in this way. The defeat on the Piave shook the last hope of victory. Peace must be obtained at almost any price, and some radical change must be made or the Empire was lost. One plan followed another while the strife of parties waxed fiercer than ever. The game of centralization and the supremacy of a single nationality was obviously played out. At the eleventh hour a desperate attempt was made to rally whatever loyal elements were left in support of a new federal constitution where all should stand upon an equal footing. But such a revolutionary change, complicated and difficult to carry out in the best of times, was impossible to rush through in a state and a society which were plunging headlong into ruin. Even at that desperate moment Hungary refused to admit the possibility of a surrender of Croatia which would mean her own exclusion from the sea. And presently the collapse of Bulgaria and the resumption of arms by the Rumanians left her exposed on the south and the east to attacks she no longer had the means to meet.

When finally the grand crash came with the Italian offensive in the end of October, the proud empire of the Hapsburgs literally went to pieces. The last great battle hardly deserved the name. The Hungarians withdrew from the conflict the day before the Austrians and the two peoples severed their connection with each other. The disbanded soldiers everywhere made their way home as best they could, some without, some with their arms. In each center of national-

ity a new government sprang up in a night, headed by the men who under the old system had been most prominent in the opposition. Their first effort was to rally the support of the people they represented and to reëstablish some sort of administration and order in everyday life. Their second and almost simultaneous one was to try to extend the boundaries of their dominion to the limits of their widest claims, knowing that in the future settlement of disputed territories, possession might well be nine points of the law. By the terms of the armistice that ensued, Austria and Hungary were forced to disband most of their troops but no such restriction applied to Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Jugo-Slavs, and Rumans. All of these accordingly pushed forward as speedily as possible, seizing what they wanted regardless of Austrian and Hungarian protests and restrained only when their respective claims came, as they soon did, into collision with one another.

This was the state of affairs when the representatives of the Allies and the Associated Powers met together in Paris to discuss the future of Europe and of the world. In place of the old Dual Empire, there were now only a separate diminutive Austria and a diminutive Hungary, disarmed, helpless and piteously appealing for the expected benefits of the Fourteen Points. About them were a circle of peoples inflamed by memories of past injuries and full of eager ambitions for the future. A whole new series of administrations and frontiers had sprung into existence, suddenly setting up

barriers between those who the day before had been members of the same community, interrupting trade, and for a time almost cutting off communication. There was a wild confusion of conflicting claims supported by violence on the spot and by argument and intrigue in Paris. The Czechs had their controversies with the Austrians, Hungarians, and Poles; the Poles, besides their difficulties with the Czechs and Germans, were soon involved in savage hostilities with the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. The Rumanians occupied the Bukowina, where they fell foul of the Ukrainians, and they also overran Transylvania and much of eastern Hungary, which they had been given to expect would ultimately be assigned to them but which was quite beyond the limits of the line of occupation agreed upon in the armistice under which the Hungarians had laid down their arms. As for the Jugo-Slavs, they had a disputed claim at every point of the compass.

With this situation the Peace Conference in Paris had to deal. In order to understand the decisions reached, we must keep certain facts clearly in mind. To begin with, the Conference did not have Austria-Hungary to divide up or not as it chose. Austria-Hungary was already divided up and could not be reunited by any power at the disposal of the Allies. To maintain even a commercial union between these fragments would have required not merely a theoretically supreme authority, but elaborate machinery and troops on the spot to carry out its decrees. What the

Conference had to do, and it was no simple task, was to determine the best and fairest boundaries it could assign to these divisions and to try to apportion the gains, as well as the pains and penalties, in some sort of an equitable manner. In the second place, however honestly desirous the arbitrators at Paris might be to follow the principles of abstract justice, certain plain truths could not be ignored. The Poles, Czechs, Rumans, and Serbs were all of them friends and allies and had been officially recognized as such. They had suffered much and they had many claims to consideration and sympathy. Their demands might often be extravagant, and there was an element of oriental bargaining in the way they put them forth, but in the main they believed sincerely that these were no more than their due. That they, after all their sufferings and achievements, real or imaginary, should in the hour of victory be put on the same level as the common enemies, with whom the Allies had been fighting for years, seemed to them not justice but cruel ingratitude. In point of fact they were not and could not be put on the same level. When the Austrian peace delegates arrived at Saint Germain and took the ground that their state, which they called German Austria, was not the successor but a fragment of the former Austrian empire and not more accountable for its misdeeds or for its liabilities than were any of the other fragments, the Peace Conference declined to accept this view. It persisted in speaking of "Austria" and not "German Austria," and in regarding her and Hungary as the

sole offspring and continuation of the Dual Empire and therefore responsible for the war. The new states also enjoyed the great advantage of having representatives in Paris, who could urge the arguments in their favor and by skillful importunity might obtain concessions at the expense of distant foes who had no one to state their side of the case. This lack of opportunity to make themselves heard until it was too late was bitterly felt by both the Austrians and Hungarians as was natural enough, although they exaggerated its influence on the decisions that were reached.

Another thing to remember is that it was not merely difficult to decide with fairness to all parties, but absolutely impossible to satisfy all "rights." No one but a person ignorant of the conditions could conceive of a regenerated eastern Europe where every nationality should get what had been its historical frontiers and also its ethnographical limits and also the geographical boundaries to which it seemed entitled by nature and also the resources requisite for an independent economic existence. These various desirable things unfortunately did not coincide and could not be made to do so. Each nationality could obtain all of its "rights" only by wrongs to others. The question of which "right" ought to prevail in a given instance was often many sided and arduous and open to honest differences of opinion, not only between the parties directly interested, but also among the most unbiased judges. Inevitably there was a certain amount of compromise and even mere luck in the outcome.

The greater or less recognition of different principles, sound in themselves but of variable weight according to circumstances, led to certain contrasts, not to say inconsistencies, in the ultimate decisions. The most conspicuous instance of this was in the assignment of territory to the new state of Czechoslovakia. For its Austrian half, the Czechs based their claims primarily on the fact that the kingdom of Bohemia had natural geographic frontiers which coincided in the main with the long-established historic ones and that Bohemia had had an individuality and national consciousness reaching back for many centuries. These claims were granted in their entirety by the Conference without hesitation, despite the other fact that Bohemia contained a large German minority who did not wish to belong to Czechoslovakia but to German Austria. Their preferences, however, and their appeal to the principle of self-determination, were disregarded. But when it came to the boundaries of Slovakia, at the expense of Hungary, a totally different principle was followed. The unity of Hungary was as geographically well marked and as long established by history as that of Bohemia. Czech demands here had to be based upon other grounds, namely nationality and self-determination. The Slovaks, speaking a language closely akin to that of the Czechs, were deemed to be ardently desirous of reunion with their brethren, and even the Ruthenians of Northern Hungary expressed through the mouths of supposedly representative spokesmen a wish to be included. To all this the Con-

ference assented, even though Czechs and Slovaks had for long ages been separated, and the laws of geography point emphatically to a connection between Slovakia and, still more, Ruthenia with Hungary rather than with Bohemia. What was sauce for the Bohemian goose was not sauce for the Hungarian gander. In making the above decisions, the Supreme Council was actuated by weighty considerations, and though some of the details might well have been and should have been changed, any other solution of the principal questions, would have been difficult to reach. Nevertheless, the result is hard to defend from the standpoint of consistency.

One of the main accusations that has been brought against the provisions of the peaces of Saint Germain and Neuilly is that they were made in flagrant disregard of economic necessities, violently disrupting territories that naturally belonged together, destroying long-established business connections and bringing widespread ruin. This may be admitted to a certain extent, but it is a question what else could have been done under the circumstances. The empire of the Hapsburgs had, in the course of the ages, acquired a satisfactory economic unity, each region, whether of forest, of mines, of pasturage or of agricultural land, playing the part indicated by nature and by its history, and each supplementing and depending upon the others. The great cities of Vienna and Budapest filled the rôles of modern metropolises as centers of government, finance, industry, exchange and social life. It

was practically impossible to carve up such a territory without economic revolutions and consequent suffering of the most grievous sort. If sufficient warning had been given, if, let us say, people had had some years' notice before final separation, many adjustments might have been worked out in the meanwhile, though even then the wrench would have been severe. But this ancient dominion suddenly split into pieces and the populations of the different fragments were, with the exception of the German Austrians and Magyars, determined to make a clean sweep of the past and to build up a new national future, regardless of everything but their own desires. It has often been suggested that the economic unity of the Dual Empire should have been preserved while the political bonds between the different peoples were severed. But such a suggestion pays no heed to patent facts. Independent states have never been able to enter into and remain in an economic union with one another without elaborate arrangements and mutual concessions on many points; indeed there are but few examples of such a thing having been done at all; the practical difficulties in the way of agreement have been too great. The territories that had formed parts of Austria-Hungary were as far as possible from being in a position to work out a new economic or even tariff union on the spur of the moment. They could not after their violent political separation continue their old economic unity without some central controlling power which under the circumstances was inconceivable, either from

within or from without. Besides this, several of them were now united to territories from outside larger than their own previous selves and with interests lying in other directions. A Danube Federation, or a tariff union of the smaller states of eastern and southeastern Europe may well be desirable and may eventuate in the future, but it will not come in a day and there will be many obstacles to surmount before it is a reality. In 1919 each of the victorious nationalities was bent on going its own way. Economic principles, however wise theoretically, had to be and were sacrificed, but the result has been widespread ruin and great suffering.

The principle which for better or for worse did triumph in the break up of Austria-Hungary, was that of nationality. In the eyes of the Peace Congress which regulated its limits, it corresponded with self-determination, one of the cardinal points in the new political creed of the world. In its application there were, as we know, glaring inconsistencies and exceptions in detail which we may justly criticize and there was not the same measure for all. German Austria and Hungary were cut down to the bone. Elsewhere there are minorities, in some cases considerable ones, who would have preferred a different political affiliation and who regard themselves as being under foreign rule. Nevertheless, the new states are all of them national and democratic ones based on the will of a majority of the population. Their paths are beset with difficulties and dangers and they have yet to show what use they can make of their suddenly found liberties; but the peoples

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

that compose them are for the first time in a position to shape their own destinies, to develop in their own way the fruits of their national culture. The empire of the Hapsburgs is gone for ever. For centuries it played its part, not without glory, as one of the powers of Europe and of the civilized world. But the ideas on which it was based had outlived their time. It may have been capable of transformation and of new life — who can say. But no saving transformation took place. It has, therefore, fallen and great has been the fall of it.

INDEX

INDEX

- A, B, C, powers, the, 98.
 Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 37.
 Adams, John Quincy, 79.
 Afghanistan, 5, 24.
 Africa, Ethiopic movement in, 200.
 And *see* North Africa, South Africa.
 Africa Minor. *See* North Africa.
 Alabama claims, the, 13, 14.
 Alexander I, Tsar, 247.
 Algeria, 193, 201, 203, 206, 207, 208,
 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219.
 Allies, the claims of, against Russia, 13,
 14; debts, 68 ff., 122 ff., 141, 143,
 152. And *see* Reparations.
 Alsace-Lorraine, 171, 225, 226.
 "America for Americans," 85, 86.
 American Relief Association, 18, 28,
 61, 62.
 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 145.
 Arabic language, the, 129, 206.
 Arabs, in North Africa, 206.
 Argentina, 94.
 Armaments, reduction of. *See* Wash-
 ington Conference.
 Asia, and the Monroe Doctrine, 87, 88.
 Augustine, Saint, 205.
 Ausgleich, the (1867), 250.
 Ausonius, 205n.
 Australia, Chinese excluded from, 137.
 Austria, 17, 21, 64, 115, 174-176, 242,
 243. And *see* Austrian Empire, Ger-
 man Austria.
 Austria-Hungary, formation of, 1867,
 250.
 Austrian Empire, dissolution of, 114,
 115, 258 ff.; beginnings and history
 of, 242 ff.; in the World War, 257,
 258.
 Austro-German treaty of 1879, 107.
 Backward peoples, effect of the war on,
 126, 127.
 Baldwin, Stanley, 70, 72, 121, 123, 124.
 Balfour, Arthur J., Earl, 68, 122.
 Baltic States, 31, 148, 183.
 Bela Kuhn, 7.
 Belgium, 115, 167, 174, 175, 176.
 Belgrade, 245.
 Berbers, the, 130, 205, 206.
 Berlin, Congress of, 250.
 Bessarabia, 32, 121.
 Beust, Count F. F. von, 250.
 Bingham, Hiram, 78 n.
 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 167, 215.
 Blaine, James G., 96.
 Boers, the, 131.
 Bohemia, 174, 242, 243, 265.
 Bok Peace Plan, 155.
 Bolivar, Simon, 96.
 Bolivia, 102.
 Borah, William E., 67, 73, 143.
 Boston *Transcript*, 18.
 Boyden, Roland W., 74.
 Brazil, 94.
 Briand, Aristide, 121.
 British Commonwealth of Nations,
 130-132.
 British Empire, 184, 188, 193, 194, 197,
 198, 199. And *see* Great Britain.
 Budapest, 265.
 Bulgaria, 160.
 Bullitt Mission, the, 17, 59, 60.
 Canada, and the Monroe Doctrine, 80,
 85; and Pan Americanism, 192, 193,
 195, 196, 197; 91, 131.
 Canning, George, 80.
 Carthage, 204, 205 and n.
 Catherine of Braganza, 211.

INDEX

- Caucasus, the, 5.
 Central America, 50.
 Charles V, Emperor, 209, 243.
 Charles VI, Emperor, 245.
 Charles X of France, 213.
 Cheka, the, abolished, 21.
 Chicherin, G. V., 4, 17, 20, 21, 29, 58, 63.
 Chile, 50, 58, 102.
 China, 36, 49, 53, 55, 88, 128, 145, 146, 161, 199.
 Clemenceau, Georges, 112.
 Clergy, Russian, treatment of, 29.
 Cleveland, Grover, 81, 97.
 Columbia, 48, 49.
 Committee of Thirty-One, 44, 45, 72, 154, 155.
 Communists, Russian, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 18, 33, 135.
 Communists in other countries, 134.
 "Consent of the Governed," 222, 223.
 Constantinople, 35, 205n.
 Coolidge, Calvin, 140, 142, 143, 145, 155, 158.
 Costa Rica, 50, 102.
 Counter-revolution, in Russia, possibility of, 38.
 Croatia, 253, 255, 256, 259.
 Croats, 249.
 Cuba, 50, 193.
 Cultural ties between nations, 181, 182.
 Curzon, George N., Lord, 121, 128.
 Czechoslovakia, 28, 174, 264.
 Czechs, 249, 251, 252, 257, 260, 261, 262, 264, 265.
 Czernin, Count, 257.
 Danzig, 171.
 Danzig Corridor, the, 117.
 Dardanelles, the, 35.
 Dawes, Charles G., 152.
 Dawes Report and Plan, 122, 156, 162, 163, 169.
 Deák, Francis, 253.
 Delcassé, Théophile, 216, 217.
 Democrats of United States, 141, 144, 155.
 Egypt, 215, 216.
 Emanuel of Portugal, 208.
 England. *See* Great Britain.
 Esthonia, 20, 22, 29.
 Ethnographical statistics, unreliability of, 226, 227.
 Europe, and the United States, 65, 66, 151 ff.; possible coalition in, against Monroe Doctrine, 89, 90; rehabilitation of, 152, 153; changes in political geography of, since the war, 182 ff.; what is it? 185, 186; thoughts on reconstruction of (1915), 221 ff. And *see* Pan Europe.
 Exmouth, Lord, 211.
 Far East, the, 144 ff., 184.
 Far Eastern question, 53 ff.
 Far Eastern Republic, 35, 36, 58.
 Fascismo, 124.
 Ferdinand I, Emperor, 243, 245.
 Ferdinand II, Emperor, 245.
 Fez, University of, 206.
 Finland, 29, 30, 148.
 Fletcher, Henry P., 99.
 France, relations of, with Russia, 33; and the Washington Conference, 55 ff.; intervention of, in Mexico, 92, 93; colonial possessions of, 116, 129, 130; estrangement between, and Great Britain, 119 ff.; conquests of, in North Africa, 206, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220; mentioned, 7, 14, 25, 26, 32, 68, 69, 76, 115, 116, 148, 153, 161, 162, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 181.
 Francis II, Emperor, 246, 247.
 Francis Joseph, Emperor, 250, 251, 257, 258.
 Franco-German War, 167.
 Franz-Ferdinand, Archduke, 234.
 Frederick II (the Great), 246.
 Frederick III, Emperor, 242, 243.
 Galicia, 121, 252.
 Genoa, Conference at (1922), 23 ff., 121.

INDEX

- Geographic and economic motives of nation-groupings, 182 ff.
- Geography, and the Monroe Doctrine, 81, 82.
- German Austria, 174, 175, 262, 264, 267.
- Germans, in Austria, 250, 251, 252; in Hungary, 254.
- Germany, treaty of United States with, 64; and reparations, 68, 69, 118, 119; not invited to Peace Conference, 110, 111; post-war dissatisfaction of, 161 ff.; her responsibility for the war, 166, 167; her special grievances, 168; possible union of, with German Austria, 174-176; mentioned, 7, 25, 26, 28, 34, 165, 177, 214, 215, 217, 218.
- Gibraltar, 211.
- Gilbert, Seymour P., 152.
- Gorki, Maxime, 18, 61.
- Great Britain, and France, estrangement between, 119 ff.; and the Allied debts, 123, 124, 141 ff.; post-war problems of, 130-132; her outlying dominions, and Pan Europe, 186, 187; mentioned, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27, 33, 34, 54, 55, 68, 69, 71, 72, 89, 115, 151, 153, 173, 175, 176, 181, 185 ff., 192, 194, 195, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216.
- Hague, The, Conference at (1922), 27, 28.
- Hapsburgs, the, 241, 243, 244, 248.
- Hapsburgs, Empire of the. *See* Austrian Empire.
- Harding, Warren G., 17, 40, 42, 43, 50, 69, 73, 75, 79, 136, 158.
- Harding Administration, the, foreign policy of, 40-77.
- Harvey, George, 45.
- Hay, John, 47.
- Hayti, 150.
- Herodotus, 205n.
- Herriot, M., 56.
- Holland, East Indian possessions of, 128, 129.
- Holt, Hamilton, 46.
- Holy Alliance, the, 79, 95.
- Hoover, Herbert, 18, 43, 61, 70.
- Hughes, Charles E., Secretary of State, 17, 22, 35, 40-77, 79, 87, 88, 91, 99, 142, 143, 145, 152.
- Hungary, 7, 64, 114, 115, 160, 242, 243, 244, 253 ff., 258, 259, 260, 264, 265, 267.
- Imperial conference (British), 197.
- Imperial preference, 196.
- India, British, probable future of, 131, 132, 199.
- Indo-China, 129, 199.
- Internationalism, Soviet foreign policy based on, 35.
- Ireland, 131, 193.
- Isabella I of Spain, 208, 209.
- Italians, in Austria, 249, 252.
- Italy and the South Tyrol, 170; in North Africa, 214, 215, 218; mentioned, 7, 25, 69, 124.
- Japan, relations with United States, 53, 54, 55; and the immigration question, 133, 137, 145, 156, 157; mentioned, 5, 35, 47, 49, 87, 88, 90, 146, 149, 199.
- Jews, in Hungary, 254.
- John, Don, of Austria, 209.
- John II, of Portugal, 208.
- Joseph, Emperor, 246, 248.
- Jugo-Slav movement, 256.
- Jugo-Slavs, 260, 261.
- Karl, Emperor of Austria, 257, 258.
- Kitchener, Herbert H., Earl, 109.
- Language, and Nationality, 91, 227 ff.
- Lansing-Ishii agreement, 53.
- Latin America, and the League of Nations, 47; relations of, with the United States, 48 ff., 150, 151; and the Monroe Doctrine, 80 ff., 90 ff.; 191, 192.

INDEX

Latvia, 21, 29.
 Lausanne, Conference at, 74; treaty of, 144.
 Law, A. Bonar, 121.
 League of Nations, attitude of Russia and the United States toward, 17, 18, 44 ff., 54 ff.; the Protocol, 156, 157, 158; and the Monroe Doctrine, 100 ff.; mentioned, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 76, 77, 79, 125, 126, 141, 148, 162, 164, 184, 188, 192, 194, 195.
 Lenin, Vladimir I. U., 9, 21, 22, 23, 29, 38, 39, 59, 134.
 Lithuania, 31, 117.
 Little Entente, the, 121, 183.
 Lloyd-George, David, 15, 26, 112, 118, 121, 122.
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 42, 48, 73, 143.
 Lombardy, 249.
 London, Treaty of, 113.
 London *Times*, 140.
 Louis II, of Bohemia and Hungary, 242, 243.
 Louis XIV, 211.
 Louis Philippe, 213.

Macdonald, J. Ramsay, 122, 156.
 Magyars, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 266.
 Manchurian railway, 36.
 Maria Theresa, Empress, 246.
 Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 93.
 Mehemet Ali, 213.
 Mellon, Andrew, 70.
 Metternich, Prince von, 247.
 Mexican War, 93.
 Mexico, and the United States, 51 ff., 149, 150; French intervention in, 92, 93; mentioned, 47, 98.
 Monroe, James, 79, 81, 84, 96.
 Monroe Doctrine, future of, discussed, 78 ff.; mentioned, 47, 48, 115, 140, 150, 191.
 "Monroeism" and Pan Americans, 96, 100.
 Moore, John Bassett, 45.
 Morgan, J. P., 65.

Morocco, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217.
 Mussolini, Benito, 124, 125.

Napoleon III, 213, 214.
 National sovereignty, 169.
 Nationalism, 90, 91.
 Nationalities and the reconstruction of Europe, 223 ff., 230, 231; possible fate of smaller ones after the war, 232 ff.
 Nationality, bases of, 224 ff.
 Nations, satisfied and dissatisfied, after the war, 159 ff.; bases of groupings of, 181 ff.
 Neuilly, Treaty of, 265.
 "New World, the," 85.
 Nicaragua, 50.
 Nicholas II, Tsar, 59.
 "Nordic races," 182.
 North Africa, French possessions in, 129, 130; geographical, ethnographical, historical, and structural, 201 ff.; present conditions in 219 and n.

Obregon, President of Mexico, 51, 52.
 Oil properties in Russia, 27.
 Olney, Richard, 95, 97.
 Open Door, the, 140.
 Oran, 210, 211.

Palacky, F., 242.
 Pan-American Bureau, 97.
 Pan-American Congress, first, 97.
 Pan-American Scientific Congress, 85.
 Pan Americanism, 48, 49, 96, 97, 98, 99, 184, 190 ff.
 Pan Asia, 199, 200.
 Pan Europe, 183 ff., 187, 188.
 Pan Islamism, 181.
 Pan-Mongolian Federation, 200.
 Pan Teutonism, 182.
 Panama, 48, 50, 102.
 Paris, Peace Conference at, 110 ff., 118, 125, 260, 261 ff., 267.
 Parma, Duke of, 209.

INDEX

- Peasantry, Russian, 6, 8, 9, 10.
 Pechenga, district of, 30.
 Perkins, Thomas N., 152.
 Pershing, John J., 52.
 Persia, 5.
 Peru, 50, 102, 160.
 Philip II, 209.
 Philippines, the, 88, 132.
 Phœnicians, the, 204.
 Poincaré, Raymond, 57, 121, 122, 167.
 Poland, 5, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35,
 114, 116, 117, 148, 164, 172, 173,
 174, 175, 245, 246, 247.
 Poles, 252, 260, 261, 262.
 Polish Succession, War of, 245.
 Political parties, and the Election of,
 1924, 140, 141.
 Porto Rico, 132.
 Portuguese, in North Africa, 208, 209.
 Prague, Treaty of, 235.
Pravda, the, 18.
 Presidential election of 1924, 140 ff.
 Private property, weakened faith in
 sanctity of, 137, 138.
 Progressive Party, the, 141.
 Prussia, 246.
 Race maps, 223, 224.
 Race question in the United States,
 132, 133.
 Rapallo, Treaty of, 25, 26, 34.
 Refunding bill, the, 69, 70, 72.
 Regionalism, 183.
 Reparations, question of, 67, 68, 69,
 73, 118 ff., 152, 153, 168, 169.
 Reparations Commission, 65.
 Republican Party and the election of
 1924, 141 ff.; and the League of Na-
 tions, 153 ff.
 Republics, new, in Europe, 84.
 Rif, the, 202, 203.
 Roosevelt, T., 49, 83.
 Root, Elihu, 45, 80.
 Ruhr, the, occupation of, 73, 96, 121,
 122, 162, 169.
 Rumania, 5, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 114,
 117, 148, 254.
 Rumans, 249, 260, 261, 262.
 Russia, pre-war debts of, 14, 15; 254.
 And *see* Soviet Republic.
 Russian Revolution, the, 134.
 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
 Republic. *See* Soviet Republic.
 Ruthenians, 252, 260, 264.
 Saar region, the, 169, 170.
 Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 265.
 Sakhalin, Northern, 35.
 Salisbury, Marquess of, 80.
 Samarkand, University of, 206.
 San Domingo, 50.
 Santiago Congress, 99, 100, 103, 150.
 Sebastian of Portugal, 208.
 Self-determination, doctrine of, 113.
 Senate of the United States, 41, 42, 69,
 70, 86, 143.
 Serajevo, the murder at, 257.
 Serbia, 107, 254, 256.
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 120.
 Seward, William H., 93.
 Shantung, 53, 55.
 Shell Company, and its oil concession,
 27.
 Siberia, 35, 59; Eastern, 55.
 Silesia, 117, 172, 173, 246.
 Slovaks, 249, 264, 265.
 Social revolutionists, 29.
 South Africa, 131, 199.
 South Slavs, 252, 257.
 Soviet Congress, Ninth, 21.
 Soviet Republic, situation and pros-
 pects of in 1922, 3 ff.; change of
 economic system, and its result, 10,
 11, 20, 135; need of foreign capital,
 11, 12; claims of foreign states, and
 counter-claims, 12 ff.; attitude of
 various states toward, 15 ff., 31 ff.,
 36 ff., 59 ff.; 147, 148; improved in-
 ternational position of, 20; and the
 Genoa Conference, 23, 28, 29; wins
 de facto recognition of Europe, 24;
 and the Hague Conference, 27, 28;
 and the "self-denying ordinance"
 of the powers, 28; treaty with
 Czechoslovakia, 28; changing ex-
 ternal relations of, 29 ff.; foreign

INDEX

- policy of, 35; possibilities of the future, 38, 39; status of, in 1924, 134, 135; in the Pacific, 145; in Mexico, 149; mentioned, 141, 159, 161, 174, 184, 185, 186.
- Spaniards in North Africa, 208, 209, 210, 216, 217.
- Spanish Succession, War of, 245.
- Spartacus movement, the, 7.
- Submarine warfare, German, 109.
- Suez Canal, 212.
- Switzerland, 114, 174 n.
- Taaffe, Count E. von, 251.
- Talleyrand, Clemens W., de, 111.
- Tchitcherin. *See* Chicherin.
- Territorial limits, question of, 169, 170, 171 ff.
- Tiszà, Koloman, 253.
- Tlemçen (Africa), 208.
- "Trialism," 234.
- Tripoli, 201, 203, 207, 216, 218.
- Trotsky, Leon D. B., 21, 34, 38, 39.
- Tunis, 201, 203, 208, 214, 215, 219.
- Turkey, 5, 25, 35, 144, 148, 181, 185.
- Turks, 245.
- Ukrainia, 117.
- Ukrainians, 261.
- Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the, 134. *And see* Soviet Republic.
- United States, attitude of, toward Russia, 16, 17, 59 ff., and generally, 36 ff.; declines to take part in conferences at Genoa, 22, and The Hague, 27; position of, in 1921, 41; foreign policy of, under Harding, 43 ff.; and the League of Nations, 44 ff., 154 ff.; relations with Latin America, 48 ff., 150, 151, and with Japan, 53-55; question of recognition of Soviet Government, 62-64; treaties with Germany, etc., 64; effect on Europe, of aloofness of, 65, 66; changing opinion in, concerning our interest in affairs of Europe, 66-68; and the debts of the Allies, 69 ff., 123, 124; charged with hypocrisy, 94; one-sided interpretation in, of Monroe Doctrine, 98-100; commanding position of, 135, 136; mentioned, 7, 14. *And see* Versailles-Washington Conference.
- Venezuelan boundary dispute, 81, 97.
- Venice, 246, 249.
- Versailles, Treaty of, 26, 41, 64, 65, 78, 86, 113, 117, 120, 141, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170.
- Vienna, 265.
- Vienna, Congress of, 185.
- Vorarlberg, province of, 174 n.
- War of 1859, 249.
- War of 1866, 249.
- Washington Conference for reduction of armaments, 35, 54 ff., 71, 74, 89, 103, 136, 145, 148.
- White, Henry, 113.
- White Russia, 117.
- William II, 111.
- Wilson, Woodrow, 42, 43, 48, 52, 59, 86, 98, 99, 100, 101, 109, 112, 113, 114, 124, 141.
- World Court, the, 75, 76, 77, 141, 154, 157, 158.
- World War, the, causes, progress, and results of, 106 ff.; Germany denies responsibility for, 111; aftermath of, 139.
- Ximenes de Cisneros, Cardinal, 208.
- Zaffarin Islands, 216.
- Zapolya, John, claimant to throne of Hungary, 243.
- Zimmerman note, 93, 94.
- Zinoviev, M., 39.
- Zollverein, the, 190.

